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Abstract 
 
This thesis seeks to understand the process of ICT policy development in Indonesia 
post-enactment of the Law of Electronic Transaction and Information (ITE). It uses 
Indonesia’s major ICT policy, ITE as a case study and works with three CSOs, 
ICTWatch, Satudunia, and Medialink. Giddens’ theory of structuration acts as the 
theoretical framework for this thesis to analyse the role that the interactions, 
discussions and exchanges between the government (the Ministry of Communication 
and Information), three specific CSOs (Medialink, ICTwatch and Satudunia) and big 
business (PT Telkom and PT Indosat) play in the process of ICT Policy formation. In 
doing so the thesis will follow the trajectory from when the policy was enacted during 
President Yudhoyono’s term and the issues that have led to its revision under President 
Widodo’s administration. 
ITE emerged in 2008 in response to fill the gap in ICT and Internet regulations and 
governance as the extant Law of Telecommunication (1999) was not equal to the task 
due to its narrow focus on infrastructure. However, ITE was poorly received by 
Indonesian people, calling into question the level of broader public priorities and 
participation in its formation and implementation. 
This study found there are at least three important aspects to consider in working 
towards improvements in ICT policy formation process in Indonesia: To increase the 
involvement of multi-stakeholders within policy making process; the nature of policy 
making process itself which includes layers of governance and lines of authoritative 
bodies in Indonesian system of government; and the major challenges of Internet 
infrastructure, access and the level of digital media literacy among Indonesians. 
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Introduction 
Information and communications are central to human life and social development. 
Sharing information and knowledge through printed and electronic communications 
channels is something that people commonly do. This practice allows individuals and 
communities to learn to improve their capacity to work together and to contribute more 
to society as a whole. The developments in information and communications 
technology, particularly the Internet, have made possible major changes in our 
capacity to communicate and share information.  
These changes provide various ways for effective communication, but their 
availability and accessibility to citizens and communities depends on decisions made 
by many other people in government, business and civil society - decisions that often 
seem obscure, technical or specialised but which have profound implications for the 
future of society. To be involved in the Information and Communication Technology 
(ICT) policy-making process should be a priority for most people given that new 
communications media are becoming so prevalent and the way ICTs develop will have 
an enormous impact on the possibilities of working for social justice and sustainable 
development. An active part in ICT policy-making is essential if we want to have a 
voice in how our societies develop and how the future unfolds. 
ICT is a generic term used to express the convergence of information technology, 
broadcasting and communications. One prominent example is the Internet. According 
to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the 
definition of ICT is “the means of generating, processing, transporting and presenting 
information”. It is an information-handling tool or rather a variety of goods, 
applications, programs, and services that are used to store, transmit, produce, process, 
distribute and change information (2002, p. 243). Policy is defined by the Oxford 
English Dictionary as “A course of action, adopted and pursued by a government, 
party, ruler, statesman, etc.; any course of action adopted as advantageous or 
expedient” (Trist & Murray, 2016, p. 491). This definition suggests that policy is the 
realm of those in power such as governments or official institutions. However, in a 
general sense, it could include the vision, goals, principles and plans that guide the 
activities of many different actors.  
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ICT policy generally addresses three main areas: telecommunications (especially 
telephone communications), broadcasting (radio and TV) and the Internet, with a view 
to stimulating private sector growth and creating job opportunities. A research study 
has found that for every 10 percent increase in broadband penetration, the positive 
impact on GDP growth is 1.21 to 1.38 percent (Trends in Telecommunication Reform 
2010–2011: Enabling Tomorrow’s Digital World, 2011). A healthy and vibrant ICT 
sector may also contribute to more equitable social development and an efficient public 
sector by building human capacity and creating conditions for the development of 
relevant ICT applications and content (The IT-BPM Sector in India: Strategic Review 
2014, 2014). ICT policies and strategies also include almost all areas of activity that 
impact quality of life such as health, education, agriculture and culture. They can be 
integrated into sectoral as well as broad national policies and strategies.  
The thesis will look at the Indonesian internet policy development landscape with a 
focus on the process of the development and implementation of the Law of Information 
and Electronic Transaction (ITE). In this thesis I will discuss the process that led to 
the formation of ITE, starting with its initial draft in 2003 and enactment in 2008 to its 
revision in 2016. The aim is to understand the complexity of ITE development process 
to illustrate the response of the Indonesian government towards the Internet. By 
working with three Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) chosen and Giddens’ 
structuration theory, this thesis aims to obtain a comprehensive analysis on ITE 
formation, implementation and review process in Indonesia and to highlight strengths 
and weaknesses evident in its process. The thesis is important in contributing 
suggestions on how the process could be improved by improving the level of broader 
public priorities and participation in ITE formation and implementation. 
ICT has been used as a supporting tool to do work faster and easier and as an important 
means in distance communication between people in different regions. As the numbers 
of Indonesian Internet users have been increasing since the end of Reformasi years 
(1998-2000), to approximately 143.26 million users in 2017 which is a half percent of 
Indonesia’s total population (262 million people), there have been some shifts in the 
types of Internet use by Indonesian people. According to a research study conducted 
by the Association of Indonesia Internet Service Provider (Asosiasi Penyedia Jasa 
Internet Indonesia, 2017) and Teknopreneur.com in 2017, Indonesians used the 
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Internet mostly for socialising through social media and economic activities such as 
searching for products’ price and online purchasing. This is due to the increase of 
availability of social media, microblogging and instant messaging applications. Trends 
in e-commerce also increased and placed women as the most active actors in this 
practice. 12.82% of women in Indonesia received or placed orders of goods/services 
compared with 10.06% of men. Female e-commerce users in DKI Jakarta, Kalimantan 
Timur, and Kalimantan Utara numbered more than 20% (Hasyyati, 2017:7). In 
addition, 49.52 percent of the total Internet users in 2017 were people aged 19-34 years 
old in urban areas in Java island and they accessed the Internet mostly using 
smartphones (Asosiasi Penyedia Jasa Internet Indonesia, 2017) This research showed 
that most Indonesian relied on smartphones for Internet connection due to a limited 
access of Internet infrastructure across Indonesia.  
Despite the fact of promising changes in Internet use in Indonesia, the country still has 
to deal with some challenges such as an uneven population distribution: 53 percent of 
the total population live in urban areas and the remaining 47 percent live in rural areas 
across the archipelago of more than 18,000 islands. For instance, Jakarta and Surabaya, 
which are more urban than other provinces in Indonesia, have a high population 
density. Among the other largest cities in Indonesia, Jakarta and Surabaya have 80 
percent of 3G base stations.  These conditions have created a highly concentrated 
Internet infrastructure and number of users in large cities on Java, so that Java accounts 
for 65 percent of users (Nashiruddin, 2016). These conditions also create a substantial 
challenge for the business sector, telecommunications companies and government as 
regulators to establish and develop telecommunications infrastructure that supports 
Internet penetration in economically disadvantage areas. 
Fostering a nation’s social and economic strength through ICT requires a sufficient 
institutional framework of governing ICT policies and strategies. As broadcasting, 
telecommunication and information technology has converged, it has been suggested 
that a certain level of cooperation among the agencies responsible for those converging 
industries must take place initially, in order to regulate ICT under a single political 
framework. In other words, a regulator encompassing broader industries and sectors 
needs to be created. As the use of the Internet expands within a country, issues like 
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privacy and security, intellectual property rights, and content and access regulations 
start to emerge (Gryseels, Manuel, Salazar, & Wibowo, March 2015). 
ITE as ICT Policy in Indonesia 
ITE is the major law for Internet regulation in Indonesia, was initiated in 2003 and 
enacted in 2008 in response to a gap in ICT and Internet regulations and governance. 
This is because the extant Law of Telecommunication (1999) was not equal to the task 
due to its narrow focus on infrastructure (Suardi & Redfearn, 2003). The long process 
of ITE development and implementation which took 5 years since its initiation in 2003, 
indicates that there were some challenges in producing policy and regulations to cover 
all areas of ICT sectors. These areas represent the interests of every actor involved in 
the policy-making process, such as government, big business and the public in general 
(represented in this thesis  by civil society organisations (CSOs)) The below is an 
initial overview but more detail will be explain later in chapter 4. 
The ITE itself, according to the Ministry of Communications and Information, aims to 
regulate any online transactions and activities and any prohibited acts using ICT as a 
tool. It consists of thirteen chapters and fifty-four articles that regulate online business 
and information systems. It also applies to anyone who commits cybercrimes such as 
illegal content like spreading hate speech through social media and child pornography; 
and misuse of devices like access interception, data and system interference, in and 
outside Indonesia, which might harm Indonesians. The ITE’s intent is to facilitate e-
commerce by formalizing or introducing measures such as guaranteeing the 
acceptance of electronic or digital signatures as legal evidence in the courts of 
Indonesia. 
ITE was enacted during President Yudhoyono’s second term of government, in which 
the policy-making process was placed under considerable pressure from public and 
vocal civil society organisations to accelerate Indonesia’s economic and social 
development. The character of the post-Reformasi era under the Yudhoyono’s 
administration contributed to the style of relationship between various stakeholders, 
involving a high level of political competition at the cabinet level over decision-
making. Contests over coalition politics, the appointment of ministerial posts between 
the president and the leaders of coalition parties, and an intense inter-ministerial 
5 
bureaucratic competition over territory and resources created major coordination 
problems and affected a focus on economic policy (Datta et al., 2011, pp. 67-69). 
Soon after ITE was implemented, questions were asked about its definitions of what 
is legal in online posts and activities and about the penalties for anyone found guilty 
of violating them. Three articles in particular: article 27 on defamation; article 28 on 
hate speech or blasphemy based on ethnic, religious, racial and inter-group relations; 
and, article 29 on online threats are considered the most problematic (Djafar & Abidin, 
2014). As mentioned above, the escalating ITE infringements that have occurred since 
2009 suggest a lack of understanding of the regulations by Indonesian people, and call 
into question the level of broader public priorities and participation in its formation 
and implementation. 
The Question: How can better ICT Policy be built in Indonesia and whose 
agency needs to be deployed more effectively for this to be the practice? 
Indonesia has travelled different types of governance since its independence in 1945: 
Beginning with the several kinds of democracy during Sukarno government (1945-
1965), moving towards an authoritarian regime under Suharto’s New Order (1966-
1998), and in the process of consolidating a democratic society after Reformasi (1998-
2000). The process of ICT policy development in Indonesia lends itself to analysis of 
the relationship between the state/government and society. It involves examining the 
dialogue between government and the public from different sectors such as the private 
sector, civil society organisations and citizens in general. Democratic values of 
openness, accountability and public participation are investigated within this thesis 
with regard to such a dialogue. 
Therefore, there is a need for research that examines the process of ICT policy 
development within specific political and social dynamics. This research project 
provides an empirical context to the above area of study by examining the process of 
ICT policy development in Indonesia through an examination of the actors’ 
participation within the process, including assessing whether the process and the 
practice are in line with the principles of good democracy. A “good” democracy is 
important for Indonesia to achieve its national goal of social welfare for all Indonesians 
as stated in Pancasila. This type of democracy might be interpreted in Indonesian 
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context as an environment that supports people’s everyday activities and their 
relationship with their government. As Merkel and Croissant argue, a “good” 
democracy is commonly described as a stable institutional structure that realises the 
liberty and equality of citizens through the legitimate and correct functioning of its 
institutions and mechanisms (Merkel & Croissant, 2004, p. 200). 
This study finds that the process of ICT policy development in Indonesia may be 
described as a continuum of connections between the three main actors: the CSOs, the 
government and the big business sectors, within a context of ITE debates. The 
connections vary over time from a contestation into a collaboration and then back to 
contestation. This study also demonstrates that there are certain flaws within the ITE 
that are linked with some cases of ITE violation, in particular related with digital 
freedom of expression.  
An analysis of CSOs’ role in ITE implementation and review in Indonesia in this thesis 
shows that the three CSOs observed have implemented strategic and practical activities 
within their programs to work within and outside the system of policy-making. And 
that the involvement of these groups may help mitigate the problems displayed in the 
policies’ development and implementation. 
Objectives and Significance of the Study 
In general, this research examines the process of ICT policy development in Indonesia 
by looking at practices conducted and contested by actors involved in the process, such 
as government, big business and CSOs. It uses ITE as the case study and Giddens’ 
theory of structuration as its theoretical framework. 
More specifically, the sub questions of this study are: how has ICT policy developed 
in Indonesia following the enactment of ITE in 2008 and how could the process be 
improved? To answer these questions, this study addresses three objectives: 
1. To examine the process of ITE formation, implementation and review. 
2. To investigate responses and contributions made by CSOs in ITE post-
implementation and revision process. 
3. To recognise challenges and limitations of a revised ITE and ICT environment. 
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In order to achieve these objectives, this study uses a case study of ITE, its process, 
implementation and review, with a focus on the period following the enactment of the 
ITE. This study also works with three CSOs, ICTWatch, Satudunia, and Medialink to 
obtain an illustration of public participation at national and local level within the 
process of ICT policy development. ICTWatch, Satudunia, and Medialink were chosen 
because their programs’ focus on the usage of information, technology and the Internet. 
In particular, ICTWatch has started its campaign on Internet usage since 2002 with a 
recent program of ‘Internet governance’. Meanwhile Satudunia and Medialink have 
conducted some programs in information and technology use for activists, local 
communities and marginal groups in some villages in East Java. The case study 
examines certain flaws in the ITE and provides CSOs’ responses and contributions 
towards ITE implementation and review. The ITE case study, and the examples of 
three CSOs’ responses in ITE implementation and review, combined with the use of 
Giddens’ theory of structuration in analysis, allow for further understanding of the 
complex process of ICT policy development in Indonesia. 
The significance of this research is its analysis of the ICT policy development process 
for Indonesia, in a non-Western context. This study aims to contribute to the body of 
literature on policy process and development studies. In relation to a non-Western 
context of literature, this research adds consideration of policy process and 
development studies within the context of a different understanding of cultural, 
religious, legal, and democratic processes in Indonesia.  
Indonesia is an archipelagic and multicultural nation, with a majority Muslim 
population and placed as the fourth most populated country in the world. These 
characteristics contribute to the study of public participation in policy development in 
a non-Western perspective. The background of Indonesian geography and 
demography will be described later in Chapter 1. By analysing the interactions and 
participation between the stakeholders in ICT policy development, the study will 
examine state-society relationships that takes place in the ICT sector in Indonesia and 
identify what actions and initiatives are conducted by CSOs in ITE implementation 
and review processes. By illustrating CSOs’ activities in ITE implementation and 
review processes, this study provides a contextualised explanation of public 
participation in the ICT policy development process in Indonesia. 
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Research Methods: Interviews, fieldwork and analyses of secondary 
material 
The nature of this study was largely qualitative. It consisted of an empirical analysis 
of ICT policy development in Indonesia which was examined through a case study of 
the ITE. ITE is a major law in Indonesia, enacted in 2008, which regulates the usage 
and applications of ICT, specifically the Internet. Case study “is a description and 
analysis of an individual matter or case […] with the purpose to identify variables, 
structures, forms and orders of interaction between the participants in the situation 
(theoretical purpose), or, in order to assess the performance of work or progress in 
development (practical purpose)” (Starman, 2013, p. 31). I chose a case study for this 
research to obtain an in-depth exploration of the complexity and uniqueness of a 
particular policy. Case study was used to describe and analyse the complex process of 
ITE and CSOs’ programs surrounding ITE implementation and review process. The 
description and analysis of ITE development process and CSOs’ programs were 
studied culturally, holistically, and analytically.   
This study used three research methods: interviews, fieldwork and analyses of 
secondary materials such as government reports, online resources (research reports and 
publications) and news of ITE implementation and review, and government initiatives 
in ICT development available in electronic formats. A comparative example of 
Malaysia’s experience towards ICT policy development will also be explored in one 
of the thesis’ chapter to provide a broader contextual understanding of ICT policy 
development in the Southeast Asian region.  
Like Indonesia, Malaysia is a postcolonial nation-state that gained independence in the 
mid-twentieth century. Whereas Indonesia has shed any notion of hereditary rulers and 
been working its ways towards democracy over decades, Malaysia has retained some 
parts of its monarchy and is governed as a federation. At the same time Malaysia is, 
similar to Indonesia, a developing nation with a young and Muslim-majority 
population. As such, a discussion of Malaysia offers a comparative example of how 
differently ICT policy could have developed within similar parameters. 
Interview is the one of the methods I use in this research. As described by Dunn (2005, 
p. 80), interviews are used for collecting “a diversity of meaning, opinions and 
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experiences”. They also “provide insights into the differing opinions or debates within 
a group, but they can also reveal consensus on some issues”. I used semi-structured 
interviews in order to get first-hand accounts of CSO perspectives on their experiences 
in the process of ICT policy development in Indonesia. It was necessary to make sure 
that the interviewees should be those with specific knowledge about the work of CSOs. 
The interviews were conducted with key persons from three CSOs, ICTWatch, 
Satudunia, and Medialink, in Jakarta, Indonesia during January 2014 and August 2015. 
I contacted the key persons by email first, then after I had a reply from them, I called 
them to make appointments for interviews. The key persons were identified by 
recognising the persons’ contributions to ICT policy development, their knowledge 
and leadership positions in each CSOs.  
An interview guide was used in the interviews to provide an early direction for the 
research. Follow-up emails with the informants were performed where further 
information was required. Overall, there were four interviews, all conducted in the 
Indonesian language, recorded and fully transcribed by a professional translator. Due 
to a very specific choice of CSOs, this study did not cover or make claim to represent 
all CSOs related to ICT and the Internet in Indonesia. A limitation in the numbers of 
interviews in this research due to a time constraint was also a challenging factor in 
forming a thorough analysis of the process of ICT development in Indonesia and 
CSO’s participation. 
Fieldwork was conducted by attending a business exhibition, Indonesia Infrastructure 
Week 2015, and a symposium on ‘National Broadband and Cyber Security’ in 
Indonesia in November 2015, to observe the recent activities and initiatives of big 
business in telecommunications and ICT development, particularly in infrastructure 
development. This fieldwork provided insight into some of the practices in the 
business environment regarding development of ICT infrastructure in Indonesia.  
In order to enrich data from interviews and fieldwork, this research has also drawn 
upon secondary materials such as government reports, online resources (research 
reports and publications) and news of ITE implementation and review, and 
government initiatives in ICT development available in electronic formats. I have also 
relied on a wide range of documents from various government sources, such as the 
National Planning Agency (Bappenas) and the Ministry of Communication and 
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Informatics due to a limitation of interviewing the Indonesian officials. I also consulted 
reports and publications from research institutions such as the Institute of Policy 
Research and Advocacy (ELSAM), the Institute for Criminal Justice and Reform 
(ICJR), and other CSOs which focus on ITE violation cases and assistance programs 
like the Southeast Asian Freedom of Expression Network (SAFEnet) and the Digital 
Democracy Forum (FDD). Although some of the documents, specifically government 
documents, were not publicly accessible, reports and publications from research 
institutions were publicly accessible and important in supporting my analyses.  
Thesis Structure 
This thesis is structured into seven chapters. Chapter One explains the Indonesian 
topography, demography, religion, and political system to give a background to 
understand challenges and main issues in Indonesia for Internet development. The 
current conditions of Internet use and distribution in Indonesia are also explained to 
relate to the research questions. This chapter also introduces different historical 
presidential stages in Indonesia to be discussed later in Chapter three. 
Chapter Two explains the theoretical framework and research methods of the thesis. 
Structuration theory is introduced to understand the complexity of multiple layers and 
actors in Internet policy development in Indonesia. Definitions, terminologies, 
approaches and some key words in Giddens’ structuration theory are also explained. 
This chapter also introduces actors broadly and explain interviews as the method used 
within the research: How the interviews were undertaken, for what purpose, who the 
informants were and why they were chosen.  
Chapter Three explains the intrinsic connection between the Internet and democracy 
in Indonesia, especially the Reformasi effect on understanding the Internet and social 
changes. This chapter explores the development of the Internet users in Indonesia in 
relation to Indonesian political engagement and the development of new political space 
in the lead up to Reformasi (reform) and afterwards.  
The central point in this chapter is the 1998 Reformasi, which is argued here to have 
had a profound impact on the growth of communication, civil society and democracy 
in Indonesia. The existence of such democratic space in Reformasi, helped by internet 
in Indonesia, can be observed in three aspects, people power, voicing dissent and 
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empowerment. This chapter also provides a context for understanding changes in the 
ways Indonesian people communicate, express their opinions, and empower 
themselves as the effect of democratising the internet. 
Chapter Four examines telecommunication and Internet infrastructure development 
approaches in Indonesia through tracing the various government changes from 1983 
to 2016. It provides the context for understanding the ongoing transformations of 
Indonesia’s Internet strategies towards the Internet. It demonstrates that there have 
been overlapping law and governance of Internet and in governments’ approaches in 
regulating the Internet in Indonesia from 1983 to 2016. The central question this 
chapter asks is: how have telecommunication and Internet infrastructures and policies 
developed in Indonesia since the Suharto era? 
Chapter Five analyses and breaks down the ICT policy formation process using the 
theoretical framework of Giddens’ structuration theory. In particular, it seeks to view 
the policy formation process through the macro and micro lens of Giddens’ 
structuration theory to understand the background process of ITE formation and the 
intersection of the Indonesian government, big business and CSOs. The example of 
Malaysia is introduced here to provide broader contextual understanding of ICT policy 
development in the Southeast Asian region. Looking at Malaysia’s experience in 
developing internet policy as an example is also appropriate because Indonesia and 
Malaysia share several other similarities. Despite these similarities, Indonesia has by 
far the greater challenge due to the much larger population and challenging topography 
of its archipelagic land. Starting with Internet’s arrival in the region in the mid-1990s, 
each country sought to implement ICT policy and move from a monopoly towards 
privatisation, with quite different results. The system of government of Malaysia has 
provided conditions that are favourable for ICT policy development and their national 
economy. For example, Malaysia’s better established telecommunication 
infrastructures have allowed the nation to form ICT policy more quickly than other 
countries in the Southeast Asia, with the exception of Singapore. Indonesia, in contrast, 
was still undergoing vast political changes during the latter part of the 1990’s and 
hence, still lacks adequate telecommunication infrastructure throughout the 
archipelago.  
12 
Chapter Six illustrates a case study of ITE and its issues that have arisen post-
implementation to understand the flaws with the policy, its implementation and 
review. The investigation attempts to explain how the public’s participation during this 
period, via the CSOs, provides feedback to the ITE implementation review process. 
The analysis is based on document reviews, face-to-face and follow-up e-mail 
interviews with key leaders from ICTwatch, Satudunia and Medialink. I also collected 
some additional information from other CSOs in general such as FDD (Digital 
Democracy Forum), ICJR (Institute for Criminal and Justice Reform) and ELSAM 
(Institute for Policy Research and Advocacy). I chose these CSOs because they have 
conducted some research, campaigns and analysis informing the ITE review process 
since 2010. By understanding ITE flaws and analysing CSOs’ activities with regard to 
ITE post-implementation review, interactions of social practices within the structure 
of a social system can be examined.  
Finally, Chapter Seven analyses some aspects in the ITE formation process which can 
be improved to formulate a policy that regulates the usage and applications of the 
Internet specifically, integrates other regulations, and meets expectations from 
different publics in Indonesian society. These aspects are challenges of Indonesian 
internet infrastructure and access, problems of digital media literacy among 
Indonesians, the politics of policy making process in Indonesian government system, 
and the expectations of the public, CSOs and big business.
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Chapter 1. The Internet in Indonesia 
Introduction 
The chapter is about the Indonesian context of topography, demography, religion and 
political system as a background to understand challenges and main issues in Indonesia 
for Internet development since its arrival in 1994 (Lim, 2006b, p.94) and its growing 
usage to recent days. The chapter also explains current conditions of Internet use and 
distribution in Indonesia related to the research questions, including the complexity of 
multiple layers and actors in Internet policy development in Indonesia. The complexity 
of different historical presidential stages in Indonesia is also introduced in this chapter 
to be discussed later in details in Chapter three.  
Known as a huge archipelagic country, Indonesia has 13,667 islands which extend 
5,120 kilometres from east to west and 1,760 kilometres from north to south. There 
are five main islands: Sumatra, Java, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and Papua. Two of the 
islands are shared with other nations: Kalimantan is shared with Malaysia and Brunei; 
and Papua shares the island with Papua New Guinea. Strategically positioned between 
the Pacific and Indian oceans, Indonesia's total land area is 1,919,317 square 
kilometres. The additional surrounding sea areas together with an exclusive economic 
zone bring Indonesia's territory (land and sea) to about 7.9 million square kilometres 
(Statistics Indonesia, 2015).  
Due to the country’s features of numerous mountains, tectonic plates and some active 
volcanoes which can be found in almost every islands, natural disasters are common 
in Indonesia. The tallest mountain is located in the Jayawijaya, Papua. In addition to 
the mountainous landscape, much of the islands are covered in thick tropical 
rainforests that give way to coastal plains and support biodiversity in the world (State 
Ministry of Republic Indonesia, 2010). This geographic conditions have been major 
challenges for Indonesian government in developing telecommunication 
infrastructure. Bridging and connecting people in different islands and areas have 
become a main task for Indonesian government in infrastructure development 
programs. And this task certainly demands for a budget which is not minor. 
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Meanwhile, Indonesian demographic conditions range from its large population of 
254.5 million people, a GDP growth of 5% and an inflation rate of 6.4% in 2015. Half 
of the population are below 30 years of age and live in urban areas mostly in Java and 
western parts of the country. Nearly half of Indonesia’s population lives in rural areas 
(Worldbank, April 2016). 90% of Indonesians are of Malay origin, half of whom 
belong to the Javanese ethnic group. There are also Chinese and Indian minorities. 
Islam is the major religion of 85.2% of the population, designating Indonesia as the 
largest Muslim country in the world. The remaining population consists of Protestants 
(8.9%); Catholics (3%); Hindus (1.8%); Buddhists (0.8%) and other religion (0.3%). 
The official language is Bahasa Indonesia, which is similar to Malay. The barriers of 
the mountain and the sea have shaped the character and traditions of many groups 
among islands in Indonesia which reflect a great cultural diversity (Statistics 
Indonesia, 2019).   
The Indonesian political system 
Indonesia has 33 provinces (including 2 Special Territories of Nanggroe Aceh 
Darussalam and Yogyakarta) and one Special Capital Region of Jakarta (DKI). East 
Timor was once part of Indonesia, but then through a referendum in 1999, East Timor 
became the Democratic Republic of Timor Leste (Molnar, 2010, p.85).  
Indonesia is a democratic country that applies a presidential system and Pancasila is 
the soul of the Indonesian democracy. Pancasila or The Five Principles is the official, 
foundational philosophical theory of the Indonesian state. It is composed of five 
principles and contends that they are inseparable and interrelated: Belief in the One 
and Only God, a just and civilized Humanity, a unified Indonesia, Democracy, led by 
the wisdom of the representative of the People, and Social justice for all Indonesians 
(Lindsey & Butt, 2012). The 1945 constitution invests most of the power in 
the executive branch of the government, particularly in the president, who is assisted 
by a vice president and a cabinet. As in other democratic countries, Indonesia applies 
the Trias Politica that recognizes the separation of the legislative, executive and 
judicial bodies. The executive institution is centralized under the president, vice 
president, and the cabinet of ministers. The cabinet is a presidential cabinet in which 
the ministers report to the president and do not represent the political parties 
(Bourchier & Hadiz, 2003, p. 260). 
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The legislative authority is under the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) that 
consists of two bodies namely the Parliament composing of members of political 
parties and the Regional Representative Council (DPD) composing of representatives 
from each province in Indonesia. Each province is represented by 4 delegates that are 
elected by the people in the respective region. The People’s Consultative Assembly 
(MPR) is the highest state institution. Upon the Amendment of the 1945 Constitution, 
the membership of the MPR starting the period of 1999-2004, was amended to include 
not only the members of the parliament (DPR) but also the members of the DPD. 
Formerly the MPR consisted of the parliament members and group representatives. 
Currently, the MPR has 550 members from the parliament and 128 members from the 
Regional Representative Council (DPD). The parliament members and the DPD 
members are elected every five years. Since 2004, the MPR has become a bi-chamber 
parliament with the DPD as second chamber. The judicial institution -since the reform 
era and upon the amendment of the 1945 Constitution- is administered by the Supreme 
Court including the administration of the judges (Lindsey & Butt, 2012). 
Telecommunication and the Internet in Indonesia 
Since the late 1970s, immediate links between distant places in Indonesia have been 
established through telecommunications technology. The use of satellites, purchased 
by Indonesian public and private telecommunications companies, revolutionized the 
system. A unique solution to the general lack of telecommunications facilities was the 
establishment of neighbourhood wartel (“telephone shops”), where customers can 
make domestic or international calls and send or receive faxes for a time-based fee. 
However, with the rapidly expanding use of cell phones, wartel are playing a less 
critical role in the Indonesian telecommunications system. An increase in Internet 
usage has been attributable largely to the introduction of warnet (“Internet shops”) in 
major cities.  
The Internet in Indonesia has grown remarkably from its earliest introduction in 1994 
to the present. The post-Reformasi years since 1998, in particular, have seen Internet 
technologies multiplied and developed at a rapid rate, even as Indonesia experienced 
drastic change across the political, social, economic and cultural fronts. A report 
conducted by APJII (the Indonesian Internet Service Provider Association) in 2017, 
revealed that there were 143.26 million Indonesians connected to global networks 
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where they socialised, searched entertainment, conducted economic transactions and 
were politically engaged and mobilised over the Internet. As of date, 70 percent of the 
Indonesian internet users access the internet mainly and heavily through their mobile 
devices.  
Usage of the Internet in Indonesia can be characterised as mainly dominated by young 
people (aged 19-34 years) who are concentrated in urban-middle classes and based in 
Java (Asosiasi Penyedia Jasa Internet Indonesia, 2017). Since the Yudhoyono 
government, substantial emphasis has also been placed on the potential of a digital 
economy for Indonesian economic growth. At the same time, there has been 
recognition that in order for the digital economy to become reality there are two main 
issues that need to be tackled from the point of view of Internet users: access and digital 
literacy.  
The issue of access is primarily a consequence of Indonesia’s geographic spread as an 
archipelagic nation and the cost of creating the necessary physical infrastructure to 
make the Internet available across all 34 provinces. Infrastructure has been an issue 
for the Indonesian government to improve internet penetration across Indonesia 
because it requires a high cost establishment for internet infrastructure especially for 
the eastern regions of Indonesia. So far, the cost has been shared between private and 
public purses.   
Therefore, in order to address these issues of topography and cost, the Indonesian 
government initiated The Palapa Ring Project in 2009 to improve the internet 
infrastructure across Indonesia. The Palapa Ring Project is a telecommunications 
infrastructure project through the development of a 36,000 km fibre-optic line, divided 
into the West Palapa ring, the Central Palapa ring, and the East Palapa ring. The project 
is only completed for the western and central regions of the nation. At present, The 
Palapa Ring Project is at its second stage of development for the eastern region and is 
estimated to be completed in 2019 (Ministry of Communication and Information, 
2014).  
During the two periods of President Yudhoyono’s leadership (2004-2014), there have 
been initiatives of ICTs development program attempted. The development of urban 
hotspots, wireless telecommunication, the connected village (Desa Berdering) project 
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for remote and blank-spotted villages in Java, the village internet (Desa Internet), the 
operation of mobile internet vans for remote areas of Indonesia, the convergence 
technology blueprint, and the ICTs milestones are among the programs and projects 
initiated and implemented by the government.  
There have also been initiatives to share the cost of building internet infrastructure for 
remote areas in the eastern region by the Ministry of Communication and Information 
(MCI). Since 2016, the MCI has begun to urge the principle of network sharing 
between Telkomsel and other telecommunication providers for remote areas. The 
initiative was named active sharing concept which was a mechanism of 
telecommunication infrastructure sharing among active telecommunications providers 
in the country and was designed to enable cost-effectiveness in the 
telecommunications industry. The active sharing concept, at present named ‘network 
sharing concept’ according to the MCI, is able to make the telecommunications 
industry more efficient, affordable and sustainable. Although the implementation of 
‘network sharing concept’ is still on-going process due to an absence of government 
regulation support and a disapproval from certain telecommunications provider, the 
initiative was considered to be the beginning of a consolidation process in Indonesian 
telecommunication infrastructure among telecommunication service providers (Panji, 
December 8, 2015).  
Internet access and infrastructure are seen as important by the Indonesian government 
who believe these things are vital for economic growth and social cohesion, therefore, 
the MCI has developed a government strategic plan 2015 – 2019 which focuses on 
three aspects: the improvement of telecommunication infrastructure through 
broadband connectivity, internet governance and digitalisation of television 
broadcasting.  
The usage of broadband connectivity, according to the MCI, has an important role in 
creating the conditions for sustainable economic growth and improving social welfare. 
The effects of broadband connectivity will impact the economic growth factors such 
as innovation, the emergence of new goods and services, new business models, and 
will increase competitiveness and flexibility in the economy. The MCI says, “1% of 
fixed-broadband penetration is expected to decrease the amount of 8.6% 
unemployment rate and 10% of it is targeted to boost economic growth by 1.38%. The 
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broadband connectivity program is supported by a priority agenda of broadband 
infrastructure development such as deploying a nation-wide network of fibre-optic 
backbone (Palapa Ring Project) to connect 497 districts and cities across Indonesia” 
(Ministry of Communication and Information, 2015b).  
The second focus of the Indonesian government strategic plan 2015 – 2019 is internet 
governance. Internet governance is a program to improve information security, to 
encourage the growth of e-commerce, to implement the Domain Name Service (DNS) 
framework to reduce illegal content, and to integrate e-government services. The 
program is conducted through some strategies such as establishing referral 
standardization of security and applying strategic electronic system certification, 
formulating a national roadmap of e-commerce, collecting data proliferation of e-
commerce and developing the number of start-up company, establishing a ministerial 
regulation of DNS and implementing a national DNS nation-wide, developing a master 
plan and ensuring the establishment of a presidential regulation of e-government as the 
basis for the implementation of e-government services and integrating database and e-
government services in governmental agencies. 
The third focus of the Indonesian government strategic plan 2015 – 2019 is the 
digitalisation of television broadcasting. The program is considered to improve the 
efficiency of frequency spectrum usage, broadcasting industry infrastructure, and to 
accelerate new business opportunities for content industry. The digitalisation of 
television broadcasting program is supported by several agenda such as to accelerate 
migration process of analogue to digital television, to develop policies and regulations 
that support the migration process, and to step-up the revision process of the Law of 
Broadcasting.  
However, Internet access alone will not bring all the advantages of a digital economy 
to Indonesians. Digital media literacy, defined as the ability to assess, evaluate and 
differentiate between the various forms of information and sources available online 
and, the shifting etiquette that governs norms, behaviour and interactions between 
users on a multiplicity of platforms is crucial to Indonesians’ ability to use the Internet 
competently and legally. Digital media literacy is linked to the development of 
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) education at schools and homes. 
But what passes for acceptable online behaviour in Indonesia is a social and cultural 
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norm closely related to Indonesia’s identity as a multicultural nation with a majority 
Muslim population.  
Belated attempts to define standards for online interactions through laws such as the 
Law of Information and Electronic Transaction (hereafter ITE) 1 have been made but 
much remains subject to interpretation and contestation. The ITE is the key focus of 
this thesis and introduced above as an attempt by the Yudhoyono government to adjust 
the policy surrounding Internet use and bring it level with technological as well as 
socio-political and economic developments in and surrounding Indonesia. However, 
the ITE remains a controversial policy because although its shortcomings (which I 
return to later) were apparent from the start, it has taken up to 2016 for this flawed 
piece of legislation to be revised.  
Prior to the enactment of ITE in 2008, the law dealing broadly with the 
telecommunication industry was the 1999 Telecommunication Law (Lee & Findlay, 
2005, p. 354). Enacted in 2000 in the early days of commercial Internet in Indonesia, 
the Telecommunication Law was designed to create space for greater competition 
among Internet Service Providers (ISPs). Hence, its concerns were not with user 
practices, online behaviour or content. This was understandable as online content 
creation in Indonesia did not begin until 1998 (Lim, 2003c, p. 279).  
In this thesis I discuss the process that led to the formation of ITE, starting with its 
initial draft in 2003 and its enactment in 2008 to its revision in 2016. The aim is to 
understand the complexity of ITE development process to illustrate the response of the 
Indonesian government towards the Internet. By working with three CSOs and 
applying Giddens’ structuration theory as an explanatory heuristic, this thesis aims to 
analyse ITE formation, implementation and review process in Indonesia and to suggest 
how the process could be improved. 
ICT policy governance structure 
It is important to note that in Indonesia the responsibility and direction for the ICT 
environment is split between two government bodies: the Directorate General of Post 
 
1 An English translation of the legislation is available at:  
http://www.flevin.com/id/lgso/translations/JICA%20Mirror/english/4846_UU_11_2008_e.html 
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and Telecommunication (hereafter DGPT) and; the Indonesian Telecommunication 
Regulatory Body (hereafter BRTI). The DGPT is in charge of telecommunications and 
Internet infrastructure applications while the BRTI is the primary regulatory decision-
making body (Lee & Findlay, 2005, p. 358).  
BRTI was established in 2003 to ensure the principles of transparency, independence 
and fairness in telecommunication network and service operations. This body is 
responsible for regulating, supervising and controlling the implementation of 
telecommunication networks and services (Meurling, Grainger, Sawitri, & Redfordi, 
2012, p. 242). The BRTI is also charged with creating and ensuring fair competition 
in the Indonesian telecommunication industry with both public and private 
participation. However, the independence of BRTI has already been questioned 
(Adiwiyoto, 2004). 
The BRTI was set up some 10 years after GSM licenses were first issued by the 
government. Working under the authority of the Minister of Transport and 
Telecommunication, BRTI comprises both the office of Director General of Posts and 
Telecommunication (DGPT) and Telecommunication Regulatory Committee.  
The ITE was first drafted in 2003 under the initiative of the DGPT and the Department 
of Industry and Trade. The draft was then discussed with academics from Padjadjaran 
University, University of Indonesia, and Institute of Technology Bandung before it 
was delivered to the DPR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, the House of Representatives) 
by President Yudhoyono in 2005. The ITE Bill was deliberated in DPR with the 
Minister of Communication and Information and the Minister of Law and Human 
Rights acting as government representatives. During the deliberation process in the 
DPR, Yudhoyono created a task force to undertake discussion of the ITE. After 
extensive deliberations carried out between 2006 and 2008, the ITE was finally 
enacted in March 2008 (Zulhuda, 2003). 
In the context of this thesis, it is crucial to note that at no point during the ITE formation 
process was there broader participation from the Indonesian public. In fact, the closest 
the public came to any participation in the process was when the draft of the proposed 
law was discussed with academics from the three elite universities mentioned above. 
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No civil society organisations were consulted at all during the entire process from 2003 
to 2008. 
In Indonesia, the term civil society organisations (CSO) is used to denote the voluntary 
organisations frequently known as non-government organisations (NGOs) in the 
literature elsewhere. Its use and choice in this thesis reflects the history of such 
organisations in Indonesia, which began in the 1960s as NGOs funded by the state to 
support government policies in Indonesian national development. At the beginning of 
Suharto’s New Order government (1966-1998), Indonesian NGOs embarked on a 
different pathway from their prominence as government’ opposition, in response to 
changes in the economy and political landscape. In the early 1970s, there were many 
new NGOs established by intellectuals, student activists and religious leaders who 
committed their activities to community development such as LP3ES (Institute for 
Social and Economic Research), LSP (Development Studies Institute), YLKI 
(Indonesian Foundation of Consumers’ Organisations), and Sekretariat Bina Desa 
(Village Development Secretariat). The growth of the educated middle class also 
enabled the government and NGOs to work as partners in economic development and 
poverty alleviation projects with the support of foreign aid. However, that spirit of co-
operation did not carry though to political activities due to the restriction of political 
participation by the New Order government (Hadiwinata, 2003, p. 91). 
In the lead-up to Reformasi in 1998, the relations between the state and NGOs became 
more challenging due to the more complex problems in the areas of human rights, 
economic exploitation, banning of weekly magazines, and repression of labour 
activists. Hadiwinata (2003, p. 98) argues that the decline of NGOs-government 
relations in 1990s was also due to the growing number of organisations deliberately 
challenging government policies and exposing government misconduct to the world. 
As Reformasi took place in 1998, the facilitation of a democratic transition becomes a 
possibility for Indonesian NGOs. If in the New Order era Indonesian NGOs were 
directly involved in building political awareness of society, after Reformasi, they 
needed to make an attempt to draw political and ideological boundaries within the 
existing groups in society; make an effort to develop a common political platform that 
would lead to the formation of collective action; and form networks and coalitions in 
society for building a strong civil society. 
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Hadiwinata (2003, p. 119) also argues that the end of the New Order government 
created a space for democratisation in Indonesian NGOs. NGOs’ access to grassroots 
organisations via their endless pro-democracy campaigns and political education 
programs since the early 1990s and their commitment to empower the marginalised 
people contributed to the strengthening of Indonesian civil society and their ability to 
generate demand for a more accountable, clean and transparent government. At the 
same time, although democratisation in the post-Suharto era has opened a new 
opportunity for Indonesian NGOs, they still face challenges of maintaining the reform 
movement agenda and living up to the trust put in them by their beneficiaries, donors 
and government through enhancing their capacities in fighting internal corruption and 
fraud.  
Since Reformasi, the term CSOs has been preferred in a deliberate attempt to indicate 
their freedom from government interest (and intervention) and funding and emphasise 
their role in empowering communities rather than supporting the government 
(Hadiwinata, 2008). In this thesis I take CSOs to represent the voice of the Indonesian 
public within policy making process. The voice of the Indonesian public can be 
generated from other forms such as public protest, people’s opinions and thinking 
within articles in CSOs’ publication.  I chose to concentrate on specific CSOs to 
represent the voice of the Indonesian public within policy making process because of 
their contributions in accommodating public interest within the process. CSOs are also 
important for the Indonesian public as public watch of government’s policy. Although 
general people as individuals can participate in policy making process, their 
participation is limited to the review process.  
In the case of ITE initial formation process, there was a lack of CSOs’ participation. 
From the literature research I conducted, there is not any literature found documenting 
CSOs’ roles in the initial ITE formation process. CSOs’ roles might likely be nil as the 
Indonesian government was an authoritarian regime at that time and the development 
of ICT in Indonesia was still in its infancy.  
Given the overlapping areas of law, the government bodies involved and consequently 
the layers of governance that exist in in Indonesia, detailing ICT policy development 
is complex and convoluted. Moreover, due to the large gaps between when and where 
an ICT policy is proposed and when it is implemented and revised in Indonesia 
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mentioned above, it is useful to employ a theoretical framework that allows analysis 
to be conducted at both micro and macro levels without losing coherence. For example, 
while the ITE was enacted at federal level, its implementation was carried out in 
villages through information utilisation programs by self-reliance communities 
assisted by CSOs such as Medialink in Sidoarjo, East Java and Kebumen, Central Java. 
At the same time while the ITE’s shortcomings are felt at the micro level, for example, 
by Prita Mulyasari who was jailed three weeks for defamation under ITE’s harsh 
regime simply for complaining on an email list about the medical treatment she 
received,2 its revision can only take place at the macro level and in response not only 
to local but also international standards. For this reason, in this thesis I use Giddens’ 
structuration theory as its duality of structure proposition allows for these very 
different yet inter-related practices and conditions to be taken into consideration. 
Giddens’ structuration theory will be discussed later in Chapter 2 of the thesis.  
Historical presidential stages in Indonesia 
This section is about the historical context of changes in the forms of Indonesian 
political and government systems in Indonesia which spans from a period of before 
independence to the presidential era. In tracing that progression alongside the various 
leadership styles of past Presidents – from Sukarno and Suharto through to Habibie, 
Wahid, Megawati and Yudhoyono – the section seeks to understand how each 
successive administration has left its imprint on today’s policy formation process. A 
brief discussion about the Indonesian presidential stages will be explained later in 
Chapter 3. 
The main objective of the historical exploration carried out in this section is to identify 
the core actors as mentioned before as the government, big business and people, who 
were involved in the process of policy formation in Indonesia from the earliest days of 
nationhood and Reformasi to contemporary democracy. The turning point is the 1998 
Reformasi, which is argued here to have had a profound impact on the growth of 
communication and civil society in Indonesia. There are also historical moments of 
the changing format and role of the Ministry of Information (formerly called 
 
2 https://www.hrw.org/news/2010/05/03/indonesia-repeal-arcane-laws-criminalize-criticism 
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‘Kementerian Penerangan’ under Suharto’s regime, which was abolished during the 
President Wahid’s era, then it was re-established by President Megawati under the 
name of ‘Department of Communication and Information’ (Depkominfo, 2001-2004), 
and later the word of ‘Information’ has been changed into ‘Informatics’ by President 
Yudhoyono (and has become Ministry of Communication and Informatics), and 
continues to President Joko Widodo. It is also important to note that the changing of 
the word ‘information’ to ‘informatics’ was intended to acknowledge the massive 
development of ICTs globally and the demand to develop, control, and regulate the 
Internet and digital systems and infrastructures in the country. The historical context 
is also an interpretation of Giddens’ concept of time in this research, while Giddens’ 
concept of space is interpreted as the Indonesian geographical conditions.  
A period of before Indonesian independence commenced with the Dutch ruling for 
three and a half centuries from 1595. The Dutch were interested in spreading their 
Western ways of thinking and styles of government system like the cultivation system 
based on the structure of the traditional kingdoms by establishing a state apparatus or 
educated bureaucratic elites from the conversion of aristocratic elites to control society 
in Indonesia, formerly known as the East Indies (Jones, 2005, p. 40). As part of 
spreading the Western ways of thinking and the beginning of economic interests and 
humanitarian concerns in the twentieth century, the Dutch paid more attention to the 
education and social welfare of the native population especially the upper-class 
Indonesians by implementing the ethical policy. According to Uhlin (1997, p. 29), the 
ethical policy was the early liberalism introduced into the East Indies in the 20th 
century and unintentionally established as the base of Indonesian nationalism 
development because of the closer interaction with the Western ideas through 
education and civilization.  
Towards 1900s, Indonesian youth involved in political organizations started the anti-
colonial nationalist movements and struggles for independence from the Dutch 
administration. However, it was the Japanese who provided the greatest impetus for 
the Indonesian independence in 1945. Throughout this period, struggles for 
independence and the nation building were observed as Giddens’ rules and resources 
(explained below) were used by the actors to produce social practices. The Indonesian 
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political leaders, youth and some educated individuals were communicating a message 
of independence and practices of a nation building.  
Since Independence, Indonesia has undergone a variety of governmental systems that 
might be called versions of democracy. Starting with a Dutch-inspired parliamentary 
system of administration, Indonesia shifted into a guided democracy during the 
Sukarno era, was ruled by the authoritarian Suharto for 32 years from 1966, and since 
Reformasi in 1998 has been working towards a form of deliberative democracy. The 
embryo of democracy based on Western ideals born during the Sukarno period was 
suggested a pathway towards an age of authoritarianism under Suharto’s New Order. 
The discourse of democracy applied within different periods of governments 
exemplified the rules and resources of Giddens’ theory.  
During the Suharto era, economic development was the government priority. It was 
under Suharto’s administration, Indonesian economy developed and infrastructure 
improved. From 1969 to 1994 GDP (Gross Domestic Product) growth averaged 6.8 
per cent and real GDP per capita increased more than threefold. Although the political 
system was dominantly authoritarian and the military was powerful as a political force, 
it cannot be neglected that during Suharto era the Indonesian middle class grew (Eklof, 
1999, p. 3). The government's legitimacy rested on its success in achieving socio-
political stability and economic development. According to Frederick and Worden 
(1993), Indonesia's politics in the 1990s were influenced by both domestic and 
international developments with non-traditional and secular values. These values had 
set Indonesian people as urban centred, nationalist, and more materialistically oriented.  
Reformasi was not only a critical point in Indonesian political system and information 
movement, but also a major change in Indonesian economy. It marked transformation 
in Indonesian governments and the use of social capital. Under Habibie, Wahid and 
Megawati government, Indonesian economy tried to recover in the years after 
Reformasi along with the process of consolidating democracy. It was Habibie era 
which positioned major reforms and a transition of Indonesian political system, 
however, Indonesia under the Yudhoyono government reinforced Indonesian economy 
by creating a more supporting political environment and democratic society. 
Improvements in governance are still crystallising, but democratic Indonesia has 
enjoyed much relative political stability and economic prosperity. 
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However, the transition process of democracy in Indonesia has been evaluated as 
limited and stagnant due to several constraints and challenges. As Mietzner (2012) 
argues, the attempts of anti-reformist elites to return to the era before Reformasi and 
the resilient civil society because of a lack of support from the international aid, have 
stagnated the process of democracy. Hamayotsu (2013) concurs but argues that the 
process of Indonesian democracy is thwarted by the limited freedom of media and 
religious intolerance.  
Additionally, Indonesia still has to tackle major problems of corruption, military 
abuses, Islamic radicalism and abuses of minority rights (Freedman & Tiburzi, 2012). 
Davidson (2009) and Abdulbaki (2008) argue, the weaknesses of law and a limited 
government capability have also impacted on socio-economic conflicts and political 
instability throughout the years after Reformasi. McRae (2013, p. 292) also adds, 
corruption scandals and an ineffective coalition government have characterised 
Yudhoyono second term of government. As Ito (2011) argues, the decentralization 
process brought about by Reformasi in Indonesia has failed so the transition process 
of democracy in Indonesia is yet to be consolidated.  
Aside from historical changes in Indonesian government systems, Indonesian culture 
and social diversity might be rooted from their complex interactions with the physical 
environment. Indonesian geographic conditions have created major challenges for 
Suharto government to develop telecommunication infrastructure both physically and 
financially. To resolve these problems, the Indonesian government made an effort such 
as implementing the Five Year Development Planning (Repelita) since Sukarno era in 
1956 and establishing a domestic satellite system, Palapa in 1976 under Suharto 
administration. To support the state development programs, a private financial 
resource was essential during Suharto government.  
Besides having a large population and densely-populated regions, this Muslim 
majority country has an economic planning process which follows a 20-year 
development plan, spanning from 2005 to 2025. It is segmented into 5-year medium-
term plans, called the RPJMN (medium-term plans), each with different development 
priorities. The current RPJMN – the third phase of the long-term plan – runs from 2015 
to 2020, focusing on infrastructure development and improving social assistance 
programs in education and healthcare. Such shifts in public spending has been enabled 
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by a reform of long-standing energy subsidies, allowing for more investments in 
programs that directly impact the poor and near-poor, as well as vast improvements in 
infrastructure investment (Worldbank, April 2016).  
In terms of policy development in the Indonesian telecommunication sector, a 
Telecommunication Act was enacted in 1989 which was revised 10 years later in 1999 
(Ministry of Communication and Information, 2011) (this development will be 
explained in chapter 3). The 1999 Telecommunication Act is still used by the 
Indonesian government in the present time to regulate telecommunication 
infrastructure and practice. The policy formation process of Indonesian 
telecommunication and ICT will be investigated later in chapter 4 of this thesis. 
Meanwhile, the next chapter will discuss about Gidden’s structuration theory as the 
theoretical framework of this thesis and the research methods.
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Chapter 2. Theoretical Framework and Research Methods  
Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to explain and qualify Giddens’ structuration theory as 
the theoretical framework of the thesis. Working with Giddens theory, this chapter 
explains the textual and historical analysis of ITE policy and analysis of ITE 
description process in Indonesia. This chapter also introduces actors broadly and 
explain interviews as one of the method used within the research. How the interviews 
were undertaken, for what purpose, who the informants were and why they were 
chosen will be explained.  
Structuration theory comes from the field of sociology and is based on Giddens’ 
understanding of society and social actors within a complex structure which functions 
both as resources and actions. The crux of structuration theory lies in how Giddens 
seeks to reconcile the tensions and the relations between micro-level social practices 
and macro-level forces such as social structure. As Allan explains, for Giddens 
(Giddens, cited in Allan, 2011, p. 252): 
society does not exist as objective structure; rather, it is continually built 
or structured by reflexive social actors or people....It happens when people 
use specific modalities to produce both structure (rules and resources) and 
practice.  
Using structuration theory as a framework here makes it possible to understand the 
interactions of consultation, enactment and review that take place around the formation 
of a policy such as ITE to be social practices. Social practices in this instance refer to 
the actions (consultation, enactment, implementation, and revision) initiated and taken 
by the actors that are exercised recursively and reflexively to form structures. Rather 
than vacillate between agents and actors, I use the one term, actor, to denote the three 
parties i.e. CSOs, big business and government. As the ITE is a national policy, in 
most cases, government here refers to the national (the Ministry of Communication 
and Informatics) rather than provincial and other levels governments that exist in 
Indonesia. Big business in this thesis refers to the two prominent and major 
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telecommunication companies in Indonesia: PT Telkom and PT Indosat. PT Telkom is 
the only national (state-owned) telecommunication company, with its subsidiary 
mobile operator: PT Telkomsel. PT Indosat was privatised in 2003, and later owned by 
a foreign (Qatar) telecom company, i.e. Ooredoo Asia Telecommunication Pty. 
Ooredoo Asia holds 65% of shares and the Indonesian government holds less than 15% 
of shares. A brief explanation of major telecommunication companies will be 
described in more detail in Chapter 3. I focus on three CSOs: ICTwatch, Satudunia 
and Medialink as they have been involved with ITE enactment, implementation and 
revision since 2010.  
In the sections that follow I discuss structuration theory as conceived by Anthony 
Giddens and explain the suitability of its use here as a framework for the analysis of 
the ITE policy development in Indonesia. There are other possible theories that can be 
applied such as Castells’ Network Society (1996) and Latour’s Actor-Network Theory 
(ANT) (2005) to explain the process of technological development and social changes 
in Indonesian society. However, these two theories differ significantly from the 
approach I take here in their emphasis on the influence of technology towards society 
and social practices.  
For example, Castells’ notion of a network society is explained predominantly through 
his trilogy on his concept of The Information Age, which describes the shift from an 
industrial society to an informational society from the 1970s. Rather than human 
actors, Castells’ network society is designed around networks and his concern is with 
the flow of information through technology. For Castells the interrelationship of social, 
economic, political features of society, and technological innovation as emergent from 
the network is the essential feature of the twentieth century (2000a).  
The network society, according to Castells (2000b, pp. 5-6), is “a specific form of 
social structure tentatively identified by empirical research as being characteristic of 
the Information Age”. Castells views humans’ interactions as full of meaning and 
framed by their experiences, culture and relationships with others. Their interactions 
are exercised and organised to create structures within a society, which is in this case 
through networks that are predominantly technical in nature. This social structure then 
produces human actions to form a network of interactions. 
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Castells’ theory of network society might explain the concept of information and 
communication technology (ICT) and its influence in a society in this thesis, however, 
the focus of this study is how people interact with each other to create certain patterns 
of social practices guided by a context of regulation. Therefore the emphasis placed 
on the organising concept of a network of interactions established and facilitated by 
ICT, which is Castells’ emphasis, does not align with the objective of this study.  
ANT is a methodological approach to social theory that explores the relations within 
a network of human and non-human entities. It originates from science technology 
studies and was developed in the 1980s by Bruno Latour, Michel Callon, and John 
Law. Its main conceptual breakthrough is its inclusion of materials or nonhumans as 
actors in social systems or networks (Latour, 2005). Dankert (2012, p. 46) summarises 
the approach as the establishment of connections and reconnections between human 
and non-human entities which can lead to the creation of new entities that do not 
necessarily practice the sum of characteristics of the constituent entities. More so than 
Castells’ network society, ANT views technology as exercising independent agency 
(Latour, 2005). ANT makes no analytical distinction between humans and non-
humans for the purposes of understanding agency or action and simply treats them as 
actors or actant (Latour, 1990, p. 129). As such, ANT’s definition of all entities as 
actors is not compatible with the approach taken in this thesis where only humans and 
their institutions are considered actors capable of producing actions.   
In addition, although ANT also studies the relations between actors, generally 
speaking in ANT social system and technology are inseparable. According to Elbanna 
(2011, pp. 136-137), Latour treats society in his theory as a heterogeneous network 
constructed of materials such as the agents, texts, devices, architectures, which link 
together and formulate themselves to reproduce a sociotechnical interaction within 
institutions of social systems. This certainly does not align with structuration theory 
and my own views of society as consisting of repeated human social activities 
practiced in individual’s routines differently or similarly through time and space.  
Structuration theory 
As Giddens (1984, p. 2) says “the basic domain of study of the social sciences, 
according to the theory of structuration, is neither the experience of the individual 
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actor, nor the existence of any form of societal totality, but social practices ordered 
across space and time”. Hence, structuration theory is a social theory that gives the 
most attention to social practice within society. The theory has three main elements: 
structures, agents and the duality of structure. Giddens (1982, pp. 8-10) understands 
structuration to be the structuring of social relations across time and space and sees the 
reproduction of social systems as an active process of the actors’ performances. 
Thompson explains Giddens’ structuration theory as the “creation and reproduction of 
social practices bound by spatial and periodic structures, based on the analysis of 
structures and agents, wherein neither is more important than the other” (Thompson, 
1989, p. 56).  
The formulation of structuration theory is based on Giddens’ observations on how 
people conduct their activities daily in social life. Individuals learn what actions are 
right and acceptable within any given society by watching what others do. If they think 
that certain actions are right, they will continue to carry on the actions. If they do not 
agree with an action, they can carry out a protest or perform a contrary or different act. 
It is through the repetition, adjustment and routine of actions and reactions as described 
above that certain norms, rules and structures appear to become features of a society 
(Allan, 2011, p. 252). These features are originated from the individual’s routines 
patterned in the same ways or differently through time and space (Giddens, 1984, p. 
3). Together they form the feedback loop that is essential within this thesis’ focus on 
the interaction between actors who produce certain practices using their knowledge 
and resources in certain structure. These practises may or may not be repeated to form 
certain mechanism of interactions. They depend on actors’ responses towards certain 
norms and rules in a society through time and space. A new or revised structure will 
emerge as actions are adjusted and exercised regularly by actors and accepted by 
society.  
Structure and structuration  
From Giddens’ perspective, one of the features of society produced after an action is 
performed is the structure. Since individuals who perform actions are human beings 
subject to change and not always constant, the same can be said of the structure their 
actions form. According to Giddens (1984, p. 17), “structures in social analysis refer 
to recursively organized sets of rules and resources which are both medium and 
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outcome of social practices”. Giddens’ definition of structures can be explained using 
an example of the family. Family itself is a system of interactions within a society. The 
concept of a family in general can be applied when there is more than one person in a 
relationship, although nowadays it is a very complex concept. Within a family concept, 
there are many kinds of structures given within the relationship and interactions among 
the individuals involved such as the interactions between spouses, siblings and parent-
child. In relation to Giddens’ definition of structures, the rehearsed and 
institutionalized activities and relationships among the actors shape, link and facilitate 
systems and regenerate other actions which themselves depend on particular norms in 
society.  
Similarly, Allan (2011, p. 253-254) explains, it is when individuals make use of certain 
norms, rules, and material goods within their social practices that the structure then 
comes into existence. The norms, rules and material goods are seen as individuals’ 
assets that enable social practices in presence. Giddens names these properties in his 
theory as rules and resources and he views them as the properties that enable and 
constrain individuals to perform actions.  
Cohen (Cohen, 1989, pp. 214-215): points out that Giddens acknowledges that 
constraints and enablement are complementary and in doing so  
[s]tructuration theory underscores the insight ignored in exclusively 
negative definitions of constraint, that no matter how severe constraints 
may be they always establish opportunities for some more or less 
extensive range of activities which enables actors to intervene in social 
life. 
In the context of this thesis this is an important point as there are many constraints 
such as geographical challenges, infrastructural issues and literacy limits in Indonesia 
that have created opportunities for actors such as CSOs to intervene in social life. I 
return to these in further detail in Chapter 4 but one example of such enablement would 
be the media literacy program such as Internet Safety that ICTwatch put in place to 
ensure novice internet users are not caught up in defamation and blasphemy, which are 
considered illegal under the current ITE.  
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Giddens (1984, p. 17) treats structure as rules and resources, not as an isolated set of 
properties. He further breaks rules down into two categories: normative rules and 
codes of signification. Normative rules are rules that govern behaviour, while codes of 
signification refer to rules in which meaning is produced. Giddens’ account of rules 
refers to the modes of transformative relations integrated into a rehearsed set of social 
practices which express forms of domination and power.  
Normative rules are of great relevance here because in many instances, the ITE was 
written with the intention of regulating online behaviour in Indonesia. For example, in 
Chapter VII it has no less than 11 Articles (27-37) that list “Prohibited Acts” 
(Wiryawan, Djafar, & Santoso, 2011). These range from acts of impropriety and 
provision of false information in electronic transactions to dissemination of 
information aimed at spreading hatred and dissension based on ethnicity and religion. 
However, the attempt at regulating online behaviour has failed at least in part because 
much of the policy is very broadly framed and vaguely worded leaving Indonesian 
Internet users open to extremely harsh “penal provisions” for minor offences. The six 
years’ imprisonment for defamation, for example, or the choice of a fine of up to one 
billion rupiah is a prime example (Anggara, Eddyono, & Napitupulu, 2015, pp. 15-
16).  
Perhaps in the years before Reformasi under the Suharto administration, such 
normative rules might have been acceptable and enforced by the strong arm of the law. 
However, by and large Indonesian society has undergone so much change in what is 
close to two decades since Reformasi that the desire for freedom of expression is now 
understood as a basic right of all citizens and not to be easily given up or trifled with. 
It is this change in social and political attitudes, what Giddens might term as structures, 
that has created a corresponding alteration in the social practices surrounding the 
process of ICT policy formation in Indonesia. 
Haugaard (1992, p. 80), similarly describes a rule as a structural format stored in 
individual memory. Actions are produced by articulating individuals’ knowledge. This 
knowledge is stored in an individual’s memory and works as a rule for the individual 
to perform and repeat actions. These actions then are saved practically in the 
individual’s awareness. People acquire the knowledge through the process of 
reflexivity by observing other people’s activities and questioning whether their actions 
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correspond to the knowledge they have. Then the knowledge is transformed into 
actions. This process is exercised many times in people’s activities and social life. 
Within this definition of a rule, it can be said that structure depends on agents’ memory 
traces or knowledgeability to exist and through the process of reflexivity, rules are 
both learned and preserved.   
The concept of resources in Giddens’ theory of structuration is fundamental because 
resources provide individuals with dual capabilities, namely allocative and 
authoritative resources (Giddens, 1984, p. 258). These resources establish a structure 
of domination and facilitate individuals as agents to generate different types of power 
within kinds of society. I will return later to a discussion on the structure of 
domination, kinds of resources and types of power later in the section of the application 
of structuration theory in the Indonesian ICT policy context. 
The duality of structure 
According to Giddens, society is made up of the interactions of practices that are 
produced and reproduced by individuals. Since human practices are complex and 
dynamic, Giddens uses the concept of the duality of structure to explain the 
relationship between the individuals and structures within a society. It refers to the 
structural properties of social systems; the “conditions and consequences” of actions 
implicated in its production and reproduction (Giddens, 1982, pp. 36-37). The duality 
of structure occurs in a recurrent process when individuals use certain tools and their 
knowledge to act and interact with others to form structures and reproduce actions as 
the medium of social practices. The structures become the outcome of social practices 
when norms and rules carried out in actions are exercised within society. 
The duality of structure distinguishes Giddens’ theory from other social theories 
because it resolves the concept of dualism – a recurrent process of individual actions 
draws out the structure as the medium, then confirming, reaffirming and reinforcing 
an existing structure as the outcome. Although Giddens’ concept of the duality of 
structure was relatively innovative when first theorised during the 1970s and 
introduced in New Rules of Sociological Method: a Positive Critique of Interpretative 
Sociologies, the big challenges lie in how better social structures can be built and how 
more effective agency can be deployed.   
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This, in a sense, is also the central question at the bottom of this thesis: how can better 
ICT Policy be built in Indonesia and whose agency needs to be deployed more 
effectively for this to be the practice? The analysis of the ITE Policy formation process 
here seeks to lay bare the various actors involved but it aims also to understand how 
flaws can be addressed and revised effectively to strengthen such policies. As Cohen 
(1989, p. 200) put it: “if systems are patterned and regulated through series and cycles 
of practices and relations articulated across time and space, what quality of systems 
remains to be addressed?”  
The following section will discuss Giddens’ concept of agents and agency to introduce 
the idea of individuals and their functions within structures. 
Agents and Agency 
Giddens (1984, pp. 5-6) uses the term, agents to denote groups or individuals who 
draw upon structures to perform social actions through embedded memory or memory 
traces. As mentioned earlier, in this thesis I use the term, actors rather than agents. 
Memory traces, according to Giddens are the knowledgeability of the agents, i.e. what 
agents know about what they do and why they do it. The reflexive agents then create 
social practices through recursive activities, monitor their actions reflexively and 
rationalize their actions based on their motivation (Giddens, 1984, p. 377). 
The reflexive monitoring of action, rationalization of action, and motivation of action 
are important aspects of social interactions. When individuals interact with each other, 
they observe each other’s behaviours, pay attention to the flow of conversation and 
monitor their actions. At the same time, they have to provide reasons for what they do 
or rationalize their actions in interactions with others. Giddens discusses the 
‘rationalization of action’ within the concept of consciousness (Allan, 2011, p. 257) 
and divides it into discursive and practical consciousness. Discursive consciousness is 
the ability to express our reason for our actions within social situation. Practical 
consciousness is the knowledge of how to go on in social life. Both discursive and 
practical consciousness are critical to social interactions as they impact actors’ ability 
to perform social practices in the presence of other human beings. It is possible here 
to understand digital media literacy, as defined in this thesis, as part of practical 
consciousness as it enables actors to understand how to do things and behave in online 
social life. 
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Action, by Giddens’ reckoning, “is a consciously intentional ‘doing’ which has the 
unintentional effect of reproducing structure”, (Giddens, cited in Haugaard 1992, p. 
75). Moreover, action should be conceived as a continuous flow of interventions in the 
world that are initiated by autonomous actors. The individual actor has been Giddens’ 
focus for analysing action using the model of what he calls the stratification model of 
action. According to this model, Giddens views actions as performed by the actors, 
limited by unacknowledged conditions of action and unintended consequences of 
action (Thompson, 1989, p. 58-59). In other words, the structuration model describes 
how individual actors continuously monitor the flow of their activities.  
Giddens (1984, p. 9) sees agency as the “capacity to make a difference, also known as 
‘transformative capacity’, i.e. with the power to intervene or to refrain from 
intervention, which is closely connected with power”. Agency does not refer to “the 
intentions people have in doing things, but to their capability of doing those things in 
the first place”. To act is to exert power. “To be able to ‘act otherwise’ means being 
able to intervene in the world or to refrain from such intervention, with the effect of 
influencing a specific process or state of affairs” (Giddens, 1984, p. 14). So, actors 
perform practices (actions) using their capabilities (agency) by making use of certain 
rules and resources to intervene in structures within society. Performing practices also 
brings possibilities and opportunities of change and modification. 
Structuration Theory in the Indonesian ICT policy context  
An examination of the Indonesian ICT policy development process cannot be done 
without looking at the changes in Indonesian government and politics. In the context 
of this thesis, the post-Reformasi period or the period after Suharto regime of 
authoritarianism ended is the most crucial and relevant. This period – extending from 
the 1998 to 2004 – was one where the development of democracy in Indonesia was 
extraordinarily productive as spaces of public discourse about changing and new 
political conditions multiplied online. Reformasi itself, which took place in 1998, 
marked a turning point in governance in Indonesia as it ushered in a democratic 
system. According to Nurhadryani, Maslow and Yamamoto (2009, p. 217), the Internet 
played a major role in facilitating the flow of information and mobilisation of protests 
through the online political discussions that took place around the economic crisis in 
1997. As such, it was the coming together of accumulated political dissatisfaction with 
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a new means of circulating mass dissent and its expression in protests, which led 
ultimately to the collapse of the Suharto regime in 1998. Lim (2006b, p. 96) also relates 
how the Internet has provided independent spaces for and an important means of 
political discussion leading to the social mobilization of an early Indonesian civil 
society.  
In the post-Reformasi period, the Indonesian people, many of whom were student-
activists, academics and journalists, became much more involved and vocal in the 
political process than they were during Suharto’s New Order era. They actively 
searched for more information about politics, formed and joined political parties, and 
contributed to the development of public opinion on the Indonesian government’s 
conduct and other state-related matters (Hill & Sen, 2005, p. 66). Hence, although the 
Internet was introduced into Indonesia earlier in 1983 by the UINET (University of 
Indonesia Network) (Parapak, 1994, p. 66), the growth of democracy in Indonesia is 
not easily disentangled from the role of information and communication technologies 
(ICT). In fact, according to Lim (2006), the booming of Internet outlets known as 
warnet in 1996 were a major breakthrough in political accessibility for Indonesian. For 
the many Indonesians not yet able to afford personal computers at home then, 
“accessing the Internet from warnet [was] a direct form of social engagement” which 
created ‘free space[s]’ where common people meet and discuss about daily life and 
politics without government supervision” (2006b, p. 95). Similarly, Hill and Sen 
(2005, p. 63) argue that the spread of warnet spreading fast from Java and Bali through 
to Sumatra, and Sulawesi between 1996 and 2000, helped drag the public into a cyber-
community. 
Alongside the political and social changes of the post-Reformasi period were changes 
wrought in the field of Indonesian telecommunication management, which culminated 
in September 2000 with the implementation of the Telecommunication Law (1999) 
(https://jdih.kominfo.go.id/). Before this law’s enactment, Indonesian 
telecommunication services were administered by a monopoly. The state played the 
dominant role acting as both regulator and operator. Based on the Law of 
Telecommunication (Law No 3/1989) (https://jdih.kominfo.go.id/) current then, only 
BUMN (state-owned enterprises) were given licences to manage basic 
telecommunication service in Indonesia. The two companies licensed were PT 
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Telekomunikasi Indonesia Tbk (Telkom) and PT Indonesia Satelite Corporation Tbk 
(Indosat). Any national or international private companies who wanted to be involved 
even in the most basic provision of telecommunication services in Indonesian had to 
incorporate Telkom or Indosat (Budhijanto, 2010, pp. 37-38). The state-mandated 
duopoly resulted in many benefits for the two companies. However, it also resulted in 
poor consumer-oriented service and a ‘take it or leave it’ attitude in the 
telecommunication service industry (Lee & Findlay, 2005, p. 340). This remained the 
status quo for 10 years until the new Telecommunication Law (1999) enacted in 2000 
came into effect.  
While the technological, social and cultural developments that led up to the Reformasi 
and events that followed immediately afterwards remain of great significance, 
relatively lesser attention has been paid by commentators to the telecommunication 
policy changes that accompanied and continue to flow on from that important epoch. 
This thesis seeks to address the gap using Giddens’ structuration theory to understand 
the interplay between government, big business and civil society (the latter in the form 
of CSOs). 
The Telecommunication Law (1999) was prompted by the arrival of an era of global 
competition and deregulated private participation in telecommunication industry 
through public-private partnership programs. It was based on an anti-monopoly 
principle and designed to create a space for competitive practices and an orientation 
towards consumer interest and telecommunication users. The new Act was an attempt 
by the Indonesian government to reform the national telecommunication system in 
accordance with the development of global technologies and the convergence between 
information and broadcast technologies. It reinforced the liberalisation of the 
Indonesian telecommunication industry from the duopoly of Telkom and Indosat 
detailed above to one supported by a pro-competitive regulatory system (Lee & 
Findlay, 2005, p. 341). Both state-owned enterprises Telkom and Indosat were 
eventually privatised in the 1990s (Lee & Findlay, 2005, p. 345) and in this thesis, 
taken to be the big business actors in the structure of the ITE Policy. 
Under the Indonesian legal system, the Telecommunication Act outlines only the basic 
principles, and authorises detailed implementation measures that were to be 
determined by the designated ministry (the Ministry of Communications) through 
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governmental, ministerial and DGPT administrative decrees, depending on the nature 
of the subject. 
As the use of ICT and the Internet in business practice and information activity 
increased throughout 2000s, it became apparent that there was an urgent need to 
manage this system with a more specific regulation because the extant Law of 
Telecommunication (1999) was not equal to the task. ITE was drafted in 2003 to 
address the gap in the regulations and since 2008, served as the Indonesian cyber law 
until today (Maskun & Khairunnisa, 2016, p. 140).  
The ITE and its rollout between 2008 and 2015 is the subject of study for this thesis. 
The rationale for focussing attention on this policy specifically is to understand the 
role that the interactions, discussions and exchanges between the government (the 
Ministry of Communication and Information), three specific CSOs (Medialink, 
ICTwatch and Satudunia) and big business (Telkom and Indosat) play in the process 
of ICT Policy formation. In doing so I will follow its trajectory from when it was 
enacted during President Yudhoyono’s term and the issues that have led to its revision 
under President Widodo’s administration.  
Giddens’ structuration theory functions as the lens to view the interactions and 
contestations between the government, CSOs and big business within the structure of 
the Indonesian ICT policy development. It also serves as the holistic framework for 
examining how the legislative process of the Indonesian ICT policy unfolded after the 
enactment of ITE in 2008.  
In applying structuration theory to the Indonesian ICT policy, the legislative system of 
policy formation process is likened to rules that through their hold on power and 
facilities, dominate the structure of Indonesian telecommunication system. ITE and 
related ministerial regulations are both the rules and resources at the same time. The 
legislation process then serves as the form of communication that manages the 
interactions among the actors within the structures. Actors’ knowledge and their ICT 
abilities together with the established networks of CSOs are forms of resources that 
link structures, actors and social practices. 
As Giddens (2003, pp. 455-456) puts it:  
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[a]ll social interaction involves the use of power, as a necessary implication 
of the logical connection between human action and transformative 
capacity. The stocks of knowledge drawn upon by actors in the production 
and reproduction of interaction are at the same time the source of accounts 
they may supply for the purposes, reasons and motives of their action.
  
Understanding a society as being made up of interactions and contestations of actors, 
structures and duality of structure within the Indonesian ICT policy development 
requires a multi-layered examination on the formation, confirmation, reinforcement 
and transformation of social practices. This thesis attempts to contribute to the 
understanding by investigating those interplays within the period after ITE enactment 
from 2008 to 2016.   
The two former state-owned enterprises, PT Telkom and PT Indosat represent big 
business in this thesis. As the two firms that formed the duopoly under the previous 
ICT policy, they continue to play important roles in the telecommunication services 
development in the country albeit from the reduced position of two private operators 
among many others. Finally, although there would be few government departments 
that have nothing to do with telecommunications today, in Indonesia it is the Ministry 
of Communications and Informatics that oversees its day-to-day operations. As such, 
it rightly stands as the government actor in this thesis. In aggregate, all three groups – 
government, CSOs and big business – are deemed actors, after Giddens’ structuration 
theory. 
Since the Reformasi era, online activism and activists have gained even greater 
momentum and prominence. The Internet also played a significant role in overall civil 
society development in Indonesia (Lim, 2003b, 2005; Nugroho, 2008). In fact, 
according to Lim, the proliferation of Internet cafes during the end of the 1990s and 
discussions surrounding the monetary catastrophe in Indonesia fostered much of civil 
society’s call for a change in regime change in 1998 (Lim, 2007, p. 221). Hill and Sen 
(2000, 2005) argue that the Internet has been an important factor in the political 
development of Indonesia’s nascent democracy because it has facilitated the 
involvement of ordinary Indonesians in policy making at the local and national level.  
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In the context of social and political change, Internet use by Indonesian CSOs has 
certainly played a historical role. During the authoritarianism of the New Order, it 
provided social movements with alternative sources of information, which were very 
important for building the pro-democracy coalition. For example, a free Internet 
mailing list known as Apakabar or INDONESIA-L moderated and contributed by John 
MacDougall in USA, which emerged during 1990s, was popular as a crucial source of 
uncensored domestic and global information (Hill & Sen, 1997, p. 75). Apakabar, 
together with the popular warnet (internet kiosk) were used to distribute alternative 
information about government programs and politicians’ practices in 1996 and to 
support the creation of open and democratic debate and the rise of civil society in 
Indonesia (Lim, 2002, p. 387).  
With regards to the concerns of the CSOs, after the toppling of the Suharto regime was 
achieved, solidarity became less of an objective for CSOs. The divisions between them 
became clearer as they each pursued different missions (Hadiwinata, 2003). Since 
then, the diversity of advocacy groups and civil society organizations has flourished 
all over Indonesia. According to Nugroho (2008, pp. 10-12), 92 percent of Indonesian 
CSOs have used the Internet to achieve their stated organisational goals and missions. 
For example, the use of the Internet has also influenced the way environmental CSOs 
work on forest protection in Indonesia. Research conducted by Kurniawan & Rye 
(2013); Rosyadi, Birner & Zelelr (2005); and Santoso (1999) suggest the Internet to 
be an important tool for fulfilling various purposes in environmental activism efforts. 
The use of the Internet has also been crucial to the CSO networks’ regional and global 
expansion. Such international partnerships are of benefit to Indonesian civil society, 
lending bargaining power in legislative processes.  
No CSOs were involved in the ITE policy formation process from 2003 to 2008, 
leaving the consulted academics from the three elite universities as the sole parties 
concerned with the interests of the public. However, since its enactment in 2008, CSOs 
have been crucial to implementing, documenting and reviewing the ITE’s rollout 
(Wiryawan et al., 2011). CSOs have also played an important role in discussions and 
lobbying the government to revise the ITE policy (Eddyono, Anggara, & Napitupulu, 
January 2016). I will explain this matter further in Chapter 6. 
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Research methods 
To illustrate, I have chosen to focus on three specific CSOs as instances of civil society 
in action. The three CSOs were chosen because they are the main organisations 
actively involved in the development of ICT policy in Indonesia, especially policies 
that regulate the Internet, over a minimum of four years. The variety in their scope of 
activities mean they also serve Indonesian society at different levels. Satudunia, for 
example, works at the national level, although it is linked to the global network, 
Oneworld whereas ICTwatch is a member of the regional hub for Internet governance, 
CitizenLab. Since 2002 ICTwatch has devoted itself to enabling and running Internet 
safety, Internet rights and Internet governance campaigns. Its current project is 
concerned with advocacy in the area of Internet governance. Meanwhile, Medialink 
operates at the local level and only in certain provinces in Indonesia. At present, 
Medialink activities are concentrated in Central Java, East Java and Ambon. 
Considering the multi-layered complexity with which ITE plays out in Indonesia, it 
was necessary to examine CSOs that operate at different levels of society.  
The three CSOs also share the similarity of using websites (http://ictwatch.id/, 
http://medialink.or.id/, http://www.satudunia.net/) as their main avenue for advocacy 
and dissemination of information to the public. All operate with the principle of open 
data and sharing, so there are some overlaps in the programs they run for ICT skills 
development. Their goals are also broadly similar, i.e., to enhance ICT as strategic 
tools for a better democracy.  
In 2015, I conducted interviews with several key personnel at the three CSOs: 
ICTwatch, Satudunia, and Medialink in search of some first-hand knowledge on their 
organisations’ interactions and roles in the ITE policy review and revision process. 
The key personnel were identified by their experience and knowledge of ITE issues 
and their positions in the organisations they work. For example, people who arranged 
ITE campaigns and people who managed training classes for activists whose concerns 
was ITE revision process. I used a pseudonym to mention the key personnel in this 
thesis. Pseudonyms have been used to protect the confidentiality of the information 
shared during the interviews. For example, Agus from Satudunia, who has been 
organising regular discussions, talks and workshops to strengthen a knowledgeable 
civil society organisations in Indonesia. He has also facilitated writing classes and 
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journalistic trainings for activists and teachers to share information and write news 
about ITE and its revision process in mass media. The interviews were conducted in 
Indonesian as the language of conversation in order to yield more natural information. 
Unless otherwise stated, all translation and transcription work was completed by a 
professional transcriber. The semi-structured interviews conducted 2-4 times with the 
same key persons and took place in informal settings and, as such, varied in length 
with the longest occurring over 90 minutes and the shortest running to just over 30 
minutes.  
Examination of all three CSOs’ off and online publications, bulletins and reports, 
particularly those related to ITE was also undertaken. I also examine government 
publications, bulletins and reports, specifically from the Indonesian Ministry of 
Communication and Information which range from the year 2008 until 2016. Those 
documents were selected by using keywords of ITE formulation, implementation, its 
revision process and infringements. This information is then analysed according to the 
objectives of this research and Giddens’ theory of structuration as the theoretical 
framework, using a thematic analysis, which is one of the most common forms of 
analysis in qualitative research. A thematic analysis emphasizes pinpointing, 
examining and recording patterns or themes within data (Braun & Clarke, 2006). 
Themes are patterns across data sets that are important to the description of a 
phenomenon and are associated to a specific research question.  
I also use this information as examples to explain the process of ICT policy 
development in Indonesia by looking at a case study of ITE, practices conducted and 
contested by actors involved in the process, such as government, big business and civil 
society organisations. A detailed discussion of CSOs’ roles in ITE implementation and 
review will be explained in chapter 5. 
Conclusion 
I contend that the strength of Giddens’ framework lies in the duality of structure that 
explains how social practices at micro-level can and do, affect macro-level structures. 
While structures such as the ICT policy facilitate, and in some cases, proscribe 
Indonesians’ use of the Internet from day-to-day, what Indonesians do on and with the 
Internet, in other words their media and social practices, feed back into the structures. 
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The urge to legislate on what kinds of media content can be legally accessed, for 
example, is an outcome of this feedback loop. It is in this manner that the ICT policy 
and system is both medium and outcome (Giddens, 1984). It is where what some might 
deem deviant social practices take place and also the result of what is shaped by their 
social practices and their repercussions. The point is, the structure though formed 
remains malleable. 
The theorisation of this dynamism is key to this thesis because the ICT policy system 
in Indonesia is still in its infancy and there are still millions of Indonesians yet to take 
to the Internet, making the structure highly subject to multiple modifications. 
Sometimes responses to the need for change can occur very quickly as it did with the 
legality of motorcycle ride-on-demand mobile phone app, Go-Jek, when President 
Widodo personally intervened to overturn its banning in 2015 ("Go-Jek praises Jokowi 
for withdrawing ban," December 18, 2015, p. 18). Other times, as with the gap between 
the 1999 Telecommunication Law and the 2008 ITE, change takes many years of 
negotiation. There are many reasons for this state of affairs and I discuss the 
background to this in Chapter 3 and 4.
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Chapter 3. Pivotal connection between political history and 
presidential stages and the role of Internet in Indonesia 
 
Introduction 
The main objective of this chapter is to trace the intrinsic connection between the 
Internet and democracy in Indonesia. To do this I look back into the historical 
development of the Internet in Indonesia and the development of new political space 
in the lead up to Reformasi (reform) and afterwards.  
The 1998 Reformasi is a pivotal point in this chapter as it has had a profound impact 
on communication, civil society and democracy in Indonesia. The existence of such 
democratic space in Reformasi, helped by the Internet in Indonesia, can be observed 
in various aspects such as how people express themselves within the system of 
government, how people gather to discuss government’s policy and empower 
themselves through information, and how people express their opinions and 
disagreement about their government’s conduct. This chapter also provides a context 
for understanding changes in the ways Indonesian people communicate, express their 
opinions, and empower themselves as the effect of democratising influences of the 
internet.  
I divide the periods leading to the internet’s development in Indonesia into three main 
parts: 1980s; 1994-1997 and 1998 onwards. Throughout these sections I explain why, 
aside from the government, the two other main actors in the structure of ICT policy 
formation process in Indonesia today are the CSOs and big business.  
Indonesia had been known as an authoritarian country during Suharto’ New Order 
regime from 1966 to 1998. As computer technology developed during the 1980s into 
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) and the internet, an alternative 
source of information and communication between people emerged that contested the 
traditional mass media place as the primary source of information on government 
activities. Regulatory space for the authoritarian regime then became limited, and was 
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supplemented by a space for more democratic practices and expression. A more 
detailed explanation will be further discussed within the last section of this chapter.  
The condition described above changed slightly when the internet arrived in Indonesia 
in the 1980s. Although adopted limitedly by some elites and individuals, the internet 
provided an alternative way of communication and sharing information that, unlike 
traditional broadcast and print media, was not controlled by the Suharto regime. The 
initial opening of access to information and communication really took off when the 
Internet became commercially available in 1994 (Hill & Sen, 1997).  
The booming of online discussions during New Order regime was influenced by a 
political context, in particular elite conflicts, and the strength of civil society. 
According to Liu (2011, p. 33), Internet space in Indonesia especially during New 
Order regime was seen as a successful example of democratic space. This is due to the 
government’s inability to control the Internet, so that the internet space and practice 
developed in an independent, vibrant, and professional ways. And a strong connection 
between online and offline contentious politics also affected Indonesian internet space. 
Despite the new order’s authoritarian regime and control over the traditional media, 
the introduction of the internet opened up a space outside of this regulatory context 
and enabled more open and democratic expression to be voiced. 
According to Giddens (1984, p. 3) time and space, are ontological categories that frame 
human actions and experience. Accordingly, in this chapter the historical tracing of 
Internet development in Indonesia alongside the response of Indonesian government 
towards the Internet helps to explain how internet has been used so far by Indonesian.  
The right to gather, discuss and express opinions for Indonesians has been granted in 
the 1945 National Constitution, Article 28E 
(https://portal.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/eLaw/mg58ufsc89hrsg/UUD_1945_Peruba
han.pdf). The Article guarantees that every Indonesian can speak their voice and 
discuss it with others together formal and informally. So, the democratic value and its 
constitutional guideline have been known in Indonesia far before the New Order. 
However, the democratic value contrasted with the authoritarian style of the New 
Order regime, which Suharto imposed from 1966 to 1998. Uniformity was 
implemented by the New Order regime to create national stability to support economic 
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development. Disagreement with the government was not expected and would not be 
tolerated (Lim, 2006a). 
Meanwhile, the relationship between the Indonesian government and its people 
became worse when Asian financial crisis hit Indonesia from 1996 to 1997. Even 
before the crisis, Indonesian people were dissatisfied with government because of 
widespread corruption, collusion and nepotism within the Suharto government (Eklof, 
1999, p. 102). The Asian financial crisis was the external factor that worsened 
Indonesian economy and social conditions. This led eventually to the stepping down 
of Suharto from office in 1998 after a massive demonstration against Suharto by 
students in front of the legislative house building in Jakarta on 21 May 1998.  
After the resignation of Suharto, Indonesia went through what later came to be known 
as Reformasi, a transition period during which bureaucratic reform took place. Some 
important changes of this period can be said to have been the revision of five political 
laws on elections, parliament, political parties, social organizations and referenda 
(Lanti, 2010, p.17). Under the leadership of former Vice-President Habibie, these 
revisions led to a boom in the number of new political parties formed and signalled the 
end of authoritarian rule.  
The keterbukaan (open space) years marked the beginning of the replacement of the 
authoritarian New Order coalition with a new cross-class democratic alliance. 
According to Aspinall,  
This was reflected both in the invigoration of middle-class political 
opposition, by signs of unrest in the lower classes, and by attempts to 
establish new forms of cross-class political cooperation. The new political 
assertiveness of the middle class was reflected in greater press boldness in 
response to the largely middle-class readership, the growing range of 
voluntary associations, and the greater vigour of liberal political ideas in 
intellectual circles (Aspinall, 2005, p. 261).  
Suharto’s departure saw Habibie come into office from May 1998 until October 1999. 
Under Habibie’s administration as a reformist leader and modernist Moslem, many 
actions and decisions were taken up as symbolic of new-found freedoms. For example, 
Habibie repealed the SIUPP (press licensing system) that had shackled the freedom of 
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the press, released political prisoners jailed during Suharto era, laid the foundation of 
military reform and supported an independence for East Timor (Liddle, 1999, p. 37).  
The end of the New Order government, therefore, also created a space for 
democratisation in Indonesian NGOs (Hadiwinata, 2003, p. 119). It was after 
Reformasi when the more commonly used term, NGOs, was deliberately cast aside for 
the term, CSOs, in order to signify these organisations’ association with the people 
and community rather than government or political parties. However, although 
democratisation in the post-Suharto era had opened a new opportunity for Indonesian 
CSOs, they still faced the challenges of maintaining the reform movement agenda and 
living up to the trust put in them by their beneficiaries, donors and government through 
enhancing their capacity to fight internal corruption and fraud. 
Habibie’s government was followed by Wahid in October 1999 when Wahid won the 
first democratic election after Reformasi. One telling step that Wahid did take very 
early on was to close down the Department of Information, the main propaganda and 
censorship instrument of the New Order in 1999 (Heryanto, 2010, p. 54). Wahid was 
known by his unique characters and an unconventional approach and relationship 
towards the press. He was more open with the media than any of the past presidents of 
Indonesia. Wahid served as the President of Indonesia until July 2001 (Lanti, 2010, p. 
18).  
Megawati, Sukarno’s daughter, came into power when Wahid was removed from the 
office in July 2001. She served as the President of Indonesia until October 2004, when 
she was defeated by Yudhoyono in the 2004 presidential election. Indonesian political 
contestations during Reformasi through changes in government from Habibie to 
Wahid and Megawati within such a short time, from 1999 to 2001, had affected the 
flourishing of online discussions among Indonesians.  
Yudhoyono is a retired Army general officer and the chairman of the Democratic Party 
of Indonesia who served as the President of Indonesia for two periods, from 2004 to 
2014. Indonesian current president is President Joko Widodo, known as Jokowi. He is 
the seventh President of Indonesia and has been in office since 2014. Jokowi was 
previously a mayor of Surakarta from 2005 to 2012 and a governor of Jakarta from 
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2012 to 2014. He is the first Indonesian president without a military or high-ranking 
political background. 
The details of each phase of internet development in Indonesia and its connection with 
democracy in Indonesia follows. 
1980’s: the Early Adopters 
The first period that concerns this chapter starts in 1983 where along with the 
development of satellite-based telecommunication technology, a limited number of 
Indonesians first connected to the Internet through an initiative of the UINET 
(University of Indonesia Network) (Parapak, 1994, p. 66). At that time the Internet 
was only accessible at top universities like the University of Indonesia (UI) and 
Bandung Technology Institute and research institutions operating under IPTEKnet. 
This last (IPTEKnet), was a National Research Council project established as a non-
commercial information network under the Minister of Research and Technology, 
Professor B. J. Habibie (Hill & Sen, 1997, pp. 71-72).  
Habibe later became the President who oversaw the early transition to Reformasi after 
Suharto resigned. His role as sponsor of IPTEKnet was a precursor to the government’s 
place as an actor in the structure of ICT policy development as per structuration theory.  
The early years of the Internet in Indonesia coincided with the last stages of Suharto’s 
New Order regime. As such, it was marked by the domination of state control and 
surveillance over Indonesian society. Lim (2006b, pp. 89-93) contends that Suharto’s 
New Order government created national identities through the production and 
manipulation of symbols, ideas and images which were inserted in national events and 
programs legitimized by the ‘authorized party’. The events and programs such as a 
flag ceremony on Monday morning, national physical exercise (senam kesegaran 
jasmani) on Friday morning, mass jogging on Sunday morning, Televisi Masuk Desa 
(government controlled national television entering the villages) program as an image 
of unification under Palapa satellite system, Rukun Tetangga and Rukun Warga 
systems were methods of organizing neighbours into layers of state representation to 
support the New Order regime and control society.  To control civil society in 
Indonesia, force and fear were used by the New Order government in both hard and 
soft forms. The Indonesian Armed Forces was present in every province, district and 
52 
village in Indonesia and was both the largest employer and the provider of an 
impressive array of services from schools, health centres, agricultural extension and 
religious affairs offices. The Suharto government did not shy away from using this 
presence to reward supporters and punish opponents (Rock, 2003, pp. 12-13).  
The three dominant political parties that existed during the New Order era were Golkar 
(Partai Golongan Karya, Party of the Functional Groups), PPP (United Development 
Party) and PDI (Indonesian Democratic Party). Problems experienced within political 
parties included corruption, self-absorbed parties, elitism, and weak institutions. 
Indonesia decided not to financially support political parties, which resulted in 
voracious methods on state resources conducted by political parties for their 
operations. Indonesian political parties then became vulnerable to manipulation by 
oligarchic interests (Mietzner, 2013).  
Suharto’s New Order government was highly effective at repressing and controlling 
popular groups in civil society and opposition political parties in Indonesia. Civil 
society groups such as labour unions, farmer organizations, student organizations, civil 
servants, teachers, and industry and business associations were organized and 
controlled as functional groups within Golkar, designed to turn out the vote for Suharto 
and other New Order politicians.  
There were two major forces of influence within the New Order government that 
shaped the Indonesian economic policy. They were: the technocrats and economic 
nationalists. The technocrats favoured market reforms and a limited role for the 
government in the economy while the economic nationalists argued that trade 
protection and direct government investment and regulation were necessary to restrain 
foreign influence while mobilizing sufficient resources to modernise the economy.  
During Suharto’s New Order, the dominant political discourses were of economic 
stability, national development and security. Telecommunications technologies have 
long had a special place in this development era as an enabling factor for economic 
growth. The Palapa satellite system is one of the main project of that era. This 
domestic communication satellite system was inaugurated by Suharto on August 16, 
1976 with the aim to unite the archipelagic country and support national infrastructure 
development. As Suharto (cited in Ibrahim, 2004, p. 4) declared that:  
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[t]hrough the Domestic Communications Satellite Palapa, we can make 
fast, smooth and good quality connection, so that the exchange of news 
and information from and to distant places can be undertaken easily and in 
a short period of time. This fast and accurate transfer of information is very 
important for the efficient running of the government and for economic 
activities, trade activities, defence and security, as well as other activities 
the development process. No less important is the role of the domestic 
communications satellite Palapa which has vast areas and consists of 
thousands of small and big islands that are connected by hundreds of straits 
and wide seas (Suharto cited in Ibrahim, 2004, p. 4).  
An adequate telecommunication networks was crucial during the early years of 
Suharto’s regime for national integration after independence, especially with regards 
to the country’s geographic, demographic and socio-cultural conditions including the 
ever-present potential for regional, ideological and religious conflicts. An effective 
telecommunications system alongside that of transportation was prioritised by the 
Suharto government in successive Five Year Development Plans (Repelita) from 
1968-1979. Suharto’s government also viewed telecommunications services as an 
essential resource for supporting other development programs to do with the economic, 
political, socio-cultural, defence and security of Indonesia. Telecommunication 
infrastructure was seen as an important instrument for democratization and political 
process. It was also viewed as a socio-cultural tool for introducing the national 
language via television programs, supporting community development and 
educational programs as well as the armed forces communication networks (Ibrahim, 
2004, pp. 7-8).   
Technological evolution in communication tools had generated a new perspective in 
democratising information. Commencing with the role of radio as the primary sources 
of information during pre-independence Indonesia, then the use of printed media to 
get information during Sukarno regime, Indonesia under Suharto administration 
experienced a modern phase through television and satellite technologies. People had 
more alternative sources of information although certain information remained 
restricted, particularly with Suharto’s propaganda of political stability and national 
symbolism.  
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The development of satellite technologies in Indonesia was also in line with the 
development of telecommunications corporations since the year of 1961. The state-
owned companies established in 1961 and adapted from the Dutch colonial 
government, Perumtel (Perusahaan Umum Telekomunikasi) were the first providers 
of postal and telecommunications services in Indonesia. Telecommunication service 
was managed separately from postal services from 1965 and followed two years later 
by the establishment of a new state-owned enterprise, PT Indosat (PT Indonesian 
Satellite Corporation), which was established as a separate subsidiary of ITT 
(International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation). PT Indosat became the single 
provider of international telecommunications in Indonesia after being sold by ITT in 
1980. Meanwhile, Perumtel became PT Telekomunikasi Indonesia (Telkom) in 1991 
under Government Regulation No. 25/1991 and was managed as the  provider of 
domestic services (Lumanto & Kosuge, 2005, p. 521).  
Indonesian telecommunication market was, therefore, dominated by the duopoly of PT 
Telkom and PT Indosat. PT Telkom is the only national (state-owned) 
telecommunication company, with its subsidiary mobile operator: PT Telkomsel. 
Between 1994 and 1995 these two major state-owned enterprises were privatised by 
the government of Indonesia through Initial Public Offerings and joint ownership 
arrangements with most subsidiaries. PT Indosat was privatised in 2003, and later 
owned by a foreign (Qatar) telecom company, i.e. Ooredoo Asia Telecommunication 
Pty. Ooredoo Asia holds 65% of shares and the Indonesian government holds less than 
15% of shares. 
For this reason, PT Telkom and PT Indosat are the two companies I refer to when I 
discuss big business as one of the actors in the structure of Internet policy development 
in Indonesia after Giddens’ structuration theory. 
1994-1996: Internet became commercially available  
The Internet finally became generally available to Indonesians in 1994, when the 
country was still facing considerable political strain. In June 1994 IPTEKnet proposed 
the provision of Internet access to academics and researchers. For the purposes of this 
thesis, it is important to note the crucial role that government continued to play, 
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through bodies like IPTEKnet, as an actor in the development of ICT Policy and 
infrastructure.  
Indonesia’s first licensed and commercial Internet Service Provider (ISP): RADNET 
was launched in May 1995 (Hill & Sen, 1997, pp. 71-72) and was followed by PT Indo 
Internet, an ISP in Jakarta that provided internet connections to the Indonesian 
government and limited members of the Indonesian public (Apster, February 2007, p. 
1). There were five commercial ISPs operating by 1995, which grew to twenty-two in 
May 1996 (Hill & Sen, 1997, p. 73). In 1996 an ISP association, APJII (the Indonesia 
Internet Service Provider Association), was formed with the objective to foster a 
supportive environment for ISPs by negotiating and consulting with the government 
on ICT policies (Apster, February 2007, p. 1). 
In 1994, Onno W Purbo and the Computer Network Research Group he established at 
Bandung Technology Institute, wanted to create affordable Internet access for society 
and bypass “the state-owned telecommunications company’s domination” (Lim, 
2006b, p. 94). They were able to do so when they “successfully hooked into the global 
Internet access via a Japanese satellite” with the aid of some engineering innovation 
(Lim, 2006b, p. 94).  This practice of linking directly to satellites is what later allowed 
business to set up warnet (condensed from warung internet, internet kiosk) to provide 
internet access at an affordable price. The bypassing of state-owned and controlled 
telecommunications was pivotal to the Indonesian democracy. 
As it was throughout most parts of the world, many of the earliest adopters of the 
Internet came from academia. Equipped with the necessary know-how and assurance, 
they were the ones able to improvise equipment and defy established media systems 
in Indonesia to create links to the online world. By 2003, these same academics were 
highly familiar with the Internet and its technologies, which may explain why rather 
than the wider public, they were the party consulted when the ITE was drafted in 2003 
by the government.  
This equating of academia with the public became much less tenable as Internet use 
spread across Indonesia and individuals with all levels of education and backgrounds 
located across the country also looked forward to use the Internet. For this reason, I 
argue that CSOs are more representative of public interest in ICT policy development 
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in Indonesia today as they are no longer government-funded or directed, run by 
grassroots volunteers and not associated with opposition parties. 
As noted above, from the 1990s, the Internet became available and familiar to more 
Indonesians through the use of warnet. Lim (2003b, p. 242) describes the “Warnet, 
warung Internet [internet kiosk], [as] a small place equipped by several computers 
hooked to the Internet and rented on an hourly basis”. Warnet can also be understood 
as micro-civic spaces where people of any kind can meet, talk to and interact with each 
other about almost any topic free from the government’s and business interventions. 
Due to the economic crisis and the rise in telephone tariffs and subscription fees, 
warnet provided an important and affordable alternative to individual dial-in accounts 
with commercial ISPs. In fact, Lim (2003c, p. 276) states warnet was the most popular 
internet access point. Lim (2003c, p. 276) sees warnet as forming “an Indonesian 
Internet … attached to the historic cultural context of Indonesian life”. In other words, 
warnet brought Indonesians together in both virtual and real life as they served as 
gathering points where people came to access the Internet and use it to contact or meet 
their friends and families and to do business such as selling and buying products and 
services. 
During this period, the Internet became one of the major alternative media open to 
Indonesians seeking to express, share and discuss their ideas, views about the state’s 
control and corporate economy. Although still classified as “non-basic services” by 
the government, the Internet had by that point allowed information from the outside 
world to flow more freely into Indonesia to colour and influence events. For example, 
a free Internet mailing list known as Apakabar or INDONESIA-L moderated and 
contributed by John MacDougall in USA, which emerged during 1990s, was popular 
as a crucial source of uncensored domestic and global information (Hill & Sen, 1997, 
p. 75). Apakabar, together with the popular warnet were used to distribute alternative 
information about government programs and politicians’ practices in 1996 and to 
support the creation of open and democratic debate and the rise of civil society in 
Indonesia (Lim, 2002, p. 387).  
Mailing-lists and warnets became technologies of freedom despite the Suharto 
government’s control of information through the Department of Information and 
SIUPP (government publication licence). According to Lim (2006a, p. 8), warnet has 
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been made popular for public to form people’s characters and personalities to interact 
with others, even as a symbol of freedom from the state. In addition to other political 
and economic factors such as the Asian Financial Crisis, the growing appetite for 
freedom in Indonesian society is what gave rise to the conditions that forced Suharto 
to resign from his office as President of Indonesia in May 1998.  
1996-1997: Asian financial crisis, people’s dissatisfaction with government, 
warnet developed 
Before Reformasi in 1998, most people in Indonesia had limited access to information 
and technology due to government policy and technology infrastructures. According 
to Lim (2003a, p. 424), warnet started to develop in late 1997 when financial crisis hit 
Indonesia. The 1997 economic crisis that caused the steep depreciation of Indonesian 
currency also had a major impact on the size of telephone bills, not to mention the cost 
of computers and internet connections. Lim (2003a, p. 236) claims that the Indonesian 
government agenda of regulating telecommunication with a monopoly owned-state 
companies and state capitalist system imposed a rigid circumstance for people in 
general to obtain information outside the state’s authority.  
Moreover, Lim (2003a, p. 239) argues that the existence of the Information 
Department in Suharto era was a form of the state’s control of information and the 
expression of ideas across traditional broadcasting and print media. Technology was 
used to manage and disseminate information that was politically acceptable. The 
practices of censorship and bans on the production or distribution of certain 
publications were applied when the information displeased the government.  
The New Order also involved some political efforts to control the dominant religions 
and institutional academics for state purposes. In their examination of printed and 
electronic mass media during the Suharto era, Hill and Sen (2000, p. 120) also found 
communication media to be highly restricted, often censored and concentrated under 
government regulations and business interests.  
According to Hill and Sen (1997, p. 71), the Internet became increasingly well-known 
in Indonesian daily life during the period of 1996-1997 and increasingly the topic of 
much discussion among business people, government officials, political activists, and 
media professionals. Yet, it remained unclear exactly who within the Indonesian 
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government was responsible for the regulation of the Internet. Further, Lim (2003a, p. 
240) suggests that the technological complexity of the Internet and the state’s lack of 
capability in controlling the internet during the late of New Order (1997-1998) made 
it relatively free from restrictions vis-à-vis traditional broadcasting and print media.  
Hill and Sen’s (1997, p. 79) study identify three different departmental divisions in 
charge of telecommunication infrastructures, media content, and technology 
regulations and monitoring. They were Deparpostel (Department of Tourism, Post and 
Telecommunication), Deppen (Department of Information) and Hankam (Ministry of 
Defense and Security). According to Liu (2011, p. 41), during the New Order, the 
Department of Information sole focus was on traditional media. However, in 1995 the 
armed forces did create a special Internet unit to investigate inaccurate online 
information (Hill & Sen, 1997, p. 76). 
Partial liberalisation implemented in Indonesian telecommunication system through 
PPP (Public Private Partnership) arrangements attempted to deal with the poor 
telecommunication development in Indonesia. The issue of regulatory capacity and 
experience also challenged the development process. Therefore, when the overthrow 
of authoritarian rule took place in Indonesia in 1998 with Reformasi, a new system of 
market restructuration and full competition was enforced to enhance 
telecommunication performance and network development. The 1998 Reformasi also 
influenced the contestation between big business and civil society.  
1998: Reformasi 
The political movement known as Reformasi in Indonesia was marked by the removal 
of President Suharto from office after 32 years. Panjaitan, cited in Nyman (2006, p. 
46) describes Reformasi as “a gradual process of change in political structures, 
mechanisms and culture, in order to create a more democratic political environment 
that strives for greater freedom, unity, justice and people’s sovereignty”. This period 
was marked by the increased media liberalisation and a growing democratisation in 
Indonesia. Reformasi in Indonesia also witnessed the rapid growth of civil society 
organizations, especially non-government organizations engaged in community 
development and advocacy (Mishra, 2002, p. 12).  
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Both the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and the political change of May 1998 created a 
strong impetus towards technological development in Indonesia. As already 
mentioned, the number of ISPs decreased in 1998 as the economic crisis saw the cost 
of international connection and telephone calls tariff increase. As a consequence, 
warnet became the most common and affordable access points to the Internet during 
the economy crisis. In fact, according to Purbo (2003, p. 97), warnet provided 60 to 
70 per cent of connections through almost 1,500 outlets in 2001 in major cities in 
Indonesia. Connections were made possible by the use of wireless fidelity (WiFi) 
infrastructure and privately driven without government involvement. According to 
Goswami (2008, p. 134), this innovative use of WiFi was the work of some creative 
individuals who worked at universities and research centres, as mentioned earlier as 
Onno’s and his colleagues’ project. Their aim was to find better and more affordable 
access to the Internet for the public other than through ISP connections. WiFi 
connections were also seen as an ideal solution to Indonesia’s challenging topography. 
Reformasi, the mass use of warnet and Information and Communication Technologies 
(ICTs) towards 2000s contributed to the growing democratisation of Indonesian by 
creating a more open political space for Indonesians. The power of people, rights to 
freedom of expression, voicing dissent and empowerment were some narratives that 
Reformasi had brought for Indonesians. The dominant narrative then was social change 
occurred with greater impact. The greater impact can only be generated when people’s 
movement was lifted by technology, and the Internet particularly.  
The growth of middle class especially in central cities such as Jakarta, played 
important roles in strengthening the process of democracy in Indonesia by the use of 
technology and information. As Aspinall (2005, p. 260) argues, economic growth 
within Suharto’s early government (1966-1980) gave birth to a larger, better-educated 
middle class with interests in democracy. Hand in hand with these interests were the 
demand for more and varied sources of information. This led ultimately to the 
liberalisation of infrastructure and regulatory frameworks from Indonesian 
government, in particular from the Yudhoyono government (2004-2014). 
As actors in the structure of ICT policy development, the government, civil society 
and big business all played a part in the formation and set up of the Internet in 
Indonesia. The actors were both facilitators and resistors in the structure. For example, 
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the effort to bypass state-owned telecommunications infrastructure had created an 
alternative means of accessing the Internet for Indonesians. Social practices such as 
freedom to source and share information freely were facilitated by the alternative 
means of access available via warnets and the failure of the government to turn their 
attention to the content being circulated online.   
Throughout these three phases of the Internet’s development in Indonesia, regulation 
of telecommunications was covered by the Telecommunication Law of 1989. In 1999 
it was replaced with the Telecommunication Act of 1999 as the major political change 
in the Indonesian government, Reformasi, took place in 1998. ITE as the major law of 
the Indonesian Law of Internet, had taken eight years after Reformasi to be enacted in 
2008, although it was firstly drafted in 2003. The details of periods of regulating 
Internet in Indonesia will be discussed briefly in the next chapter. 
Conclusion 
The intrinsic connection between the Internet and democracy in Indonesia can be 
explained by looking at the historical development of the Internet in Indonesia and the 
development of new political space in the lead up to Reformasi (reform) and 
afterwards. Indonesian political system today is a result of historical experience from 
the notion of early liberalism by the Dutch to a notion of democracy which was 
interpreted in many forms such as parliamentary and guided democracies during 
Sukarno era. The idea of democracy even translated into a Pancasila democracy after 
Sukarno’s government. However, democracy was substituted by the authoritarian style 
of government during the New Order in which Suharto, ABRI, and Golkar were in 
control of Indonesian political system for 32 years. It was since Reformasi which took 
place in 1998 and ended New Order period, Indonesian democracy has been moving 
towards a more deliberative form.  
The historical development of the Internet in Indonesia and the existence of such 
democratic space in the 1998 Reformasi, provides a context for understanding changes 
in the ways Indonesian people communicate, express their opinions, and empower 
themselves as the effect of democratising the internet
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Chapter 4. Regulating the Indonesian Internet: From 
Telecommunication Law of 1999 to ITE of 2008 
 
Introduction 
This chapter examines telecommunication and Internet infrastructure development 
approaches in Indonesia through tracing the various government changes from 1983 
to 2016. The aim is to provide the context for understanding the ongoing 
transformations of Indonesia’s Internet strategies towards the Internet. It demonstrates 
that there have been overlapping law and governance of Internet and governments’ 
approaches in regulating the Internet in Indonesia from 1983 to 2016. The central 
question this chapter asks is: how have telecommunication and Internet policies 
developed in Indonesia since the Suharto era?  
The chapter begins with the regulation of postal services and telecommunications 
through to the Internet. It continues the work done in Chapter 2 to explain why the 
Internet is so deeply integrated into ideals of democracy in Indonesia. Taking its cue 
from Lim (2003b, p. 234), who argues that “technological transformations are 
embedded in power relations”, it seeks to further explicate the connections between 
changing government approaches to ICT policy and technological change in 
Indonesia. The government’s approach in this chapter is understood to include 
policies, laws, regulations, programs, strategies and plans as they relate to 
telecommunication and ICT development.  
In tracing the history of these developments, I expect to add to the depth of 
understanding of how the three actors–government, big business and CSOs–interact to 
inform and construct the structure of Internet policy development in Indonesia. 
Together, these three actors also create the social practices that constitute the structure 
of ICT policy development in the country. Practices are used, after Giddens’ 
structuration theory, to denote actions that are part of the ICT policy development 
process and include consultation, enactment, implementation and revision actions. 
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These practices are contested and repeated by the actors as they interact. Their 
interactions might facilitate, accommodate and even produce certain practices that 
strengthen their relations by resolving tensions. In this case, a new social structure 
might be formed as the result of actors’ interactions. However, it cannot be denied that 
a contrary result might take place where actors’ interactions are less mutual and 
conflicting.  
As in Chapter 2, I divide the period under study into three parts to facilitate 
examination. Each part represents major turning points of telecommunication reform 
in Indonesia from the monopoly control of the state and government in 
telecommunications into the liberalisation model and the ITE law implemented post 
Reformasi. They are: the telecommunication law of 1989; the telecommunication 
reform from 1999 and; the ITE post-enactment from 2008. However, because policy 
tends to be formed retrospectively to technological development, the three periods in 
Chapters 2 and 3 do not entirely coincide with each. Instead, as the following table 
shows, there is considerable lag between the introduction of telecommunication 
technology and the policies that govern them: 
Table 1. Lag between the introduction of telecommunication technology and the 
policies 
Year Chapter 3 Chapter 4 
1983 Early adopters access the Internet  
via IPTEKnet 
 
1989  Telecommunication Act 3/ 1989 
1994 Commercially available internet  
1998 Reformasi  
1999  Telecommunication Act 36/1999 
2003 Draft of ITE  
2008 Enactment of ITE 2008 
2016 Revisions to ITE 
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Each of the periods will be discussed in further detail in later sections. As must be 
obvious by now, I am drawing a picture of the major technological, political and policy 
changes that led up to the enactment of the ITE and its aftermath.  
As my focus is on the Internet, I do not go any further back than 1983. However even 
from the start during the era of its first president, Sukarno, the government of Indonesia 
maintained a state monopoly to control and manage the telecommunication industry, 
using the 1964 Telecommunication Act No. 5. This Act covered all communication 
services and was used to regulate postal services, radio and newspapers during the 
early years of nation-building as means of disseminating propaganda. The 1964 
Telecommunication Law’s main objective was to harness telecommunication to serve 
national interests especially in the development of politics, economy and military 
institutions. It granted the government full authority as the regulator and operator of 
Indonesia’s telecommunication system (Sugondo & Bhinekawati, 2004, p. 99).   
In 1976 the nation’s telecommunication infrastructure was brought up to date when 
Palapa, the national satellite system, was launched by President Suharto (Barker, 
2005, p. 703). Even with loans from international donors for developing 
telecommunications infrastructure in Indonesia, a limited state budget led the 
government to reform the telecommunication sector by implementing the 
Telecommunication Act No. 3 in 1989.  
The main objective of the 1989 reform was to reduce reliance on public funding by 
introducing and authorising private investment into the sector as a means of meeting 
the growing demand for telecom services. The absolute control of the state in 
telecommunication sector was lessened through strategies of revenue-sharing 
agreements, joint-venture companies and joint operations. By 1995, public funding 
had ceased and the government formed a strategic alliance with two domestic private 
companies: PT Telkom and PT Indosat, and a foreign company, Satelindo, for the 
provision of international and mobile basic services (Lee & Findlay, 2005, p. 342).  
I begin my examination in this chapter in 1983 when the early adopters first enjoyed 
access to the Internet through their work on the National Research Council’s projects 
and research institutions under IPTEKnet (Hill & Sen, 1997, pp. 71-72). Despite the 
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small pool of early adopters, the early years of the Internet in Indonesia were important 
because it was when Indonesians were first introduced to and learnt to use the new 
technology as well as understand it as an alternative form of communication and 
interaction. 1983, therefore, marks the first turning point in Indonesian 
telecommunication and ICT policy development. As discussed in Chapter two, the 
interim between the 1989 and 1999 Telecommunication Acts, two major events 
occurred that left their mark on Indonesian society and led to significant changes in 
ICT policy. They were the 1997 financial crisis and Reformasi. 
As Suharto stepped down in 1998, a new style of leadership and government came into 
power with President Habibie. In contrast to Suharto, Habibie had never served in the 
military and was moreover, the same academic who initiated IPTEKnet in the 1980s. 
His style of leadership made for a change in how the government communicated with 
its people. Information became less restricted and the number of sources for media and 
communication increased. In fact, soon after he was in office, Habibie abolished the 
Surat Ijin Usaha Penerbitan Pers (SIUPP), the press licensing system in Indonesia 
(Lanti, 2010). As government controls relaxed and information sources grew, 
Indonesians were able to express their opinions more openly and publicly.  
The second period of concern in this chapter begins with Indonesian 
telecommunication reform in 1999. It can be linked to the enactment of 
Telecommunication Act No. 36 to accelerate the liberalisation of telecommunications 
services through market restructuring and regulatory reform. Open competition was 
introduced to accelerate the restructure of the fixed-line and mobile services market 
using a licensing scheme for telecommunication operators. The Indonesian 
Telecommunication Regulatory Body (BRTI) was also established in this period to 
ensure principles of transparent, independence and competition as part of reform in the 
telecommunication industry (Lee & Findlay, 2005, p. 355).  
Following the reform of the bureaucracy in 1999, the authority to regulate 
telecommunications was transferred to the Ministry of Communication and 
Information (MCI, with the Directorate General of Posts and Telecommunications 
(DGPT) under the MCI acting as the enforcement agency. Prior to 1999, 
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telecommunications was the responsibility of the Ministry of Tourism, Posts and 
Telecommunications (MTPT).  
Changes in government system into quasi-democratic systems continued under the 
successive leadership of Presidents Habibie, Wahid and Megawati following 
Reformasi also facilitated public involvement in growing social and political 
organisations, discussions and momentous events such as the 1999 and 2004 national 
elections. ICT and the Internet made the process of democratic elections and 
information about them available to the public, not only in Indonesia but also abroad. 
It was also during this period that Internet usage increased dramatically and the 
government initiated the e-government program in 2003 (Rachmawati, Suhartanto, & 
Sensuse, 2012, p. 51). The practice of e-government became popular since the 
introduction of the Presidential Instruction No. 3/2003 which contains national policy 
and strategy pertaining e-government development in Indonesia. In addition, the 
Yudhoyono government formed a specific body, Detiknas (the National ICT Council), 
to organize an integrated ICT policy within government departments nationally and 
locally in 2006 (Detiknas, 2010).  
The third period that concerns this chapter starts in 2008, immediately following the 
enactment of the ITE and continues to 2016. ITE was enacted to address the needs and 
interests of actors invested and participating in e-commerce who sought assurance of 
its legal status and protections in Indonesia. Among other things ITE introduced the 
acknowledgment of digital signatures and electronic proof as valid evidence in a court 
(Kementerian Komunikasi dan Informatika, 2010). ITE remains the only law in 
Indonesia that directly addresses the conduct of cyber activities but it has proven 
controversial because its regulation of prohibited acts online has been too vaguely and 
broadly formulated (Eddyono et al., January 2016). 
It was during the second term of Yudhoyono’s government that ICT development was 
finally consolidated through a national ICT strategy. The ICT White Paper drawn up 
in 2010 is the Indonesian roadmap containing projections of ICT infrastructure 
development up to 2020 (Kementerian Komunikasi dan Informatika, 2010). The 
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following table illustrates the three periods outlined above and the key events that 
occurred therein: 
 
 
 
67 
 
Table 2. The development of Indonesia telecommunication and ICT infrastructure and policies 
Year Changes in technologies  Changes in policies  Government periods and 
actors 
Before 1983 Radio, newspaper and postal services. 
Satellite development in 1976 
Telecommunication Act no 5/1964:  
Government monopoly as regulator and operator of 
telecommunications 
 
President Sukarno (1945 – 1965) 
President Suharto (1966 – 1998) 
Indosat, Perumtel and Satelindo 
Telecommunication 
Law 1989 (1983 -
1998) 
Newspaper and television. The Internet was 
introduced in 1983  
Telecommunication Act no 3/1989: 
Liberalisation/privatisation, government as regulator and 
private investment in Telecommunication industry. 
The Act implemented PPP (Public Private Partnership) 
program, Kerja Sama Operasi (Joint Venture) program and 
Pola Bagi Hasil (Revenue Sharing) program. 
 
Suharto 
Telkom and Indosat 
CSOs (donors’ aid and students 
movement) 
The 1999 
telecommunication 
reform (1999 - 2008)  
Digital media and convergence platform 
a key national ICT program: the National 
Single Window (INSW) system applications 
in 2007 
Universal Service Obligation (Casey & Toyli) 
program began in 2007 
Telecommunication Act no 36/1999 
The law divided the policy and regulatory functions, increased 
private participation, and guaranteed justice and equity 
principles in the telecommunication sector. 
Reformasi and second term of liberalisation of 
Telecommunication industry to enhance ICT development as 
economy enabler.  
Nusantara 21 program started in 2000 
Habibie (1998 – 1999) 
Wahid (1999 – 2001) 
Megawati (2001 – 2004) 
Yudhoyono (2004 – 2014) 
Civil society (CSOs) as 
campaign initiators to balance 
government policies. 
ICTwatch in 2002 
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Presidential Instruction No 6/2001: Telecommunication, Media 
and Information. Telematics technology should be used by 
government officials to enhance a democracy process and good 
governance. 
Formation of Indonesian Telecommunications Regulatory 
Body (BRTI) in 2003 to ensure transparency, independency and 
fairness in telecommunication network and service operations. 
 
ITE post-enactment 
(2008-2016) 
Palapa Ring Project in 2009 
BWA (Broadband Wireless Access) service 
and network competition was introduced by 
the Indonesian government in 2009 to increase 
ICT tele-density 
A Community Access Point (CAP) scheme as 
the Internet community centres in 2012. 
78,160 base transceiver stations across the 
country to support basic telephony services. 
Telecommunication Act no 36/1999 
ITE no 11/2008 
Ministerial regulations of negative content in 2010 
A national ICT Roadmap 2010-2020 along with a national 
flagship program in 2010 
Indonesian Economy Development Expansion Acceleration 
(MP3EI) Masterplan establishment. MP3EI is a strategic 
direction for accelerating and widening Indonesia economy 
development during period 15 years from 2011-2025 in 
accordance to National Long Term Development Planning 
2005-2025 
Yudhoyono (2004 – 2014) 
Jokowi (2014 – present) 
Telkom, Indosat 
Satudunia and Medialink in 2010 
Civil society (CSOs, individuals 
using social  media apps) 
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In the following sections, each of the three periods: 1983-1998; 1999-2008 and; 2008-
2016 will be explored in detail to provide the necessary background to understanding 
the dynamic processes of telecommunication and Internet policy development in 
Indonesia.  
1983 – 1998: Telecommunication Law of 1989 
The first period is the period in which Suharto government and Telkom (a state-owned 
company) were the dominant players in developing Indonesian telecommunication 
infrastructure and managing telecommunication policies. During the 1990s, both the 
telecommunication and ICT systems and sectors were regulated by the 
Telecommunication Act No. 3/1989. The Act allowed the Indonesian 
telecommunication sector to be liberalised by introducing private investment in the 
telecommunication industry. As Sugondo and Bhinekawati tell it, by 1995 the 
government’s plan was to have all telecommunication development financed by 
private companies, leaving the government as the regulator of telecommunication 
industry (2004, p. 99). The 1989 Act permitted private investors to provide basic 
services through PPP (Public Private Partnership) arrangements. The KSO (Kerja 
Sama Operasi/ Joint Venture Operation) scheme became the only option available for 
domestic fixed-lined services, while either the PBH (Pola Bagi Hasil/ Revenue-
Sharing Agreement) or a JVC (Joint Venture Company) models was possible for 
mobile services.  
The Act also classified telecommunication services into one of two categories, basic 
and non-basic. Basic services were controlled by the government and operated by the 
two state-owned companies: Telkom and Indosat as the ‘operating bodies’. Satelindo 
joined as the third operating bodies for the provision of international and mobile basic 
services in 1994 as a joint venture company. One year after that, Telkom was granted 
a 15-year exclusive right as fixed-line basic provider and Indosat/Satelindo received a 
10-year exclusive right to provide international services (Lee & Findlay, 2005, p. 344).  
For non-basic services, the 1989 Act relaxed entry restrictions for private operators 
(‘other bodies’). As a result, by 1999 there were hundreds of ISPs and many operators 
of Internet telephony service in Indonesia. However, as there were complaints from 
the ‘operating bodies’ of claims about government income in early 2000, the 
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government restructured the setup of Internet telephony service providers requiring 
them to have a licence or merge with Telkom and Indosat (Lee & Findlay, 2005). 
1999 – 2008: Telecommunication Law of 1999 
The year of 1999 was seen as an important phase of telecommunication reform, which 
occurred alongside the national program of economic reform. This second period of 
Indonesian telecommunication reform was marked by the introduction of 
Telecommunication Act 36/1999, which superseded the previous Act, 
Telecommunication Act 3/1989 and deregulated private participation in the 
telecommunication industry through public-private partnership programs. The new 
Act reinforced the liberalisation of the telecommunication industry from a monopoly 
of two state-owned telecommunication operators: PT Telkom and Indosat to one 
supported by a pro-competitive regulatory system (Lee & Findlay, 2005, p. 341). 
Under the Indonesian legal system, the Telecommunication Act outlines only the basic 
principles, and authorises detailed implementation measures to be determined by the 
designated ministry (the Ministry of Communications and Information) through 
governmental, ministerial and the Indonesian Telecommunication Regulatory Body 
(DGPT) administrative decrees, depending on the nature of the subject.  
The 1999 Act had two main reform objectives. They were to restructure how 
telecommunication companies operate to improve competition and to reduce the 
disparity in access to telecommunication services across the spread of Indonesia. As 
Lee & Findlay (2005, p. 354) explain: 
The government initiated the 1999 reform phase with the publication 
in 1999 of the ‘Telecom Development Blueprint’. According to the 
Blue-print, the primary objectives of the 1999 reform were: first, to 
move away from the traditional public-private partnership (PPP) 
model so that private operators were no longer required to cooperate 
with a state-owned incumbent in all service categories; second, to 
introduce competition through a sequenced approach, by creating a 
duopoly market structure in fixed-line operations between Telkom 
and Indosat, and to have the two incumbents compete in the domestic 
and international service markets; and finally to establish a regulatory 
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framework that is transparent, independent and pro-competition. 
These principles were reflected in the enactment of Telecom Act 
36/1999 (the 1999 Act) in 2000. 
Following the 1999 Act, Presidential Decree No. 6, ‘Information and Communication 
Technology Development and Usability in Indonesia’ was issued in 2001 as an 
indication of the government’s commitment to making the optimal use of ICTs in 
Indonesian society and to unify the nation (Utoyo & Mudiardjo, 2007, p. 161). In 2001, 
the government also released a 5-year Action Plan for the Development and 
Implementation of ICTs by Presidential Instruction No 6/2001 as a framework for 
policy development in telecommunications, IT and e-commerce. This action plan was 
implemented by TKTI (Indonesian Telematics Coordinating Team), itself formed in 
2003 by Presidential Decree No. 9/2003 (Zita, 2005). Through TKTI, the government 
made an effort to coordinate across state agencies and promote warnets. TKTI was 
also responsible for telecommunication infrastructure and applications, legal 
structures, human resources, finance and investment, standardization issues and e-
government. Indonesian government also began to develop the National Information 
System program (Sisfonas) in 2002 to provide telecommunication services to rural 
villages across Indonesia by 2010 (Utoyo & Mudiardjo, 2007, p. 165).  
Within this period, the government of Indonesia started to focus more on the 
development of ICT policies. Through the establishment of Detiknas or the Indonesian 
National ICT Council in 2006, the government under Yudhoyono sought to accelerate 
the growth of ICT through a synchronization of ICT programs between government 
departments, ministries and units. Detiknas is an executive-coordinated body formed 
in 2006 by a Presidential decree No. 20/2006 and headed by the President of the 
Republic of Indonesia. It manages a number of strategic national ICT flagship 
programs which act as the basis for other Indonesian ICT programs development and 
element of Indonesian ICT blueprint. The flagship programs that extend from the e-
Indonesia program in 2006 consist of seven programs such as e-procurement, e-
education, e-budget, National Single Window (INSW), Single Identity Number (SIN), 
the Palapa Ring project, and a software legalization program (Detiknas, 2010). 
In 2007, there were two other significant government efforts in the area of Internet 
policy. First was the establishment of ID-SIRTII (The Indonesia Security Incident 
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Responses Team on Internet Infrastructure). ID-SIRTII was responsible for ensuring 
network safety and security in accordance with Indonesian laws. Its aim was to 
discourage and eliminate the misuse of Internet applications such as hacking, cyber 
criminalities and terrorism. The team includes representatives of the Central Bank, 
academics, ICT experts and law enforcement bodies. The team is also expected to 
assist the Minister of Communication and Information Technology in discharging the 
planning, coordinating, supervising and controlling functions of ID-SIRTII (Utoyo & 
Mudiardjo, 2007, p. 164). Second was the assignment of BRTI to amend the 
Telecommunication Law in late 2007. As explained previously in chapter 1, BRTI 
acted as the Indonesian primary regulatory decision-making body to ensure the 
principles of transparency, independency and fairness in telecommunication network 
and service operations (Lee & Findlay, 2005).  
This period is also important as the first draft of the ITE was prepared in 2003 by 
Directorate General of Post and Telecommunication (DGPT) and the Department of 
Industry and Trade. The draft was then discussed with academic elites from 
Padjadjaran University, University of Indonesia, and Institute of Technology 
Bandung before it was delivered to the House of Representatives (DPR) by President 
Yudhoyono in 2005. The ITE Bill was deliberated in DPR together with the Minister 
of Communication and Information and the Minister of Law and Human Rights as 
government representatives. During the deliberation process in DPR, Yudhoyono 
created a task force to undertake discussion of the ITE. After extensive deliberations 
carried out from 2006 to 2008, ITE was finally enacted in March 2008 (Zulhuda, 
2003). 
There are two points of note in the seemingly straightforward process described above. 
The first is the absence of consultation with CSOs and big business, the second is the 
omission of broader dissemination of the Bill under discussion to the Indonesian 
public. Both of these meant that public participation in the process was limited to the 
elites in academia and government, bypassing the feedback and input of ordinary 
Indonesians. If we view this through the lens of structuration theory, then it is possible 
to say that an actor (the public) essential to the success of the structure and the social 
practices that ensue from it was conspicuously absent. I discuss the consequences of 
their omission further in chapter 5 but it is sufficient to note at this point that after its 
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enactment, the ITE had faced judicial reviews twice in 2008 and 2009 and encountered 
lots of protests and concerns regarding ambiguous and imprecise formulation of 
certain articles. 
2008 – 2016: ITE enactment, implementation and revision process 
The third stage of Indonesian telecommunication history sees further development of 
national, strategic and integrated policies for ICT. The enactment of the ITE in 2008 
established rules for the protection of private rights and data, certificates of authority, 
domain names, dispute resolution and intellectual property rights. Any deliberate, 
unauthorised, and unlawful interception or tapping of electronic information and/or 
electronic documents or its transmission, other than for the purpose of a legal 
enforcement is a breach of the ITE and subject to sanctions. The law also prohibits 
online pornography, gambling, slurs and defamatory attacks, extortion and threats 
(Meurling et al., 2012, p. 243).  
The Law No 11/2008 of Electronic Information and Transaction states that the 
government facilitates the usage of ICT and electronic transactions according to the 
regulations embedded. The Law also mentions that the government provides 
protection to public interest from any disturbances resulting from the misuse of 
electronic information and transactions that might disrupt national security. As already 
mentioned, ITE’s intent was to facilitate e-commerce by guaranteeing the acceptance 
of electronic or digital signatures as legal evidence in the courts of Indonesia (Ministry 
of Communication and Information). The second term of the Yudhoyono government, 
which began in 2009 was, therefore, a period where a stable, if fairly new, democracy 
was able to demonstrate a strong commitment towards ICT development in Indonesia. 
The bulk of ITE and its original impetus is concerned with enabling e-commerce in 
Indonesia and assuring merchants interested in taking up the vast new markets online 
of its security. However, there remain nine articles in ITE that needed further 
explanation using state and ministerial regulations. They are article 10 of certification 
institution, article 11 of electronic signature, article 13 of electronic certification 
administration, article 16 of electronic system administration, article 17 of electronic 
transaction administration, article 22 of electronic agent administration, article 24 of 
domain name management, article 31 of interception procedure, and article 40 of 
government role in ICT use. In 2011, after two years of implementing ITE enactment, 
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MCI confirmed there to be slow response towards specific regulations needed for these 
nine articles, and that this resulted in uncertainty over supporting regulations for online 
transactions in Indonesia (Eddyono et al., January 2016).  
From 2008 to 2013, attempts to revise ITE by CSOs met with silence from the 
Indonesian government, the MCI and DPR, although there was a steep increase in 
infringements against ITE during that period. Article 27 of ITE, which relates to illegal 
Internet content, was badly in need of more detailed explanations that were not 
forthcoming from government or ministerial regulations as required (Djafar & Abidin, 
2014). Small wonder, then, that a report from ELSAM (Institute for Policy Research 
and Advocacy), as CSO’s representation, concluded that regulating Internet content 
using ITE was not appropriate as the law opposes the right of freedom of expression 
(Djafar & Abidin, 2014). In lieu of greater clarity about how ITE could be properly 
implemented during that five-year period, it was left to the Ministry of Communication 
and Information to regulate Internet use.  
Towards the end of President Yudhoyono’s second term in 2014, the government 
suggested a positive response over the revision of ITE. Finally the revision of ITE was 
placed on the list of the National Legislation Program in 2015 under the Jokowi 
administration. The process of revising the ITE policy commenced in 2016 and 
completed by November 2016. Although the ITE revision process was only on minor 
aspects of the law, the revising law has been implemented since then as the Indonesian 
cyber law. 
The Indonesian political system of this period was significantly impacted by the 
national election in 2009 and the use of ICTs. For example, compared to the 2004 
general election, the 2009 general election was distinguished by the progress in how 
the political parties used ICT technologies such as social media in campaigning for 
election. According to Tomsa (2008), Golkar (Partai Golongan Karya or Functional 
Groups Party) and PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera or Prosperous Justice Party) were 
two parties in Indonesia that had relatively high level of institutionalization, compared 
with other parties inside and outside the DPR. The high institutionalization leads to 
social media mandates because it enables parties to develop newer and more 
sophisticated electoral strategies, which is why Golkar and PKS were the only ones to 
enact formal party policy towards social media (Purwoko, 2011), (Sihaloho, 2011). 
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In 2009, the Yudhoyono government made a commitment to free and open source 
software campaigns within Indonesian ministries to support creativity and 
independence in ICT. This policy was also a response to two problems: the prevalence 
of illegal software and piracy and, the limited budgets of government. The policy was 
enacted as reference of the legal and open source software usage and utilization in 
March 2009 (Kementerian Komunikasi dan Informatika, 2012, p. 140).  . 
President Yudhoyono, who began his second term in 2009 also made a strong 
commitment towards ICT development by projecting a national ICT Roadmap 2010-
2020 which aims to reach a status of ‘Indonesia Digital’ in 2020 in relation to the 
vision of ‘Indonesia Information Society’ in 2025. The national ICT roadmap was then 
documented as the White Paper of ICT in Indonesia in 2010. The White Paper is 
designed to be the milestone and outlook of communication and information 
development in Indonesia. It contains the Indonesian ICT development strategy in four 
stages, namely ‘Indonesia Connected’, ‘Indonesia Informative’, ‘Indonesia 
Broadband’, and ‘Indonesia Digital’. (Kementerian Komunikasi dan Informatika, 
2010, p.80). Indonesian ICT roadmap promises a connected Indonesia, which assures 
no blank spots of Internet signals within all regions in Indonesia. This roadmap has 
been underway since 2011 and it is planned that remote and border areas across 
Indonesia have Internet access by the year of 2020. The White Paper of ICT in 
Indonesia was also one of eight primary programs of 22 Indonesian main economy 
sectors, known as MP3EI (Indonesia Economy Development Expansion Acceleration 
Masterplan) establishment (Kementerian Komunikasi dan Informatika, 2012). MP3EI 
is a strategic direction for accelerating and widening Indonesia economy development 
during period 15 years from 2011-2025 in accordance to the National Long Term 
Development Planning 2005-2025. 
Following the MP3EI, The Ministry of Communication and Information has 
constructed priority programs which have been constantly developed such as the 
‘Internet Sehat’ program, the Information Security program, the digital television 
migration program, the ‘Palapa Ring’ project, e-government and e-business 
development programs. A funding scheme of ICT Fund was also formed by the 
Ministry of Communication and Information Regulation No. 23/2012 to finance the 
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broadband service development in Indonesia which was completed in 2014 (Ministry 
of Communication and Information, 2014).   
A joint responsibility system between several directorates under the Ministry of 
Communication and Information was implemented during Yudhoyono government, 
mainly an arrangement between the Directorate General of Post and 
Telecommunication, and the BRTI to manage Indonesian telecommunications 
standards, rules and policies. There are also some other institutions and organisations 
that have concerns towards ICT development in Indonesia. For example, the state 
Ministry of Research and Technology which is responsible for expanding ICT 
infrastructure through the development of computer hardware and applications; the 
Indonesian ISP Association (APJII); the Indonesian Information and Communication 
Society (MASTEL) which bridges the government and ICT industry group; the 
Indonesian Information Technology Federation (FTII) which promotes the growth of 
IT applications and industry; and the Indonesian Domain Name Registry (PANDI) 
which was formed in 2006 to reduce Indonesia’s dependence on overseas domains 
(Utoyo & Mudiardjo, 2009, p. 203). These different types of organisations show that 
a multi-stakeholder principle is involved in ICT development in Indonesia.  
In its second-term of the Yudhoyono government, led by the Ministry of 
Communication and Information, Indonesian government also committed to improve 
the human resources in ICT and reinforce institutions’ commitments in ICT usage and 
development in Indonesia. This commitment is supported by the establishment of an 
institution of multimedia centre in Yogyakarta as the source of skilful human resources 
in ICT. Yudhoyono government’s commitment to democratise Internet policy also 
emerged. Towards the end of Yudhoyono second-term of government in 2014, ITE 
was prioritised to be discussed in the National Legislation Program in 2015 for a 
revision.  
Conclusion 
The interactions among the three actors – government, big business and CSOs – in the 
Indonesian Internet policy development are parts of political context and changes of 
government system. These interactions, sometimes contestations, inform and construct 
the structure of Internet policy development in Indonesia. Together, these three actors 
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also create the social practices that constitute the structure of ICT policy development 
in the country. Through all of the above, it is manifestly clear that in Indonesia the 
style of government affected how big business operated  and that together, these two 
actors in the structure of ICT policy are instrumental to producing and maintaining 
practices within society.  
This chapter had investigated that there have been overlapping law and governance of 
Internet and governments’ approaches in regulating the Internet in Indonesia from 
1983 to 2016. The government of Indonesia had approached to regulate the Internet 
through three major periods: from 1983 to 1998, 1999 to 2008, and 2008 to 2016. The 
Indonesian government began to regulate postal service and telecommunication 
industry in 1983 by implementing the Telecommunication Act No 5/1964. As 
telecommunication technology developed towards the 90s, the Act then was reformed 
from a monopoly control of the state and government in telecommunications into the 
liberalisation model by implementing the Telecommunication Law of 1989. The Law 
had a purpose to enhance both telecommunication and ICT systems and sectors in 
Indonesia by introducing private investment within the telecommunication industry, 
which was not presented before. This initiation had made a major breakthrough for 
Indonesian telecommunication industry.   
When the system of Indonesian government had been reformed significantly in 1998 
and an economic reform was its major agenda, the Telecommunication Law of 1989 
was reformed into the Telecommunication Law of 1999. The Indonesian government 
then deregulated private participation in the telecommunication industry through 
public-private partnership programs. The new Act reinforced the liberalisation of the 
telecommunication industry from a monopoly of two state-owned telecommunication 
operators: PT Telkom and PT Indosat to one supported by a pro-competitive regulatory 
system. Within this period, the government of Indonesia started to focus more on the 
development of ICT policies by establishing several government bodies such as ICT 
Council, ID-SIRTII and BRTI to ensure more supports towards ICT development in 
Indonesia. This period is also important as the first draft of the ITE was prepared in 
2003 by Directorate General of Post and Telecommunication (DGPT) and the 
Department of Industry and Trade. The draft then was discussed by some academic 
elites, then was deliberated in DPR and finally enacted as ITE Law in March 2008.  
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Within the process of ITE draft discussion and deliberation, there are two important 
points to note. The first is the absence of consultation with CSOs and big business, the 
second is the omission of broader dissemination of the Bill under discussion to the 
Indonesian public. Both of these meant that public participation in the process was 
limited to the elites in academia and government, bypassing the feedback and input of 
ordinary Indonesians. If we view this through the lens of structuration theory, then it 
is possible to say that an actor (the public) essential to the success of the structure and 
the social practices that ensue from it was conspicuously absent. 
Entering a period after 10 years of Reformasi in Indonesia, from 2008 to 2016, the 
Indonesian government made some efforts to further develop national, strategic and 
integrated policies for ICT. An important point to note within this period is a dynamic 
process of ITE enactment, implementation and revision. ITE had been responded by 
the Indonesian public due to its vagueness in formulating some Articles concerned 
with the definition of information. As the Yudhoyono’s government became more 
stable in his second period of presidential, ITE’s intent was to enable e-commerce in 
Indonesia and assure merchants interested in taking up the vast new markets online of 
its security. However, there remain nine articles in ITE that needed further explanation 
using state and ministerial regulations. This had resulted in some attempts to revise 
ITE since 2009 by the Indonesian public, represented by CSOs. However, these 
initiations met with silence from the Indonesian government, the MCI and DPR, 
although there was a steep increase in infringements against ITE during that period. 
Towards the end of Yudhoyono second-term of government in 2014, ITE was 
prioritised to be discussed in the National Legislation Program in 2015 for a revision.  
Practices are used, after Giddens’ structuration theory, to denote actions that are part 
of the ICT policy development process and include consultation, enactment, 
implementation and revision actions. These practices are contested and repeated by the 
actors as they interact. Their interactions might facilitate, accommodate and even 
produce certain practices that strengthen their relations by resolving tensions. In this 
case, a new social structure might be formed as the result of actors’ interactions. 
However, it cannot be denied that a contrary result might take place where actors’ 
interactions are less mutual and conflicting.  
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To discuss how these practices are contested and repeated by actors, the next chapter 
will investigate and analyse the ITE formation, implementation and revision process 
using the theoretical framework of Giddens’ structuration theory.
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Chapter 5. ITE Formation Process 
 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to further break down and analyse the ICT policy 
formation process using the theoretical framework of Giddens’ structuration theory. In 
particular, it seeks to view the policy formation process through the macro and micro 
lens of Giddens’ structuration theory. The example of Malaysia is later introduced to 
provide broader contextual understanding of ICT policy development in the Southeast 
Asian region.  
Giddens’ structuration theory acknowledges the interaction of meaning, standards and 
values, and power, which suggests a dynamic relationship in society. For Giddens 
(1982, pp. 8-10), structuration is the structuring of social relations across time and 
space and he sees the reproduction of social systems as an active process of the actors’ 
performances. And structure in Giddens’ view is maintained and adapted through the 
exercise of agency. According to Giddens (1984, p. 17), “structures in social analysis 
refer to recursively organized sets of rules and resources which are both medium and 
outcome of social practices”.  
As outlined in Chapter 2, Giddens (1984, p. 17), treats structure as rules and resources, 
not as an isolated set of properties. He further separates rules into two categories: 
normative rules and codes of signification. Normative rules are rules that govern 
behaviour, while codes of signification refer to rules in which meaning is produced. 
Giddens’ account of rules refers to the modes of transformative relations integrated 
into a rehearsed set of social practices, which express forms of domination and power. 
Normative rules are of great relevance in this thesis because in many instances, ITE 
was written primarily with the intention of regulating norms of online behaviour in 
transactions of e-commerce.  
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Within the framework of structuration theory, the ITE formation process acts as the 
structure created from government’s initiative to facilitate and protect electronic 
business transactions. The structure is important as it conjoins the roles of the 
interactions, discussions and exchanges between the government, the three CSOs and 
big businesses in ICT policy formation process. It is the structure, power and facilities 
derived from actors’ interactions and contestations that dominate the Indonesian 
telecommunication system and policy formation process.  
The structure was further developed as other actors such as big corporations and a few 
members of the elite from top universities became involved with the process of ITE 
formation. These actors produced practices - play as a micro lens of structuration 
theory - in which actors exercise them repetitively to make the structure functions. 
Within these interactions, the roles and interests of certain actors were contested during 
the policy formation process. For example, it was the academic elite who reviewed 
government’s initiative of the 2003 ITE draft, however, the decision on the ITE draft 
was discussed and finalised by the government in the form of the Department of Trade 
and Industry; Department of Information; and Department of Tourism Post and 
Telecommunication. Additionally, PT Telkom and PT Indosat also contributed some 
roles during the draft finalisation with the government. On the flip side, there was a 
lack of participation from CSOs and BRTI, the independent regulator, during the ICT 
policy formation process (Zulhuda, 2003).  
Previously, chapter 3 examined the history of various governments’ approaches in 
Indonesia towards telecommunication and Internet infrastructure development to 
provide the context for understanding the ongoing transformations of Indonesia’s 
Internet strategies towards the Internet. These developments were heuristically divided 
into three periods: the early years of the Internet in Indonesia from 1983 and the 1989 
Telecommunication Law, the 1999 telecommunication reform started in the 2000’s, 
and the period immediately post ITE enactment in 2008.  
As I have argued in Chapter 3, changes in the Indonesian government system, national 
economy and technologies have affected the early development of telecommunication 
and ICT policy as well as infrastructure. The government and PT Telkom dominated 
the development of telecommunication infrastructure and the management of 
telecommunication policies. Within the context of ITE, PT Telkom’s status is state-
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owned telecommunication company, with the Indonesian government holds more than 
80% of major shares and the public owned less than 20% shares. This affected how 
internet infrastructure was rolled out during the early years of the Internet in Indonesia 
from 1983 to 1989. These circumstances caused the regulation and governance of 
Internet in Indonesia to overlap from 1983 to 2016.  
For much of Indonesia’s history as an independent nation, the development of 
telecommunication infrastructure and governance were intertwined and solely a matter 
of the state. Even when the large telecommunication arms of the government such as 
PT Telkom were privatised in the 1990s, they remained closely linked to the 
government, often too close to be entirely independent and act so. As actors within the 
ICT policy arena or structure, big business and the government in Indonesia have close 
and historical links. Not surprisingly, laws such as the Telecommunication Law of 
1999 and ITE were most concerned with facilitating and regulating media for business 
purposes. Governance of the Internet was implemented from the top down and not 
especially concerned with issues such as the rights of the user, freedom of expression 
or privacy. In fact, up until the last days of Suharto’s New Order government, the 
media remained subordinate to the strong rule of the regime.  
Both the Telecommunication Law of 1999 and ITE in 2008 are prime examples of the 
ICT policy formation process described above. The Telecommunication Law of 1999 
regulates mainly the development of telecommunication infrastructure and business 
practice in Indonesia, while ITE was originally intended to regulate online business 
practices as the number of Internet users in Indonesia expanded from the 2000s. Both 
laws have been used by the Indonesian government to regulate practices around 
telecommunication and Internet sectors. As ITE also regulates norms of online 
behaviour in transactions of e-commerce and in expressing opinions, this caused an 
overlapping of law within the Indonesian Criminal Civil Code where norms of 
behaviour in expressing opinions, particularly of defamation, are already regulated 
within the existing Articles 310 and 311 of the Indonesian Criminal Civil Code. Article 
27 of ITE might therefore be duplicating an existing law due to a misperception of it 
regulates the abusive use of internet for doing criminal acts.  
As explained in chapter 3, ITE had undergone a long process of its formation from 
2003 to 2008, and after its enactment in 2008, ITE has encountered lots of protests and 
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concerns regarding ambiguous and imprecise formulation of certain Articles related 
mostly with online practices of expressing opinions. 
In addition, since 2008, there has been an increasing volume of violations against the 
guidelines. In fact, according to a 2015 SafeNet report, there have been 137 cases of 
ITE violations since 2008, the majority of which were for defamation (Juniarto, 2014). 
Defamation, according to Article 27 verse 3 of the ITE is defined as the act of 
“[i]ntentionally and without the right distributing and/or transmitting and/or making 
offensive and/or defamatory Electronic Information and/or Electronic Documents 
accessible”. There is growing consensus among the public that such situations are the 
result of the ambiguity and vagueness with which the articles were framed and phrased 
within the ITE, especially those clauses concerning ‘prohibited acts’ (Djafar & Abidin, 
2014). These are issues that I will deal with in some detail in chapter 5, but for this 
chapter I want to provide a broader context for ICT policy development and bring in 
the example of a neighbouring nation, Malaysia. 
Like Indonesia, Malaysia is a postcolonial nation-state that gained independence in the 
mid-twentieth century. Whereas Indonesia has shed any notion of hereditary rulers and 
been working it ways towards democracy over decades, Malaysia has retained some 
parts of its monarchy and is governed as a federation. At the same time Malaysia is, 
similar to Indonesia, a developing nation with a young and Muslim-majority 
population. As such, Malaysia provides a comparative example of how differently ICT 
policy could have developed within similar parameters. 
Looking at Malaysia’s experience in developing internet policy as an example is also 
appropriate because Indonesia and Malaysia share several other similarities. Starting 
with Internet’s arrival in the region in the mid-1990s, each country sought to 
implement ICT policy and move from a monopoly towards privatisation, but with quite 
different results. The system of government of Malaysia has provided conditions that 
are favourable for ICT policy development and their national economy. For example, 
Malaysia’s better established telecommunication infrastructures have allowed the 
nation to implement ICT policy more quickly than other countries in the Southeast 
Asia, with the exception of Singapore. Indonesia, in contrast, was still undergoing vast 
political changes during the latter part of the 1990’s and hence, still lacks adequate 
telecommunication infrastructure throughout the archipelago. Despite these 
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similarities, Indonesia has by far the greater challenge due to the much larger 
population (Indonesia: 261 million, Malaysia: 31 million) and challenging topography 
of its archipelagic land.  
2003-2008: Draft, Deliberation and Enactment of ITE  
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the years following Reformasi were full of democratic 
potential but also turbulent with frequent changes in Presidency and government from 
Habibie and Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) to Megawati. With each changes of 
government, what Giddens termed rules and resources available for the formation of 
ICT policy were different. Contest over coalition politics, the appointment of 
ministerial posts between the president and the leaders of coalition parties, and intense 
inter-ministerial bureaucratic competition over territory and resources created major 
coordination problems and affected a focus on economic policy (Datta et al., 2011, p. 
67-69). The character of the post-Reformasi era under Yudhoyono administration 
contributed to the highly political and competitive style of relationship between the 
actors involved at the cabinet level over decision-making. As such, the post-Reformasi 
environment inevitably affected the relationship between agents within the 
telecommunication industry in Indonesia.  
Like Indonesia, Malaysia also suffered the ravages of the Asian financial crisis of the 
late 1990s but it had the advantage of a stable government led by Prime Minister 
Mohamad Mahathir during this period. As its longest-serving Prime Minister Mahathir 
led the country from 1981 to 2003, weathering Malaysia’s own Reformasi due to the 
imprisonment of his then deputy, Anwar Ibrahim. He also managed to steer the country 
through the Asian Financial Crisis. His Vision 2020 statement,3 first shared with the 
public during a talk delivered in 1991 also had time to take root. Although not without 
controversy, the Mahathir government saw the nation of Malaysia survive the crisis 
and thrive economically (Mahathir, 1991). 
It was also a Mahathir enamoured of the possibilities of cyberspace who launched the 
Multimedia Super Corridor mega-project in 1996 (Leong, 2014). Hence, in contrast to 
Indonesia which experienced political turbulence since 1998 up to 2014 and change as 
 
3 http://www.wawasan2020.com/vision/ 
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a series of different prime ministers came in and out of office at the same time as the 
Internet became more commonly available and used, Malaysia was able to bear the 
onslaught that wider access and (mis) use of the Internet by the broader public brought 
to nations in Southeast Asia.  
Looking at the Indonesian context, it was not until the year of 2004 when President 
Yudhoyono was first directly-elected and began his first term of government as the 
Indonesian president, the discussion of ICT potentials to enhance national economy 
was started. At this point in time, Indonesia was in transformation from a patrimonial 
administrative state to a patrimonial oligarchic state, where business-state relations 
were shifted. As Fukuoka (2012, p. 87) argues state-business relations were 
transforming into a distribution of patronage within Indonesian democratization 
period. So much so that during this period, business elites gained enhanced autonomy 
from the state and independent of bureaucratic elites. As a result, entrepreneurs-turned 
politicians were able to actively take part in the economic policy making as they gained 
direct access to state resources. 
During this period, President Yudhoyono was acting under considerable pressure from 
the public and civil society to accelerate Indonesia’s economic and social 
development. In 2008 the number of Internet users was just 25 million users (about 
9% of Indonesia’s total population then) but by 2012, it had increased exponentially 
by more than twice over to 62.9 million. Following this growth in the number of users 
was a corresponding rise in the access to and production of controversial online content 
(SAFEnet, June 2015), clearly indicating a need for better media literacy among the 
populace. In the meantime, as a consequence over the panic of controversial online 
content, the focus of Internet regulation shifted to include the filtering and blocking of 
objectionable content by law. The intent to control the type of content available on the 
Internet via law became part of the ITE. However, the original impetus for the ITE 
was to provide a guarantee of security for electronic business transactions.  
As mentioned earlier, ITE is the law that regulates any online transactions and 
activities and any prohibited acts using ICT as a tool. It mainly regulates online 
business and information system but it also applies to anyone who commits 
cybercrimes. Before its enactment in March 2008, ITE had been developed over a long 
period of time. The draft of ITE was first prepared in 2003 by Directorate General of 
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Post and Telecommunication (DGPT) and the Department of Industry and Trade under 
President Megawati Sukarnoputri. By the time the draft was discussed with academics 
from Padjadjaran University, University of Indonesia, and Institute of Technology 
Bandung and delivered in 2005 to the DPR, President Yudhoyono had come into 
office. The ITE Bill was then deliberated in DPR together with the Minister of 
Communication and Information and the Minister of Law and Human Rights acting as 
representatives of the government. During the deliberation process in DPR, 
Yudhoyono created a task force in 2006 to undertake discussions of ITE. After 
extensive deliberations carried out from 2006 to 2008, ITE was finally enacted in 
March 2008 (Zulhuda, 2003).  
Despite the turmoil of ITE implementation, the second-term of Yudhoyono 
government in 2010, made a major commitment towards ICT infrastructure 
development with the Digital Indonesia plan, which has since been implemented 
within the ICT National Roadmap 2010-2020 concurrent with the MP3EI (Indonesia 
Economy Development Expansion Acceleration Masterplan). Along with this 
commitment, more site-specific, community-based ICT programs such as Bandung 
Digital Valley in 2011 and Jogja Digital Valley in 2013 also emerged as promising 
moves towards a digital economy.  
The case of Malaysia differs in that it responded to the arrival of the Internet and 
implemented a policy on telecommunications and broadcasting much more quickly 
than Indonesia. The Malaysian equivalent of the ITE is the Communications and 
Multimedia Act (CMA), which was enacted in 1998 and came into force on 1st April 
1999. It came into being partly in response to the Malaysian government’s mega-
project, Multimedia Super Corridor begun in 1996, which was designed to obtain the 
status of global centre and regional IT Hub for Malaysia. The CMA governs 
procedural, economic, technical, consumer and social regulations within three 
industries which used to be separately regulated namely: the broadcasting, 
telecommunications and IT industries (Hussein, 2000, pp. 79-80). Convergence 
between the three industries and the necessity for an independent supervisory authority 
that would strive for self-regulation for the industries were the main reasons this Act 
emerged. The CMA 1998 emphasises several areas such as a high technical standard 
of communication and multimedia industry, consumer satisfaction by maintaining 
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service quality and supporting competition activity, and content prohibitions which 
could preserve Malaysia’s cultural identity (Hussein, 2000, p. 85).   
According to Xue (2005), the basic principles of transparency and clarity; more 
competition and less regulation; flexibility; bias towards generic rules; regulatory 
forbearance; emphasis on process rather than content; administrative and sector 
transparency; and industry self-regulation are reflected within the CMA 1998. 
Although there are several actors involved in formulating national information policy 
and strategy in Malaysia such as the Ministry of Energy, Communications and 
Multimedia, The Prime Minister’s Office and the National Information Technology 
Council (NITC), the dominant actor is the Malaysian Communications and 
Multimedia Commission (MCMC). Through MCMC, Internet content and traffic are 
regulated under the principle of self-regulation by the industry in accordance with 
government regulations (Xue, 2005, p. 243).  
According to Tisch (cited in Salman, 2009, p. 5) in Malaysia, ICT arrangement on e-
government is formed to translate political will into action among stakeholders which 
includes the government, the business sector and civil society groups. The Malaysian 
Communications and Multimedia Commission (MCMC), being the nation’s key 
regulatory body, is currently playing a key role in creating and setting mandated 
standards and policies to address conflicting principles.  
Xue (2005, p. 244) argues, Malaysia’s approach towards ICT development is a 
collaborative practice between the public and private sectors in developing 
infrastructure and adopting a policy of competition towards the telecom market. 
Malaysia’s Internet policy is intended to encourage the development of content and 
applications, while relying on industry self-regulation to control harmful content. 
Although Malaysia was considered successful in its response to ICT development 
through the enactment of the CMA 1998, the Act also introduced concerns with regard 
to the new licensing scheme and content requirements for Internet Service Providers.  
The Malaysian Bill of Guarantees states that the Internet will not be censored in 
Malaysia in order to realise Malays vision as a major global ICT 
(https://www.mdec.my/msc-malaysia/bill-of-guarantees). This does not mean that 
anyone can distribute illegal content with impunity and without regard to the law. 
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Actions can be taken against contents that are deemed seditious, defamatory or 
contravene the Official Secrets Act 1972, the Defamation Act 1957 and the Sedition 
Act 1948 (Salman, Choy, Mahmud, & Latif, 2013, p. 13). Malaysia as a multi-ethnic 
and multi-religious society is very sensitive to anything that may jeopardise the peace 
and harmony of the country. The rights to express alternative views on nation building 
facilitated by new media in Malaysia has been challenged by the ways Malaysian 
government interact with its citizen in a context of telling the truth or acting patriotic. 
As Leong (2016, p. 156) argues this condition is the “result of how the entangled 
historical understanding of how nation, media and technology relate to each other 
within Malaysia’ social imaginary are in dispute with their contemporary 
interpretation”. 
From the brief comparison between Malaysia and Indonesia’s approaches towards ICT 
policy development above, it could be suggested that the frequent change in 
government during the ICT policy formation process in Indonesia had several effects. 
The first of which are the change in actors (government) and the rules and resources 
brought to the process. The changes in the Indonesian government from Suharto to 
Habibie to Wahid to Megawati and to Yudhoyono government had brought certain 
practices and resources that exercised and contested within the structure of ICT policy 
development process in Indonesia. In contrast, although it suffered broadly similar 
external (financial crisis) and internal (reformasi) disruption, Malaysia’s ruling party, 
Barisan Nasional (National Front) and Prime Minister provided sufficient stability for 
ICT policy to be developed and implemented relatively swiftly. 
There are two other points of note in what is described above. The first is the absence 
of consultation with CSOs in the Indonesian instance particularly when compared to 
the Malaysian example; the second is the omission of broader dissemination of the Bill 
under discussion to the Indonesian public. Both of these meant that public participation 
in the process was limited to the elite in academia and government, bypassing the 
feedback and input of ordinary Indonesians. Crucially, although the Malaysian ICT 
policy formation process also largely omitted public participation, the undertaking by 
the government not to censor the Internet in the 1998 Bill of Guarantees 
(https://www.mdec.my/msc-malaysia/bill-of-guarantees) completely changed how the 
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online environment developed in the country from that point onwards (see Leong 2014 
for more details).  
If we view the absence of public participation through the lens of structuration theory, 
then it is possible to say that an actor (the public) essential to the success of the 
structure and the social practices that ensue from it was conspicuously absent. I discuss 
the consequences of their omission for Indonesia further in chapter 5 but it is sufficient 
to note at this point that after its enactment, the ITE had faced judicial reviews twice 
in 2008 and 2009 and encountered lots of protests and concerns regarding ambiguous 
and imprecise formulation of certain articles. This has led eventually to the revision of 
ITE that finally began in late 2016 under President Joko Widodo, thus introducing a 
raft of different actors in the process of ICT policy formation. 
The revision of ITE in 2016 
From 2008 to 2013, attempts to revise ITE met with silence although there was a steep 
increase in infringements against ITE during that period. Article 27 of ITE, which 
relates to illegal Internet content, was badly in need of more detailed explanations that 
were not forthcoming from government or ministerial regulations as required. Exactly 
what comprised illegal content was not clear despite the increasing access and 
capability of users to activities ranging from pornography and gambling to racial 
vilification. Small wonder, then, that a report from ELSAM (Institute for Policy 
Research and Advocacy) concluded that regulating Internet content using ITE is not 
appropriate as the law opposes the right of freedom of expression (Djafar & Abidin, 
2014). In lieu of greater clarity about how ITE could be properly implemented during 
that five-year period, it was left to the Ministry of Communication and Information to 
regulate Internet use.  
By 2015, APJII (Indonesian Internet Service Providers Association) reported the 
number of Internet users to have reached 88.1 million of users (Asosiasi Penyelenggara 
Jasa Internet Indonesia & Pusat Kajian Komunikasi Universitas Indonesia, 2015). 
Amid the escalating number of breaches against ITE from 2012, the government’s 
reaction towards the revision of ITE remained rigid (Djafar & Abidin, 2014). Still, as 
the acting coordinator of the law, the Ministry of Communication and Informatics 
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(MCI) attempted to offer some forward momentum by formulating some policies on 
filtering multimedia content and blocking procedure from 2010.  
The first block put up by the MCI, for example, was to prevent a video of indecent 
behaviour between an Indonesian actress and a male band member from circulating 
online within Indonesia (Hasyim, 2015). Blocking was instituted by MCI through a 
TRUST Positif + database, which contains a blacklist of websites that carry illegal 
content (mostly pornography). The list is used as a reference for ISPs who are 
responsible for blocking all content listed in the TRUST + database. If ISPs refuse to 
do so, their business licenses can be revoked by the government (Ministry of 
Communication and Information, 2014). Due to a lack of transparency and imprecise 
blocking mechanism, several websites not related to illegal content were also 
inadvertently blocked.  
At the same time, several other overlapping laws can also be used to regulate online 
content in Indonesia. There is, for example, a Law of Pornography that extends to 
online content considered harmful to social norms whereas online content that disturbs 
public interest is within the remit of ITE. Objectionable journalistic content falls under 
the Press Law, while the Law of Copyright regulates intellectual property of online 
content (Djafar & Abidin, 2014). Considering the importance of citizen journalism to 
the democratisation of Indonesia, the overlapping laws could affect the public’s right 
to express opinions and voice critique for government.  
As with Indonesia, the laws governing defamation and sedition overlap with the 
regulations surrounding Internet use in Malaysia. The Malaysian government has 
taken a double-pronged approach to direct the type of content Malaysians can post, 
read and share online. Firstly, it has revised and broadened laws governing actions 
offline to include online acts. For example, the Sedition Act originally enacted in 1948 
was revised in 2015 to include within its purview the ‘propagation’ of seditious 
publications by ‘electronic means’ (Leong & Lee, 2016). Secondly, it has reinterpreted 
laws governing the Internet such as section 23 of the CMA. In one example, using the 
Act to block access to online sources that share information the government considers 
harmful.  
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Without delving into the various political motivations behind their actions, I want to 
note here that control of online content has been achieved in this instance in Malaysia 
via revising and reinterpreting laws, quite swiftly, in comparison to Indonesia. 
Whether the heightened pace of policy (re)development is actually a good turn of 
events for Malaysia is an issue I cannot address in any length here but it is sufficient 
to note that the complexities of overlapping laws and authorities Indonesia policy 
makers labour under is not exceptional. At the same time, while the discourse of 
freedom of expression is now common across Southeast Asia, it is vital to recall that 
mass media, for which communication and ICT policies were first developed, remain 
subordinated to national developmental objectives in many countries in the region such 
as Vietnam and Singapore. 
To return to the discussion on Indonesia, due to a gap in internet filtering regulations 
and misuse of internet services linked to a low level of media literacy, a policy for 
pornography content filtering and blocking has actually been initiated by MCI since 
2008. The draft of ministerial regulation of multi-media content was to be legalised in 
2009 by MCI. This draft was based on article 40 verse 2 of ITE and gave the 
government the authority to censor or block internet content. A plan to form a body of 
internet censorship emerged in 2010 but society resisted (Eddyono & Anggara, 2014, 
pp. 6-9).  
In 2012, MCI attempted to change the name of multi-media content draft into a draft 
of reporting procedure or internet content report but it too failed due to public protest. 
A year later, a draft of illegal sites management was going to be authorised together 
with the legalisation of ministerial program, TRUST Positif + but it took until 2014 
before it was made official by ministerial regulation no 19. However, the general 
public were still very much against the program because the right to freedom of 
expression and opinions is guaranteed in the national constitution. The implementation 
of TRUST Positif would be a violation of their constitutional rights and freedom of 
expression on the net (Hasyim, 2015). 
Above examples of government’s attempts to implement certain regulations to 
regulate Internet content were examples of structures in Giddens’ framework, which 
were not successful to be preserved by the government. This is due to the role of public 
(CSOs) as the other actor who contested government’s attempts to produce certain 
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policies within the structure of Indonesian Internet policy development. Borrowing 
Giddens’ definition of “structure is both the medium and outcome of an action”, the 
draft of ministerial regulation of multi-media content proposed by the government in 
2009 and the draft of reporting procedure in 2012 had created a medium for producing, 
facilitating and maintaining certain practices within society. However, as these two 
drafts were failed to be legalised due to the resistance of society, these two drafts can 
be observed as the structure that served as the outcome of an action as well.  
Verse 3 of Article 27 criminalises anyone who “[i]ntentionally and without the right 
distribute and/or transmit and/or make offensive and/or defamatory Electronic 
Information and/or Electronic Documents accessible” ("Law of Electronic Information 
and Transactions,"). Due to the number of infringements against this article and the 
severity of penalties for them (up to six years’ imprisonment without trial), Article 27 
of ITE has become a focal point of policy revision among CSOs. For example, 
Satudunia recommended in its report (Cahyadi, 2015) that revision of ITE should see 
a separation of Internet security and content regulations, an independent regulator of 
Indonesian telecommunication and ICT, and public interest priority over business 
interest in ICT infrastructure and access in rural and remotes areas.  
The lack of clarity on how different levels – infrastructure, access and distribution, 
content and activities, and literacy – of internet regulation proposed by the government 
also has severe implications for social practices in Indonesia. Specifically in ITE post-
implementation review process, concern over some activities undertaken on digital 
platforms by users have led to the development of   programs and campaigns by CSOs 
directed at the revision of ITE. Social practices conducted by CSOs towards ITE 
revision process interrelate with communities’ support are being contested with 
government’s initiatives in the structure of ITE post-implementation review process. 
These will be discussed further in Chapter 5.  
The ongoing conversation surrounding the revision of ITE among CSOs and general 
people were articulated in their unrelenting campaigns and activities towards the new 
government system in 2014. CSOs and general people looked forward to the newly 
elected President Jokowi to move the revision of ITE forward in Prolegnas 2015. After 
a period of eight years, the revision of ITE was tabled on the agenda of the Indonesian 
National Legislation Program (Prolegnas) for 2015 and announced by the President 
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Jokowi (Poetranto, November 15, 2014). This was followed on 22 December 2015 by 
a draft revision signed off by President Jokowi and submitted by the Minister of 
Communication and Information to the DPR (Ministry of Communication and 
Information, 2015a).   
In March 2016, the commission 1 of DPR conducted a public hearing of ITE proposed 
revisions, which was attended by the government, members of political parties, and 
public (CSOs and academics). One result of this hearing was the establishment of a 
task force consisting of DPR members and the Ministry of Communications and 
Information, which was placed in charge of discussing the revisions with DPR 
members and bringing ITE revisions into the legislative session for approval by June 
2016. A second hearing took place in April 2016 in which the Ministry of 
Communication and Information approved the proposed revisions to ITE regarding the 
‘hate speech’ content in Article 27(3) with amendments to penalty and case status. The 
harsh 6-year penalty was shortened to 4 years and a ‘delik umum’ (general offense) 
case status was changed into a ‘delik aduan’ (a report should be lodged by a victim) 
status. In practice, this changing status means as a power shifting of putting someone 
directly into a jail due to a law’s violation (Ministry of Communication and 
Information, 2016).  
Conclusion 
Compared to Malaysia, Indonesia was slow to initiate a specific law for regulating the 
ICT and Internet. This meant that technologies have matured and the pace of change 
have accelerated so the task has become much more complicated. In the case of ITE, 
ICT policy formation process has taken a long 5 years (2003-2008). Within the 
process, the government and the big business have played significant roles in drafting 
ITE but the public has only had limited input. The voice and interests of ordinary 
Indonesians general people was represented by a small number of the educated elite in 
academia. Although it is not possible to link the shortcomings of ITE only to the scant 
public input, the glossing over of this essential part of policy making process has most 
certainly not helped to create confidence in public policy.  
However, it needs to be emphasized the while Indonesia has undergone significant 
political turbulence during the crucial period of the Internet’s early development in the 
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nation, Malaysia was ruled by Prime Minister Mahathir from 1981 to 2003 and had 
been governed by same political coalition since its independence from the British. The 
political stability of Malaysia government has provided conditions that are favourable 
and important for its success in ICT policy development and its national economy. 
These conditions which did not occur in Indonesian context.  
The next chapter will specifically focus on the case study of ITE, what issues that have 
arisen post-implementation since 2008 to understand the flaws with the policy, and 
how public provide feedback for and participate in ITE review process.  
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Chapter 6. Case study of ITE (2008-2016) 
 
Introduction 
Chapter 5 explained the process of policy formation in Indonesia with a focus of ITE 
formation process from 2003 to its enactment in 2008. It also briefly described the 
major issues with ITE post its enactment in 2008 and the revision process that 
culminated in 2016. In order to place the Indonesian development of ICT policy within 
the broader context of the Southeast Asian region, the case of Malaysia was also 
introduced as one that began with fairly similar parameters. It provided some important 
insights into what was achieved by a neighbouring country in terms of ICT policy and 
the political and economic systems that made the crucial difference. 
Beyond the ongoing transformation of the Indonesian ICT and Internet policies, ITE 
has been the only law in Indonesia that regulates social and business practice on the 
Internet since 2008. ITE is the case study in this thesis because of its significance 
within the Indonesia ICT policy and the long lead-up to its enactment. ITE has also 
been a major cause for challenges in online activities. A report made by SAFEnet in 
2016 (https://safenetvoice.org) showed, there have been 137 cases of netizen violating 
ITE since 2008. For this reason, ITE is regarded by some organisations such as the 
Alliance of Independent Journalists (AJI), the Legal Aid Institute for the Press (LBH 
Pers), and the Indonesian Legal and Human Rights Aid Association (PBHI) as a law 
that restrains the right of Indonesian citizens to express their opinions freely online 
and, thus, to critique the government (Jakarta Post, 15 September 2008). 
The objective of this chapter is to use the issues that have arisen post-implementation 
to understand the flaws with the policy, its implementation and review. The 
investigation tries to explain how the public’s participation during this period, via the 
CSOs, provides feedback to the ITE implementation review process. Consistent with 
earlier chapters, I focus on three CSOs namely, Satudunia, Medialink and ICTwatch. 
The analysis is based on data drawn from face-to-face and follow-up e-mail interviews 
with key leaders from these three CSOs and document examinations. Additional 
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information is collected from other CSOs like FDD (Digital Democracy Forum), ICJR 
(Institute for Criminal and Justice Reform) and ELSAM (Institute for Policy Research 
and Advocacy), as they provide additional support for the ITE review process. The 
interviews and document examinations were conducted to gain further insights of ITE 
review process and to form a discussion on later section within this chapter on CSOs’ 
contribution and involvement in ITE implementation and review process. 
In contrast to when ITE was drafted, discussed and implemented, the inclusion of the 
public (via CSOs) and its concerns in the review process significantly shifts the focus 
of the policy from e-commerce to issues such as privacy and freedom of expression. 
In structuration theory parlance, the role of the public as an actor in the ICT policy 
formation process is bolstered, making the process much more inclusive and hopefully, 
comprehensive. It also fits within the notion of democratic governance which was 
discussed earlier in Chapter 2. In investigating the process of ITE implementation 
review and responses from the public, it is important to observe the interactions and 
relationships among parties involved in the process of ICT policy development in 
Indonesia.  
Within this thesis’ use of Giddens’ structuration framework, the ITE policy is the 
structure within which the Indonesian authorities, whereas the government (the 
Ministry of Communications and Information), big business (Telkom and Indosat), and 
civil society organisations (CSOs) observed in this thesis are the actors. The 
interactions that occur between these actors form a structure of ITE policy formation 
process. In the course of these interactions, all three actors draw on rules and resources 
such as the discourses of democracy, rights to expression and to critique government, 
cultural notions of acceptable norms and taboos as well as ingrained media and policy 
formation practices from the Suharto era.  
This chapter extends from the policy formation process analysis carried out in Chapter 
4 into the examination of the flaws identified in ITE and the CSOs’ efforts to intervene 
in the ITE revision process in DPR (The House of Representative). By understanding 
what flaws are identified in ITE, it provides a medium of relationships between the 
state and its society in a structure of policy-making process. While CSOs’ responses 
towards ITE review process serve as the outcomes of what practices occurred at 
society level as they interact later with other practices from other two actors and 
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provide feedback within policy making process. These functional features of a 
structure as the medium and outcome of an action are consistent with Giddens’ concept 
of duality functions of structure that allows for these very different yet inter-related 
practices and conditions to be taken into consideration. As Giddens says, “the 
structural properties of social systems do not exist outside of action but are chronically 
implicated in its production and reproduction” (Giddens, 1984, p. 376). 
Since the enactment of ITE in 2008, questions have been asked about its definition of 
what is legal content online and the severe penalties potentially meted out to anyone 
found guilty of violating them outlined in Article 45. Three articles in particular: 
Article 27 on defamation; Article 28 on hate speech or blasphemy based on ethnic, 
religious, racial and inter-group relations and; Article 29 on online threats are 
considered the most problematic (Djafar & Abidin, 2014). Overall, the main issues 
with ITE can be broadly explained as overly broad definitions of what constitutes 
information and communication, vague wording of violation and threats, and a 
duplication of extant laws leading to the likelihood of complications (Maskun & 
Khairunnisa, 2016). 
Due to the overly broad and vague wording contained within ITE, more and more 
instances of violation against it have occurred since 2008, nearly doubling from 8 in 
2012 to 14 in 2013 and 36 in 2014.  At the end of 2015, the number of cases had 
reached a total of 118. Most of the cases were related with violations of defamation 
Article of ITE (SAFEnet, June 2015). As a result, several CSOs and individuals have 
been advocating for the revision of ITE soon after its enactment in 2008.  
For example, in 2008, the CSOs Satudunia and ICTwatch initiated a request for a 
separate judicial review on Articles 27, 28, 29 and 45 within this law but the request 
was rejected by the Constitutional Court because according to head of judges, “these 
articles are not contradicted with democracy and human rights’ principles”. He also 
said that Article 27 is meant to preserve the nation’s balance and to prevent the 
technical and legal rules in an online system (Jakarta Post, 15 September 2008). In the 
same year, a review was conducted by Narliswandi Piliang, a journalist with the 
publication of the article entitled, Hoyak Tabuik Adaro dan Soekanto (literally 
translated “Rocking the box of Adaro and Soekanto”) on several mailing lists in 2008 
(http://international.ucla.edu/institute/article/100728). The defamation case started 
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when Narliswandi allegedly posted the article on the website presstalk.info. 
Narliswandi said Alvin Lie, a legislative member from the National Mandate Party, 
had received some money related to a transfer pricing of coal trade case between PT 
Adaro and Coaltrade Services International Pte Ltd, Singapore. Alvin Lie’s action 
might influence the policy making in the House of Representatives (DPR), so that DPR 
would cancel a probe into questionable circumstances surrounding the company's 
initial public offering. The article was later reposted on several websites, and 
distributed to the e-mail list of Kompas Readers' Forum. However the review was not 
accepted by the Constitutional Court for the same reason as previous (Jakarta Post, 14 
November 2008).  
From 2012 onwards, due to the lack of success at revisions to ITE, some communities 
and coalitions such as FDD (Digital Democracy Forum), ID-CONFIG (Indonesian 
CSOs Network for Internet Governance), KITA (Internet without fear coalition), and 
SIKA (Friends for Fair Information and Communication) were established specifically 
to help the Internet-using public defend their rights to make the most of the Internet. 
The establishment of these groups was a response to less support from government 
towards ITE revision process and a contribution to enhance Indonesians’ 
understanding and ability in utilising the Internet. FDD was formed in 2012 as a 
community effort in digital democracy movement. Similarly, ID-CONFIG was formed 
in 2012 as a joined secretary in exchanging information among a number of CSOs in 
Indonesia who have concerns on internet governance and online freedom of 
expression. Meanwhile KITA and SIKA were coalitions among other older 
organisations which have given assistance for ITE victims such as ICJR, ELSAM, 
LBH Pers, ICTWatch and SAFEnet and formed in 2015 to heighten the movement 
towards ITE revision process (SAFEnet, June 2015). FDD, ID-CONFIG, KITA and 
SIKA are not part of this thesis focus directly because they did not involve in ICT 
policy development since the beginning and they are not relatively permanent as 
organisations, although they had supported the ITE revision process since 2012 and 
focused on improving Indonesians’ capability in understanding and using the Internet.  
One of the issues that has arisen is the apparent lack of digital and media literacy and 
an understanding of the online environment held by Indonesians. According to Bain 
and Company (22 May 2017), more than 230 million consumers in the Southeast Asian 
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region are “online engaged consumers”. And in its 2017 report on the digital landscape 
in Southeast Asia, We are Social reveal that of the 132.7 million Indonesians (51% of 
population) who are now online, 47 million use their mobile phones to access the 
Internet (We are Social and Hootsuite, 2017). However, while access to and the 
volume of content continues to grow in Indonesia, there has not been a corresponding 
growth in media literacy leading to ever more urgent need to police online content 
(Asosiasi Penyedia Jasa Internet Indonesia, 2017). 
Tensions between laws designed for the policing of content and those that are designed 
to protect the right to freedom of expression sometimes clash as the content policing 
can be used to silence dissent, dissatisfaction with and critique of the powers-that-be. 
While governments and business are focussed on policing norms to maintain law and 
order, the public are more concerned with their ability to use the Internet to its fullest 
potential. Counter actions by CSOs have taken several forms. For example, in the face 
of attempts by the MCI to manage illegal content on the net by using blocking and 
filtering software tools from 2010, CSOs like Satudunia and ICTwatch have been 
trying their best to protect freedom of expression and democracy in Indonesia. Their 
efforts include the campaign on Internet governance led by ICTwatch since 2012 
(interview with Ronny, from ICTwatch), the declaration on ID-IGF (Indonesia Internet 
Governance Forum) in 2012 (Banyumurti, November 2, 2012) and the representation 
at the 8th Internet Governance Forum in 2013 (Parlina, March 2, 2013).  
Other CSOs have focussed their energies on working together to educate and inform 
Indonesians on the threat ITE, as originally worded, poses to unknowing users. These 
efforts include the ‘Netizen Prison’ campaign to highlight the threat of imprisonment 
if opinions expressed online are deemed illegal, blasphemous or categorised as 
expressing hate towards certain people or groups held by SAFEnet on 9 November 
2014 (SAFEnet, June 2015), a meeting on Indonesian digital democracy in 2014 
(Forum Demokrasi Digital, December 16, 2014), a dialogue on safeguarding 
democracy and ITE revision in 2015, and discussions on netizen’s roles in guiding 
democracy in Indonesia and ITE emergency status’ among CSOs in 2015 (Forum 
Demokrasi Digital, November 11, 2015).  
A draft revision was signed by President Jokowi and submitted by the Minister of 
Communication and Information to the DPR on 22 December 2015 (Ministry of 
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Communication and Information, 2015a). The latest information regarding the process 
of ITE revision comes from Commission 1 from DPR, which conducted a public 
hearing of ITE revision. This first hearing was attended by members of the 
government, political parties and the public (CSOs and academics). A task force 
consisting members of political parties in DPR whose duty is in charge of ITE revision 
was established as a result of the hearing. The task force discussed the revision with 
DPR members and aimed to bring ITE revision into the legislative session to be 
approved in June 2016.  
The enactment of ITE in the Indonesian communication system and its influence in 
society and the democracy consolidation in Indonesia reflect the different experiences 
of the actors within the Indonesian ICT policy development. There are at least three 
observable facts that emerged from the fieldwork conducted for this thesis in Jakarta 
in 2014 and 2015. First, the discourse from the Indonesian government of digital 
economy Indonesia is increasingly influential in driving policy. For example, starting 
from 2014 Jokowi’s administration has made the ICT sector one of the 5 top priorities 
of Indonesian national programs, and started to implement 4G LTE technology in 
2015. Jokowi’s leadership also promised greater momentum towards a digital 
revolution to support Indonesian digital economy (Amirio, 12 December 2015).  
The Indonesian government has issued a roadmap of Indonesia’s e-commerce through 
the Presidential Regulation No. 74 of 2017 on E-Commerce Road Map for the Year of 
2017-2019. The roadmap is designed to be a guide for the central and regional 
governments to establish policy and an action plan to accelerate e-commerce. It is also 
expected to provide guidance for stakeholders in the organization of e-commerce 
activities. There are eight major components to the roadmap: funding, taxation, 
consumer protection, education and human resources, communication infrastructure, 
logistics, cyber security and the implementing organization. The roadmap has the goal 
of creating at least 1,000 techno-preneurs and to generate at least $10 billion annually 
by 2020 (Amin, 11 February 2016). This launch represents the  commitment from 
Jokowi’s government to support better access and innovation for small and medium 
enterprises to narrow development gaps in Southeast Asia and establishing 
cooperation with leading technology companies such as Plug and Play, Google, 
Facebook, and Twitter (Diela, 16 February 2016). 
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Second, there is a divergence in the objectives and pathways selected towards these 
objectives between big business and CSOs in ICT development in Indonesia. For 
example, the business event I attended in 2015 in Jakarta, less participation came out 
from CSO. There was a symposium on National Security and Broadband Plan in that 
event where no CSOs’ members were involved. Government and big business 
participation were mainly observed in this event. However, a few years earlier in 2013 
at the IGF event in Bali, much more interaction between big business and CSOs took 
place. Clearly, participation from the public in the form of CSOs is possible but it tends 
to vary with the nature of the event and the organisers. 
As Ronny from ICTwatch says,  
The IGF is an annual United Nations (UN) event, which is designed as an 
open and inclusive forum for discussing issues of Internet policy and the 
role of multi-stakeholders. The event's objective was to be a neutral space 
for governments, businesses and civil society to meet and discuss the 
central issues and challenges of Internet policy. The IGF also promotes a 
democratic, bottom-up and participatory platform (interview on January 
27, 2014). 
One example of how CSO design programs to improve media literacy among the 
populace is ICTwatch’s production of the social media videos titled, Asadessa and 
Linimasa (http://asadessa.ICTwatch.id/). These videos are part of ICTwatch’s program 
for advocating ‘Internet rights’. Up to three videos were produced for dissemination 
among to communities across Indonesia to help them learn about and pick up the skills 
required to use ICT technologies and retrieve information confidently.  
One observation that emerged from my fieldwork is the growing development of ICT 
and media literacy in Indonesian communities supported by CSOs’ programs. Take 
for example Medialink’s partner: a learning group community in Lumajang, East Java. 
Medialink’s program was to provide assistance for this group to obtain any information 
about the National Health Insurance program using ICT technologies. The group’s 
members learned how to search and select for information they need from government 
website and social media and use the information to address their health insurance 
needs.  
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Main problems in ITE 
This section seeks to explain the issues that have arisen with ITE post-implementation. 
The aim is to understand the flaws with the policy, its implementation and review. I 
concur with Juniarto (2012), who argues that the main flaws within ITE come from 
Articles 27, 28, 29 and 45 in the legislation. Specifically, Juniarto (2012, p. 97) points 
out that:  
[t]he problem in Article 27 of defamation lies in its formulation. It is 
too broadly defined, making it difficult to differentiate between public 
and private communication. Because of this, personal communications 
like SMS, e-mail, BBM [Blackberry Messenger], and Path are open to 
threats from this law. Moreover, the formulation of the types of 
defamation in Article 27 is not clear enough. Existing Articles 310 and 
311 of the Indonesian criminal code already regulate certain kinds of 
defamation. Article 27 might therefore be duplicating an existing law.  
Juniarto also contends that the term ‘information’ in article 28 is too broad and should 
be better broken down into specifics such as pamphlet, news, speech, and broadcast 
that contain blasphemy. In addition, Article 29 of ITE has a subjective meaning of 
violation and frightening threats that might cause uncertainty in its interpretation 
(Juniarto, 2012). All of the above is compounded by the severity set out in Article 45 
of the same Act, which states that anyone who infringes Article 27, 28 and 29 can be 
arrested immediately and subject to six years’ imprisonment without the rights to 
defend. The six years’ imprisonment has required the law enforcers like the police, the 
public prosecutor and the court to place an offender in to custody right away. Whereas 
according to the Indonesian Criminal Civil Code (KUHAP), the minimum requirement 
of a person who is against the law and can be arrested immediately is five years penalty 
or more (Eddyono, 2014).  
Vagueness 
Article 27 verse 3 of ITE criminalises users who “[i]ntentionally and without the right 
distribute and/or transmit and/or make offensive and/or defamatory Electronic 
Information and/or Electronic Documents accessible” ("Law of Electronic Information 
and Transactions,"). Defamation under the Indonesian law is governed by the 
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Indonesian Criminal Code under Chapter XVI, Articles 310 up to 321, which covers 
six types of defamation. Defamation is also governed under the Indonesian Civil Code, 
Articles 1365 and 1372. According to both laws, the term ‘defamation’ is used to 
encompass both slander and libel. It involves the issuance of a defamatory statement 
that causes a person to suffer harm. In addition to the Indonesian Criminal Code and 
Civil Code, acts of defamation are included as prohibited activities under Law No. 11 
of 2008 regarding Information and Electronic Transactions (ITE) (Human Rights 
Watch, 2010, pp. 16-19). 
Theoretically, defamation law aims to make a balance between protection of individual 
reputation and freedom of expression. However, defamation laws are often used in 
practice as a means of chilling speech. Like almost all other laws, defamation is 
defined within jurisdictions that are based on geographical areas. The practice of 
expressing opinions on the Internet, which is trans-border in nature and can be treated 
as defamation, poses a challenge to the existing laws. In some countries, under civil 
law jurisdiction, defamation is treated as a crime rather than a civil wrong. Defamation 
law is supported by the international standards on freedom of expression and the 
protection of reputation developed since 2000 by the international human right bodies 
such as the United Nations Human Rights Committee. Article 19 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is one example of the international standards 
often referred in a court, which is also the result of CSO’s work in London in 2000 
(Collins, 2010).  
Article 27 of ITE does not clearly distinguish between the various types of defamation. 
This is problematic because certain kinds of defamation such as slander and libel are 
already regulated in the existing Articles 310 and 311 of the Indonesian Criminal Civil 
Code (KUHAP). The lack of clarity in Article 27’s definition of information, 
communication and kinds of defamation, therefore, opens the law up to 
misinterpretation. To date, Article 27 has been employed as an instrument to place 
individuals in prison because they critique other people, institutions or government. 
Without a clear idea of how Article 27 is to be applied, the individual’s right to express 
their views or opinions on certain things is restricted. Therefore, an improvement in 
Article 27 is vital. 
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According to SAFEnet report in 2016 (https://safenetvoice.org), there have been 137 
cases of netizens violating ITE since 2008. Among the cases, there have been at least 
74 individuals litigated under this Law. A telling majority of 92% of the cases were to 
do with online defamation. The cases were significantly increased in 2015 in which 
there were 60 cases related to online defamation from January 2015 through April 
2015 alone. The current trends indicate at least four additional cases per month 
(https://safenetvoice.org).  
Additionally, because Article 27 does not define what type of information and 
communication it covers i.e. whether they include public or personal communication, 
this has led to personal communication like SMS texts, e-mail and chat messages to 
be subject to this law. Probably the most known example of a breach of Article 27 
verse 3 is the case of Prita Mulyasari. A working mother of two small children, Prita 
was accused of defaming the Omni International Hospital because she shared a piece 
she wrote about the disappointing service she received there with a mailing list (Wisnu 
& Wulandari, 5 June 2009).  
Prita was placed in pre-trial detention without warning in May 2009, on the basis of 
the ITE law a couple months after she sent her friends the now infamous email. She 
was imprisoned for three weeks and after being put on trial several times, she lost in 
fight with Omni International Hospital and was penalised 204 million rupiah. This was 
a sum approximately equivalent to USD 15,000 or 287 times the average monthly 
income of Rupiah 710 495.5 in a Non-Agricultural Low Income Level Urban 
Household in 2008 (Statistics Indonesia, 2014).  
A month later in June 2009, she was tried and acquitted by the district court of 
Tangerang. A year later in September 2010, Prita was relieved of the fine of 204 
million rupiah by the Supreme Court. However, in June 2011, Prita was sentenced to 
6 months in prison after the prosecutor’s appeal. She successfully fought for a judicial 
review at the Supreme Court at which she was subsequently acquitted in September 
2012. 
The case is renowned as one of the earliest cases of defamation on the basis of the ITE 
and Prita’s lengthy (5 years) struggle to fight for her freedom. That her plight struck a 
chord among the Indonesian public was attested to when the Facebook campaign, 
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Coins for Prita, managed to collect 650 million Rupiah in support of her (Jakarta Post, 
December 19, 2009). In the process the campaign not only collected millions of rupiah 
to help her, it also attracted hundreds of supporters and made Prita a national icon. 
Prita’s case is an example that illustrates well the shortcomings in Article 27 of ITE 
on the issue of what kinds of online information comprises defamation. Although Prita 
was eventually found not guilty based on the decision of the Constitutional Court in 
2012, she had by that time been detained for 20 days and suffered from the 
contradictory decisions made by different courts in Indonesia. Despite this, Prita’s 5-
year battle with the authorities over perceptions of defamation and the support she 
received demonstrated how public opinion and support can overcome the inertia and 
intractability of authorities. 
Looking at the above example, there are several related principles that remain 
debatable such as the principle of transparency, accountability and receiving 
complaints and critics. From the 137 cases that have occurred since 2008, personal 
complaints and critics are the most common reasons of cases for online defamation. 
One wonders if Prita’s complaint would have had a similar reception if made against 
a smaller company instead of a public-listed corporation that in 2016 declared a gross 
profit of 14,18 billion rupiahs (OMNI Hospital, 2016). Online defamation cases such 
as Prita’s also illustrate the fact that an authoritarian style of public officials in 
managing complaints and critics still pervades in Indonesia. 
The reactions and responses to the vagueness of Article 27 such as the accusation 
against Prita, her struggle to clear her name and the support she has received from the 
public now form part of the resources used in the formation of the structure of ICT 
policy. Public support for Prita had given her capabilities to fight for her rights and 
also to ensure her judicial process was fair and free from certain interests. The concept 
of resources in Giddens’ theory of structuration is fundamental because resources 
provide individuals with dual capabilities, namely allocative and authoritative 
resources (Giddens, 1984, p. 258). These resources establish a structure of domination 
and facilitate individuals as agents to generate different types of power within kinds of 
society. Giddens propose three kinds of structure in a social system: signification, 
legitimation, and domination. Domination is an element in structure, which is 
concerned with how power is applied, in particular in the control of rules and 
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resources. In the case of Prita, Article 27 within ITE was clearly part of a structure of 
domination. How the law was brought to bear on Prita’s online complaint and what 
transpired afterwards bear out Giddens’ view on the duality of structure, where 
structure is both “the medium and outcome of the conduct it recursively organizes” 
(Giddens, 1984, p. 376). 
Although it is customary in everyday life to think of resources as positive in that they 
are reserves on which individuals can draw, resources within structuration theory can 
also be negative. 
Broad definition of information 
The second flaw of ITE comes from the vague wording of violation and threats in 
Article 28, which deems it a crime to “[i]ntentionally and without the right 
disseminating information intended to incite hatred or hostility towards an individual 
and/or specific groups of people based on their tribal, religious, racial, and intergroup 
identity” ("Law of Electronic Information and Transactions,"). Article 28 also overlaps 
with Article 156 of the Indonesian Criminal Code and Law No. 40/2008 of Ethnic and 
Racial Discrimination as it covers the same ground. Using this Article 28, it is possible 
for people who have different beliefs and express their differences to be seen as 
committing blasphemy towards other beliefs. For example, the case of Sandy Hartono 
and Sebastian Joe who were alleged to have offended under Article 28 because of their 
posting in social media which are related to a religious discrimination (Eddyono et al., 
January 2016, p. 8). The unclear formulation of ‘hate’, ‘hatred and hostility’ in Article 
28 might imperil people’s freedom of expression and opinion. 
There seems to be an extension from offline definitions of crime to online 
environments because this Article regulates prohibited expression manifested in 
speech, not based on conduct. In practice, the actions of hate dispersal in their offline 
forms are mostly conducted between groups which fight against each other based on 
religious differences. Due to a general arrangement of hate dispersal action within 
Article 28 verse 2, it is important to note that this Article is potentially a threat for 
people to express their opinions about certain beliefs and religious differences in online 
media. According to a report from SAFENET, there were at least 4 cases related to the 
violation of Article 28 verse 2 from the year of 2012 to 2014 (Juniarto, 2014).  
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Hostility and intimidation cases based on their tribal, religious, racial, and intergroup 
identity have been given a serious attention in Indonesian society. Within ITE, this 
matter is articulated in Article 28 verse 2. The examples of Sandy Hartono, Sebastian 
Joe and Alexander Aan highlight how hatred and intimidation are considered as vital 
infringement within ITE. All three accused were deemed to be at fault and sentenced 
to between 2 to 6 years. Sandy Hartono was found guilty of Article 28 infringement 
for creating a fake Facebook account and posting images and written materials which 
contain hostility toward Islam in 2011 and sentenced to 6 years in jail. A year later, in 
2012, Sebastian Joe was also found of guilty and sentenced 4 years in prison for 
posting some articles on Facebook that included intimidations towards Islam and God. 
Within the same year, Alexander Aan was also sentenced 2.5 years in prison of Article 
28 infringement for spreading hate on religions and race on Facebook. All of them 
were accused of spreading hate based on religion and intergroup identity using 
Facebook pages and postings (Wiryawan et al., 2011).  
Similarly, Article 29 of ITE, which addresses threats of violence or intimidation issue, 
was applied in Anthon Wahju Pramono case in 2013. He was an advocate alleged to 
have sent an SMS (short message service) containing personally threats of violence or 
intimidation to an owner of a textile factory in Solo, West Java.  Anthon Wahju 
Pramono was found guilty of making a death threat by sending some SMS 
intentionally to the boss of PT Sri Rejeki and sentenced 3 years in prison in 2013 under 
Article 29 of ITE. Intimidation or threats of violence issue carried out by the Article 
29 of ITE was not formulated clearly, therefore it might be misinterpreted by the 
Indonesian law enforcement officials. Article 29 of ITE says “any person who 
knowingly and without authority sends electronic information and/or electronic 
documents that contain violence threats or scares aimed personally” ("Law of 
Electronic Information and Transactions,"). 
The lack of clarity of Articles 27, 28 and 29 of ITE have led to the misinterpretation 
of those Articles from the law enforcement officials like the police, the public 
prosecutors and the court. Without greater guidance from ITE, officials are left to 
interpret the infringement of these Articles on their own and may impose different 
kinds of procedure and penalties subject to their individual understandings. For 
example, according to an ICJR (Institute for Criminal Justice and Reform) report, the 
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average penalty of ITE violation stipulated by the public prosecutor is only 5.1 months 
sentence. However, to date the average sentence of ITE breach sits about three to four 
months sentence on average (Eddyono et al., January 2016).  
Repetition or misinterpretation of Articles 310 and 311 of defamation in Criminal 
Code 
The last of the flaws lies in how Article 27 duplicates extant laws. The ICJR report 
shows that Article 27(3) of defamation might be duplicating the existing Articles 310 
and 311 of the Indonesian Criminal Code that already regulate defamation and were 
passed before ITE was enacted (Global Business Guide Indonesia, March 10, 2015). 
As mentioned earlier, Article 27 can also be linked to the Law of Pornography. 
Moreover, Article 28 of ITE extends offline norms into online environments such as 
that outlined in Article 156 of the Indonesian Criminal Code and Law No. 40/2008 of 
Ethnic and Racial Discrimination (Eddyono et al., January 2016, pp. 8-10). The 
duplication of these laws can be confusing and lead to an excess of criminalisation. 
Generally speaking today the view that the online and offline parts of individuals’ lives 
are separate is no longer held to be true. However, considering the difficulties in 
improving media literacy, especially in rural areas throughout Indonesia despite 
growing access to the Internet, this continues to be an area of great concern.  
The flaws within some Articles of ITE indicate that the implementation of ITE as a 
cyber law in Indonesia might inhibit people from voicing their critical views, 
comments and complaints using an electronic medium of communication such as 
email, blog, or Facebook because they could face imprisonment. As Agus from 
Satudunia says, “ITE has expanded into an instrument of retribution which can be used 
to restrain public criticism, to interrupt a discourse that is against a moral aspect”, and 
to trip up people through their opinions electronically with a confinement threat 
(interview on August 19, 2015).  
CSOs’ contribution and involvement in response to ITE’s initial 
implementation and revision  
Aside from drawing attention to the potential restriction of freedom of expression over 
the Internet, there have been other actions undertaken to counter the issue. For 
example, programs to inform public on media and technology literacy that has been 
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conducted by Satudunia and Medialink at local communities in Central and East Java. 
Greater co-operation and co-ordination across multiple CSOs have also been initiated 
by ICTwatch and Satudunia in order to achieve more influential contributions in policy 
making process. Participating more in advocacy revision of ITE and legal challenges 
has been maintained by ICJR and ELSAM/LBH Pers for the sake of public interest. 
In the 8 years since the enactment of ITE, the law has provoked several responses from 
the general public and CSOs. These responses include legal action and advocacy by 
individuals and CSOs who are concerned with democracy discourse and restrictions 
on freedom of expression on the Internet. I have already mentioned the unsuccessful 
attempt by Narliswandi Piliang in 2008 to review ITE in court (Jakarta Post, 14 
November 2008). Around the same period, legal action was taken by CSOs advocating 
a review of Articles 27, 28 and 29 into the Constitutional Court but that also failed 
(Jakarta Post, 15 September 2008). Another attempt was made by Anggara and 
Wahyudi Djafar from ICJR to engage in a judicial review of ITE in the Constitutional 
Court in 2010, that met a similar fate (Malau & Rahardjo, 19 January 2010). In all 
decisions of criminal defamation provisions of ITE, the Constitutional Court reiterated 
its reasoning that the provisions constituted a justifiable restriction on freedom of 
expression, which is intended to serve the equally important goal of safeguarding 
citizens’ right to protect their honour and dignity. What these attempts indicate is that 
the dominance of the government as an actor in the regulation of new media in 
Indonesia.  
The enactment of ITE also provoked different types of responses from CSOs that 
focussed on the development of ICT and the Internet in Indonesia. Some, like 
ICTwatch which has been conducting programs on Internet Safety, Internet Rights and 
Internet Governance since 2002 simply continued to develop campaigns to educate 
Internet users on their rights with the Internet Sehat program. The guidance provided 
in the program was designed to stimulate young people to be more productive and 
creative in generating innovations in working and daily life supported by technologies 
(interview with Ronny, from ICTwatch on January 27, 2014).  
ICTwatch’s concern with Internet safety precedes ITE, as it began in 2002 to use the 
phrase, Internet Sehat (a safe Internet), when addressing the general public about 
Internet use. According to Ronny, from ICTwatch whom I interviewed, the 
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organisation first launched the Internet Sehat campaign via a web site on 29 April, 
2002 and marked its offline advocacy of Internet Sehat to the Indonesia Ulama Council 
(MUI) on March 13, 2002. Safety, or in this case, the avoidance and control of deviant 
behaviour and content while online is the focus of ICTwatch’s work on digital literacy.  
Ronny reveals that the term Internet Sehat is designed to emphasize the wisdom of 
balancing the nation’s morals against that of the freedom of expression on the Internet 
through three social practices. They are: self-censorship at the level of family and 
school; increasing the production of positive, useful and interesting local content; and 
empowering civil society through ICT (interview on January 27, 2014). Part of their 
agenda is to draw attention to cases of Indonesian celebrities’ indecent behaviour in 
videos.  
Ronny continues,  
We began a campaign of self-censorship in families and schools to 
promote Internet Sehat. This campaign was a response to the unclear 
censorship policies towards the Internet from the Indonesian 
government. We asked for MUI’s support as the Islamic institution 
who can list what is proper and not according to Islam rules, to 
legitimise the Internet Sehat campaigns (interview on January 27, 
2014). 
In addition, ICTwatch’s ongoing advocacy for Internet Governance supports multi-
stakeholder dialogues in ICT policy to uphold the key principles of transparency, 
accountability, equality, collaboration and professionalism. According to Ronny, from 
ICTwatch, the importance of multi-stakeholders has been an emphasis since the 
declaration of Indonesia Internet Governance Forum (ID-IGF) in November 2012 and 
the organisation of the 8th Internet Governance Forum in 2013. ID-IGF was formed 
based on the commitment between the business sector and ID-CONFIG, the 
Indonesian Civil Society Organisations Network for Internet Governance, in 
Indonesia. This declaration was signed as an acknowledgment among multi-
stakeholders that the Internet governance not only needs technical skills but also 
interactions continuously with other issues such as laws, economy, education and 
development (interview on January 27, 2014). 
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I have already mentioned the efforts of ICTwatch to educate communities on media 
and technology literacy with the production and sharing of a series of documentaries 
titled Asadessa and Linimasa. According to Ronny, these documentaries were also to 
empower these communities to enrich local content on the net and have been in use 
since 2011 (interview with Ronny, from ICTwatch). These videos feature the efforts 
made by ordinary Indonesians to use the Internet, social media and ICT to establish 
and empower themselves and their communities over the course of five years starting 
with 2011 and ending with 2015. For example, the 2012 documentary tells the story 
of the role media literacy played in how citizens responded to counter rumours spread 
online and via mainstream media during events like the Ambon riots in 2012 
(http://asadessa.ICTwatch.id/linimassa-02/). In one section (starting around the 11 min 
mark), the narrator uses the phrase “how ordinary people can do extraordinary things” 
to describe the range of ways Indonesians use the Internet to create their own spaces 
to advocate (for HIV/Aids), share information (through blogging, tweeting and 
community radio) and even, express opposition. In another section of the documentary, 
the narrator relates the story of how Indonesians, from mummy bloggers and disabled 
rights bloggers to those who market their works of batik art to the world, have 
employed the strengths of the Internet to venture into e-commerce.  
Similar activities have also been conducted by Satudunia, another CSO with a focus 
on the strengthening of the knowledgeable civil society in Indonesia. Since 2006, 
Satudunia has organised regular discussions, talks and workshops under the principle 
of ‘Connect, Share and Find’. According to Agus, from Satudunia, they facilitate 
writing classes and journalistic trainings for activists and teachers as a process of 
knowledge transfer. These activities are intended to share information about ITE and 
to train activists and journalists in writing news about ITE in mass media. He said:  
We aim to spread an awareness of ICT usage and Internet policies among 
Indonesian society. We also provide fellowship programs for activists that 
continuously campaign the agenda of revision of three national laws in 
2015: the revision of Broadcasting Law, draft of Public Broadcasting Act, 
and the revision of ITE. [He also added] Satudunia started a new concept 
of Focus Group Discussion (FGD) this year. We initiated to conduct 
regular FGD among CSOs to establish a strong coalition and new 
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perspective in looking towards our organisations. The FGD used to be a 
one-to-many discussion with an expert and CSOs’ members as participants 
(interview in August 2015). 
The activities conducted by Medialink, Satudunia and ICTwatch seek to create social 
change through changing practices or actions repeated on a regular basis within the 
structure. As Giddens argues that in structuration concept, action and structure are 
necessarily related to each other: structure in societies formed as people act in regular 
ways, and action is only possible because each individual possess socially structured 
knowledge (Giddens, 1984, p. 377). By empowering communities using CSOs’ 
programs and activities, a structure of policy process is formed consisting of practices 
and interactions between CSOs and communities which provide actions to form 
another structure of policy process with government or business practices. As with the 
instance of Prita’s alleged infringement against Article 27 of ITE, these programs and 
campaigns by CSOs demonstrate the duality of structure, making resources like Article 
27 both the medium and the outcome of the conduct it recursively (in this instance, 
attempts to) organize. 
Other CSOs have also responded to the process of ITE review by the establishment of 
CSOs coalitions: KITA (Internet without fear coalition) in 2012 and SIKA (Friends 
for Fair Information and Communication) in 2015. They aim to confirm the process of 
ITE revision in the national legislation program operates publicly (SAFEnet, June 
2015). This establishment was an additional effort in assistance of the earlier efforts 
made by ICTwatch since 2012 on Internet governance campaign (interview with 
Ronny, from ICTwatch), the declaration on ID-IGF (Indonesia Internet Governance 
Forum) in 2012 (Banyumurti, November 2, 2012) and the 8th Internet Governance 
Forum in 2013, which was explained earlier (Parlina, March 2, 2013). 
There are also some activities conducted by FDD (Digital Democracy Forum) which 
involved public participation in the process of ITE review such as a meeting on 
Indonesian democracy digital in 2014 (Forum Demokrasi Digital, December 16, 
2014), a dialog of safeguarding democracy and ITE revision in 2015, and discussions 
on netizen’s roles in guiding democracy in Indonesia and ITE emergency status’ 
among CSOs in 2015 (Forum Demokrasi Digital, November 11, 2015).  
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Media Literacy and Regulation 
Looking at the growing number of cases related to the flaws in ITE occurred since its 
enactment, a question of media and Internet literacy comes forward. In the context of 
the potential threat that improper or unknowledgeable use of the internet could present 
for users courtesy of ITE, the development of better and broader media literacy among 
Indonesians is increasingly important.  
According to APJII survey in 2016, the number of Internet users in Indonesia was 
143.26 million people while the population of Indonesia was 252.4 million people. 
The number was concentrated in western-urban areas of the country such as Java, 
Sumatera and Bali (Asosiasi Penyedia Jasa Internet Indonesia, 2017). In fact, from 
2010 to 2015 the number of urban internet users has been at least three to four times 
as many as those who live in rural areas. In the last three months of 2010, for example 
there were 17.74 % of users of the internet based in urban areas where just 4.16 were 
from the rural areas. And in 2015, this ratio became 32.04: 11.70 (Statistics Indonesia, 
2016). By and large this means that people in rural regions and smaller cities have very 
limited access to internet technologies and lesser opportunity to pick up IT skills, let 
alone learn about media literacy. Those who do so tend to have learnt these skills 
through CSOs’ programs.  
An example of the kinds of programs initiated by CSOs is the concept of smart village 
adopted by villages in West and Central Java since 2011 through the Desa Membangun 
program, initiated by local government and Gedhe foundation. Desa Membangun is a 
movement of connecting villages by initiating a self-reliance village approach in 
utilising ICT in the management of village resources and governance. (Desa 
Membangun, 2011). Community empowerment through the use of ICT and social 
media also took place in Medialink’s communities in Kebumen and Wonosobo in 
Central Java; and Sidoarjo and Lumajang in East Java; who have used ICT and social 
media for information seeking about JKN (National Health Insurance) funding and 
data assistance (Medialink, January 2014).  
Conclusion 
ITE as the case study of this thesis is analysed to show how the Indonesian government 
and its people have responded towards the development of information and 
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communication technology, particularly, the Internet. Looking at the long process of 
ITE formation, from 2003 to 2008, the Indonesian government seems to be puzzled 
how to form an appropriate law to regulate the Internet. And since 2008, the 
implementation of ITE has produced many problems related to the ‘prohibitions acts’ 
clauses, particularly the online defamation clause. The cyber law that was designed 
and expected to accommodate safe and trustworthy electronic business transactions 
has become a restraint on the freedom of expression and rights in digital environments. 
By investigating ITE shortcomings and major cases of ITE violation since 2008, the 
process of ITE implementation review seems to be more challenging for the 
government of Indonesia to re-formulate a specific regulation for Internet practices. 
Responses from CSOs and Indonesian people towards ITE implementation have 
generated a crucial agenda for ITE to be revised and placed in Prolegnas in 2015. The 
discussion of ITE revision has been urged to be conducted within participation from 
various parties involved and approaches.   
When the Indonesian government finally decided to revise ITE and placed the revision 
agenda in the Prolegnas in 2015, it might seem that the objective of protecting freedom 
of expression and digital democracy had been fulfilled. However, there continues to 
be some debate surrounding the revision of ITE. Firstly, a discourse of pros and cons 
of whether ITE should be revised or not. Secondly, there is no consensus as to whether 
omitting Article 27 altogether or reduce its penalty would be more effective. And 
lastly, since the most cases of ITE violation have to do with defamation online, further 
discussion as to whether defamation in Indonesia belongs to the category of criminal 
act or civil act is significant.  
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Chapter 7. Working towards improvements in ICT Policy 
formation 
 
Introduction 
Following chapter 6 which illustrates main flaws in ITE as the result of the gaps 
between the ideal and actual process of ICT policy development in Indonesia since 
2008, the purpose of this chapter is to analyse some aspects in the ITE formation 
process which can be improved to formulate a policy that regulates the usage and 
applications of the Internet specifically, integrates other regulations, and meets 
expectations from different publics in Indonesian society. These aspects are public 
participation in policy process from the beginning until the end of process (enactment 
of law or regulations), the politics of policy making process in Indonesian government 
system, and challenges of Indonesian internet infrastructure and access, and the level 
of digital media literacy among Indonesians. 
As explained earlier in chapter 1, internet infrastructure and access are the main 
challenges in Indonesian internet development. These two issues are primarily 
consequences of Indonesian geographical condition, which make the building of 
internet infrastructure across the nation very costly. Although there have been some 
infrastructure development programs implemented since 2009 such as the Palapa Ring 
Project to connect all regions to the Internet, problems with equity and affordability in 
relation to internet access still remain. It requires a strong commitment from the 
government to support internet infrastructure development and cooperation between 
business entities and the government to provide equal and affordable access for 
Indonesians. Not to mention public participation, represented by the CSOs, in the 
policy making and implementation processes. Within the context of ITE making and 
implementation process analysed in this study, it was only in initial stage that CSOs 
were not involved in the drafting process with the national government and the big 
business. However, during the ITE revision process, as explained in Chapter 5, the 
CSOs have been actively involved in certain levels such as in public hearing, 
monitoring and reviews levels.  
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An important issue emerged along with the development of ICT in Indonesia since the 
year of 2000, the issue of how Indonesians use ICT. This question is linked closely 
with the technological and communicative capabilities and skills developed within 
education at schools and homes or put differently, digital media literacy. As explained 
previously, digital media literacy in this thesis is referred to the ability to evaluate 
online content, which in Indonesian context is defined as acceptable online behaviour 
linked closely to social and cultural norms of Indonesia’s identity as a multicultural 
nation with a majority Muslim population. This condition had created problems in 
online practice within society where the ambiguous wording of various Articles in ITE 
have led to differing definitions of information that conflicted with each other.  
In Chapter 5 I also discussed how the CSOs, ICTwatch, Satudunia and Medialink have 
worked to improve digital media literacy through their programs such as Internet safety 
campaign, informative documentaries, writing classes and journalism training held by 
Satudunia. Medialink as one of CSOs observed in this thesis, also has conducted some 
programs such as a learning group Ar-Rahmah and an information distribution among 
Medialink’s community through its newsletter, Asik. Other activities conducted by 
CSOs such as FDD, KITA, SIKA and SafeNet that urge Indonesians to participate in 
ITE implementation and review process are examples of CSOs’ efforts to improve 
technological and communicative capabilities and skills among Indonesians.  
The next crucial aspect to improve ITE formation process concerns the politics of 
policy-making processes within the Indonesian government system. What is 
understood here as the politics of the policy-making process is the system operation 
and behaviours of people and institutes with power. In Indonesia, as explained in 
chapter 4, the policy-making process involves many levels and ministries of the 
government as well as members of the House of Representative (DPR), who are 
members of many different and contesting political parties. To actively advocate for 
the interests of the public during the policy-making process, CSOs as the 
representative voice of Indonesian public must understand how the process and politics 
of the DPR work. There are layers of governance and lines of authoritative bodies 
within the policy-making process in the Indonesian government system that need to be 
recognised of and to work with.  
 119 
To achieve their objective of contributing to social change, CSOs need to understand 
the politics in order to have political benefits within the system of government to 
support CSO’s campaign. Although the authoritarian regime has collapsed after 
Reformasi, civil society actors who enter the political arena still have to form political 
parties and other formal political institutions (Haynes, 1997). It is also not unknown 
in Indonesia for political parties to recruit political leaders in new democracies from 
civil society groups (Andreas Uhlin, 2000, pp. 10-12). CSOs and their leaders are 
painfully aware of the need for political nous at all the multiple levels of government 
if they are to tackle issues from access and literacy to Internet governance. 
Agus of Satudunia relates the example of the fairly frequent “emergence of a new draft 
[of regulations] at the last moment” to illustrate the need for CSOs to understand the 
politics of the policy-making process. On such occasions, because CSOs understand 
and can at times anticipate such moves, they are able to present alternate formulations 
and provoke further discussion, thus, playing the important role of questioning these 
last minute drafts from the government. The government appreciates the role CSOs 
play in this process and have, according to Agus, on the “environmental issue, the 
Mineral Resources Act” adopted the alternate proposed by CSOs. However, in the end 
the issue was taken to and settled at the Constitutional Court. Most times, however, 
alternate drafts from CSOs rarely make it to the decision-making stage at the last 
minute. As Agus explains, sometimes these last-minute drafts appear “like a dawn 
attack at election time”.  CSOs do not have any power in this instance and have only 
their “vision and mission” to bring into the policy making process to bring to the new 
draft (Agus, interview on August 19, 2015).  
The last aspect is the building of participation and expectations from the public, CSOs 
and business in relation to internet usage and its governance in Indonesia. In 
advocating for rights, empowerment and safety, the CSOs such as Medialink, 
ICTwatch and Satudunia and others have introduced these notions as resources into 
the structure of ICT policy. One result is the expectation from all actors of a transparent 
and accountable process of internet policy making, its implementation and review.  
Agus from Satudunia explains that CSOs have a variety of approaches when working 
with the government. According to him, ICTwatch has a more cooperative method of 
working with the government due to its close relationship with the current Minister of 
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Communication and Information. ICTwatch’s insider advantage benefits their 
involvement in the ministerial programs and can in turn bring more benefits to other 
CSOs and Indonesian people. CSO can, therefore, work within the government system 
even as it works with society, thereby improving their bargaining position within the 
policy-making process (interview on August 19, 2015).  
Infrastructure and Access 
A reliable telecommunication infrastructure is critical to information access. This 
concern has been central to Satudunia’s efforts to strengthen a knowledgeable civil 
society by ensuring information equity between the government’s programs and 
society. According to Agus from Satudunia, Civil Society Organisation (CSO) has a 
role in building an organisational capacity in using information, communication, 
knowledge and technology with a new and continuous perspective and strategy 
(interview on January 27, 2014). Due to the limited telecommunication infrastructure 
in certain regions in Indonesia, especially outside the island of Java and the eastern 
parts of Indonesia, Satudunia has concentrated its efforts on facilitating the flow of 
information and the continuity of access across Indonesian society through two priority 
programs.   
The first is the sharing of resources program directed at facilitating knowledge and 
information sharing among CSOs to strengthen online and offline civil society 
movement. As Agus puts it, ‘the ability to make changes is started from the 
organisational ability to manage and use information, communication, knowledge and 
technology strategically, effectively and efficiently’ (interview on January 27, 2014). 
This sharing of resources program is named ‘Facility Exchange’ and uses both online 
and offline methods such as satuportal.net, mail-list of Satudunia’s partners, mail-list 
of ‘ICT for social justice’, social media platforms like @oneworldID and Facebook: 
Satudunia.foundation, and online newsletter to carry out its objectives. Satudunia’s 
offline methods include bulletins, CD, workshops and focus group discussions. This 
service of resources and website sharing occurs due to the concept of Satudunia’s 
partnership with regional communities across Indonesia. Agus adds, in the past, 
Satudunia provided a website sharing service for partnership. However, the 
partnership has extended into involvement with projects, information updates and 
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collaboration opportunities for local CSOs as they have limited access and information 
to the donors (interview on August 19, 2015). 
Satudunia’s second program is concerned with capacity building in information, 
communication, knowledge and ICT among civil society organisation. The program is 
conducted in a format of in-house training and includes several tasks such as how to 
manage information and knowledge, to document and capture information, printed 
media journalism, online and citizen journalism. Satudunia has also conducted writing 
workshops on how to write a change story for CSOs regularly. Writing a change story 
is one alternative way for program’s monitoring and evaluation.  
Communication strategies and utilization of ICT applications such as ‘SMS gateway’ 
application for farmers in West Java in cooperation with USAID, training in DNA 
(Discourse Network Analysis) for conducting media analysis and ‘open source’ 
application of Open Street Map from the Humanitarian Open Street Map Team are 
also parts of Satudunia services. Agus explains, capacity building services offered by 
Satudunia are based on the assumption that CSOs in Indonesia already have a lot of 
information and general knowledge about ICT, but not the ability to manage the 
information and knowledge well. This leads to a quality of media and technology 
literacy, the ability to use, select, and process information, even to produce and 
distribute or the information to solve problems they have. In a further step, CSOs might 
use their ability to manage information to contribute more in a policy making process. 
He also adds that new perspectives and strategies towards ICT are essential for 
complex changes and problems in Indonesia (interview on January 27, 2014). 
Agus also adds that these collective intelligence programs based on the organisational 
ability and information equity are Satudunia’s major activities to strengthen civil 
society in Indonesia. One example of Satudunia practice to support ICT 
implementation at the local level is the assistance given to a village in Jatiwaras, 
Tasikmalaya West Java. Satudunia helped the village to maintain its own website, 
‘mandalamekar.desa.id’. Part of the movement of village development (Gerakan Desa 
Membangun) since 2011, the website is an example of how ICT is being used for 
village management and governance through the application of open source software. 
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Similar to Satudunia’s programs of improving access of internet and information for 
communities across Indonesia, efforts to improve information access can be evidenced 
by Medialink’s programs at the local level. According to my interviewee from 
Medialink, Bambang, the question of how people or society use information and 
benefit from it has been their focus since 2010. These questions led him and his friends 
in Medialink to establish two priorities in their programs: the assistance program for 
marginal groups to be capable in using information and the advocacy of national 
policies related to information access. Both of these priorities are a result of 
Medialink’s vision of strengthening democracy through a more equal distribution of 
information and access to sources of information for social welfare benefits (interview 
with Bambang, from Medialink, on January 24, 2014).    
Bambang says that the assistance program targeted for marginal groups was designed 
to spread the awareness of the importance of information in the solution of their 
problems, particularly basic health problems. Medialink has helped the marginal 
groups through its information utilisation programs. The marginal groups they help are 
usually small, local communities, many of whom are victims of natural disasters. 
Whether initiated by Medialink and/or the villagers, the programs serve to (re)establish 
social security. They include: Jimpitan Sehat (a program aimed at empowering female 
and less-educated group in Besuki Timur village, East Java); Kelompok Porong and 
Kelompok Belajar Arrahmah (two groups established to aid victims of the Lapindo 
mud disaster in Sidoarjo, East Java). They are examples of self-reliant communities 
who have learnt to manage information and implement ICT and the Internet in strategic 
ways (interview with Bambang, from Medialink, on January 24, 2014).  
Policy making process: layers of governance and lines of authoritative 
bodies 
As mentioned earlier, the policy making process in Indonesian government system 
involves many parts of the government as well as members of the House of 
Representative (DPR), who are comprised by members of many competing political 
parties. To be effective representatives of the Indonesian public and actively advocate 
for the interests of the public during the policy-making process, CSOs must understand 
how the process and politics of the DPR work.  
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One major practical activity to do with social changes within a community is 
participation in policy making. Medialink had contributed to this activity by facilitating 
dialogues within the communities on issues of National Health Insurance, trained 
communities’ skills in media literacy and negotiation (interview with Bambang on 
January 24, 2014).  
CSOs participation in policy development is also aligned with the requirements of 
public consultation in the legislation process as mandated by the Law of 
Decentralisation since 1999. According to this Law, both government and the 
parliament must conduct public hearing during the policy-making process. Inputs and 
initiatives on the draft of legislation might come from the government or parliament 
and civil society. Civil society can offer reviews and/or alternate drafts of laws.  
Access and participation in policy-making processes can be achieved by enabling 
public discussions about ICT formation and review. This means that CSOs should have 
more active roles to work within and outside the system of policy making, not only 
actively play roles in the review process but also in the formation process, since the 
beginning the policy was discussed. This analysis might be the answer to my initial 
assumptions of the thesis. Working outside the system, the CSOs should have the 
capabilities to organise meetings and talks among CSOs and the general public 
including students, academics, activists, journalists, media practitioners and common 
people with lesser background knowledge of internet policy development. To be 
productive these meetings and talks should be conducted based in an open and free 
environment principles. For example, one of the last activities conducted by CSOs in 
2016 was when the three CSOs (Medialink, ICTwatch and Satudunia) participated in 
public hearings on the national agenda of ITE revision alongside legislative members 
and the Ministry of Communications and Information (ICJR, 2016a).  
Public participation and expectations in policy process 
The concept of independence has always been around the discourse of democracy.  
And this discourse of democracy - a discourse of protecting civil rights in a democratic 
society - was challenged by restrictions imposed on the freedom to use the Internet and 
to voice opinions or even critics using social media, mostly after the enactment of ITE 
in 2008. Internet which appeared as the more advanced technology brings about the 
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discourse of democracy into a new platform, a digital one, posits some issues such as 
its infrastructure, access, content and security regulations. These issues if they are not 
managed carefully, as already occurred, will form more complex problems, abuse and 
exploitation of Internet regulations. The ambiguity of the wording in ITE and a lack of 
understanding from the authority, the police and prosecutor to interpret the law, have 
been the major constraint for democracy in digital era. This law might reflect anti-
democratic principles as many cases of ITE breach occurred in interactions between 
powerful versus powerless people.  
Reformasi had an impact to expectations and aspirations amongst the people for a 
stronger democracy in Indonesia. A stronger democracy requires a more transparent 
and accountable system of government and public participation in any kinds of 
political activities such as being an active member of political party, to be involved in 
the national elections, to participate actively in policy making process or express 
opinions, critics and suggestions about the governments. Working with regional and 
local communities across the country to observe and examine governments’ policies 
and programs is also of examples of public participation. 
In the context of internet policy development in Indonesia, CSOs like ICTwatch, 
Satudunia and Medialink, have made several efforts to play a role of forming opinions 
about ITE implementation and review since 2009, in specific, ICTwatch which has a 
great concern with Internet usage and governance in Indonesia since 2002. Examples 
of their efforts are some campaigns towards the revision of ITE since 2010 such as 
Sepiring Nasi, Lauk Sate, Giring Revisi, UU ITE… (A plate of rice, satay, conduct 
revision, ITE – a poetic form usually contain humorous messages to remind people to 
push government to revise ITE ) and #JANGAN LUPA, Presidennya, Anggota 
DPRnya, Menkominfonya, Segeralah Revisi…ITE (#DON’T FORGET, President, 
Legislative Members, and Minister of Communications and Information, Revise ITE 
Soon….) (Internetsehat, 2014). These campaigns used a humorous message to attract 
more attentions from people with different background to participate in ITE revision 
campaigns. 
Information about and discussions of ITE revision process were also disseminated by 
CSOs using many means of communication including file-sharing and open access 
document retrieval through CSOs websites and slide share applications. CSOs also 
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authored articles for publication in national newspapers as additional campaign of ITE 
revision process (Erdianto, 2016). Reviews and analysis breaking down the 
implications of implementing ITE and its challenges and problems were also carried 
out by CSOs. For example, Satudunia published two analysis on monitoring ICT 
policy in Indonesia, Menelisik Pertarungan Wacana Revisi UU ITE, and Melawan 
Dominasi Wacana Rejim Blokir di Internet in 2015. Workshops and journalistic 
classes conducted by Satudunia through its program: Rumah Pengetahuan, have 
shared and spread awareness about the importance of ICT skills and usage.  ICTwatch 
has also organised several publications on ITE reviews and Internet literacy, Netizen 
facts, which are created periodically (Internetsehat, 2015a). These documents are 
published and shared freely for the general people through a file sharing application. 
Moreover, ICTwatch also has a program on Internet skills enhancement through a 
learning module Buku Internet Sehat which is publicly shared (Internetsehat, 2015b). 
As Nugroho (2008, p. 97) remarks, Internet usage by CSOs has also contributed to the 
reshaping of civil society activism in Indonesia. He argues that using the Internet 
strategically in CSOs’ movement might enable CSOs to influence public participation 
in social reform and development in the country.  
According to Ronny from ICTwatch, the involvement of multi-stakeholders in 
Indonesia started in the field of Internet domain and intellectual property between the 
Ministry of Communication and Information (MCI and the business sector via the 
APJII (the Indonesian Association of Internet Service Provider) and PANDI (the 
Indonesian Association of Domain Name). After the eighth Internet Governance 
Forum (IGF) in 2013, MCI has taken an important step towards working with multi-
stakeholders. MCI invited ID-CONFIG as the civil society representative in a 
discussion of the regulation of online content. This meeting signalled an increased 
commitment from the government to acknowledge the contributions of civil society 
and the business sector as an equal partner in Internet governance (interview on 
January 27, 2014).  
Public participation and expectations in ICT policy development in Indonesia can also 
be observed from a major breakthrough event held in 2013: The 8th Internet 
Governance Forum (IGF). This event was important as it showcased collaboration 
between three actors in the Indonesian ICT policy development: the government, big 
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business, and CSO. IGF 2013 was an example of cooperation between multi-
stakeholders in Indonesia in organising an international ICT event. It also presented 
Indonesia as a country that has an evolving commitment towards ICT policy 
development.  
Yet even before IGF 2013 was held, ‘Internet Governance’ had been ICTwatch’s 
advocacy program since 2010. Its aim is to support Indonesian multi-stakeholder 
dialogues in ICT by upholding the key principles of transparency, accountability, 
equality, collaboration and professionalism. As Ronny points out, the declaration of 
commitment between the business sector and the civil society on Internet Governance 
in Indonesia (ID-IGF) during the IGF in November 2012 emphasized the importance 
of multi-stakeholders. This declaration was signed as an acknowledgment among 
multi-stakeholders that the Internet governance needs not only technical skills but also 
continuous interactions and collaboration on other issues such as laws, economy, 
education and development (interview on January 27, 2014). 
Conclusion 
There are at least three important aspects in working towards improvements in ICT 
policy formation process in Indonesia. The fundamental element to improve is 
government’s commitment to involve general public / multi stakeholders within policy 
making process. Other crucial aspect is the nature of policy making process itself 
which includes layers of governance and lines of authoritative bodies in Indonesian 
system of government. Expectations from the public, CSOs and business can only be 
transpired if public participation occurs within the policy making process. Apart from 
those aspects, the major challenges of Internet infrastructure and access and the level 
of digital media literacy among Indonesians still need to be confronted.  
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Conclusion 
 
Process of ICT policy development: from contestation to collaboration, and 
back to contestation  
 
This study began with a question about ITE enactment in 2008 and ITE post-
implementation in Indonesia. It has also further questioned the conditions after 
implementation of the ITE, during which there have been many cases of ITE violations 
or infringements related to rights to expression over the Internet. This research 
investigated how the ICT policy process has developed since ITE enactment and what 
contributions have been made by the actors within the process, in particular the CSOs.  
Using a case study of the ITE and working with three CSOs: ICTwatch, Satudunia and 
Medialink, this study determined that the process of ICT policy development in 
Indonesia constituted complex interactions between actors involved in the process, 
from contestation to collaboration and back to contestation over time. To demonstrate 
this analysis, this thesis has applied Giddens’ structuration theory to describe the 
mechanism of functioning actors and structures in the ICT policy development, mainly 
the ITE revision process. These complex interactions were highly influenced by social 
and political contexts such as changes in governments and the growth of ICT-driven 
communities and Internet-campaign CSOs, which provided a distinctive platform for 
creating flexibility within the policy process, previously a dominantly bureaucratic 
process.  
Giddens’ structuration theory serves in this thesis as a valuable framework in 
understanding the interplay between the government, big business and CSOs within 
the ITE development process. Such understanding is achieved by addressing the gap 
created by the Indonesian’s technological, social and cultural developments especially 
within the era of post-Reformasi, and a relatively lesser attention paid towards 
telecommunication policy changes.  
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Notwithstanding limitations and constraints, it is an undeniable fact that ITE revision 
has been achieved, most importantly with regard to its flaws related to rights to 
expression over the Internet, and this was only made possible by the role of CSOs in 
campaigning for ITE revision, not only to communities and public but also by working 
strategically with government and big business in ways both inside and outside the 
policy making process. There remains substantial room for reworking of the ITE, the 
ITE revision process has served as an example of the interactions between government 
and society where the interests of the general public are contested and often 
confounded by political and economic interests.  
This is in line with Aspinall’s argument:  
Indonesia remains equally a place of contestation—in the contentious 
politics of street protests and social movements that have become central 
to political life, and in the perpetual frictions that occur between oligarchic, 
popular, and other interests within arenas like parliaments, parties, and 
electoral politics. That these struggles are complex, and take place in 
contradictory and fragmented ways, involving ever-shifting political 
coalitions and conflicts, reflects the complexity of Indonesian democracy 
and the kaleidoscopic patterns of social interest that underpin it (Aspinall, 
2013). 
The collaboration aspect within ICT policy development process can be described by 
looking at the ways CSOs have worked with the government. CSOs have played 
strategic roles by implementing two ways of working: outside the system (with other 
CSOs and communities) and inside the system (with the government and big business). 
ICTwatch, Satudunia and Medialink programs that support the community in media 
and technology literacy, help the community to gain access to information and ICT, 
and help them participate in the policy-making process are some of the examples. 
Satudunia’s program of Rumah Pengetahuan (Knowledge House) is to support 
activists and journalists with writing courses and organisational capacity development 
and Medialink’s program of information usage for local communities in marginal areas 
in Central Java, East Java and Ambon. Medialink helped these communities make use 
of ICT and information, mainly concerning the national health insurance program, in 
order to obtain their rights as victims of a natural disaster. Empowering communities 
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is viewed as an effort to increase CSOs’ bargaining position with government and 
private interests in the decision-making process.  
Working inside the system means being a partner to the government’s programs in the 
ICT sector and the ITE revision process, or having a co-operation with big business in 
conducting those programs. ICTwatch programs and activities are examples of CSO 
roles for working inside the system. As observed in this thesis, ICTwatch is perceived 
as a CSO that has a close relationship with the government, in particular the Ministry 
of Communications and Information during President Jokowi’s administration. This 
view is also supported by an opinion from Agus from Satudunia, who says that a CSO 
might have a variety of approaches when working with the government. He explains 
that ICTwatch uses a more co-operative method of working with the government due 
to a close relationship with the Minister. This inside role of ICTwatch benefits its 
involvement with the ministerial programs and might in turn bring more benefits to 
other CSOs and Indonesian people. By playing inside (working within the government 
system) and outside (working with society) roles, CSOs’ bargaining position within the 
policy-making process might be improved (interview on August 19, 2015).  
An example of the inside role of CSOs is also demonstrated by describing how the 8th 
Internet Governance Forum (IGF) was organised in Indonesia in 2013. The 8th IGF 
was considered to be a major breakthrough by all actors involved in ICT policy 
development in Indonesia. This event was important as it showcased collaboration 
between three actors in policy development: the government, big business, and CSOs. 
IGF 2013 was an example of cooperation between multi-stakeholders in Indonesia in 
organising an international ICT event. It also presented Indonesia as a country that has 
an evolving commitment towards ICT policy development.  
Despite the fact that CSOs have conducted more co-operative methods of working 
with the government and big business, some division among CSO networks still 
remains. For example, in the context of ministerial regulation discussions regarding 
website blocking procedures in 2012 between the MCI and CSOs, an unofficial divide 
emerged between CSOs. There were those who believed CSOs should hold to the 
principles of law and human rights, and there were some who attempted to influence 
the expert council, a body formed by the MCI decision on websites blocking 
procedures. The principle group that believed CSOs should hold to the principles of 
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law and human rights argued that CSOs cannot compromise on matters of principle 
although CSOs could collaborate on other practical matters. This principle group, in 
the end, chose to operate outside of the government system.  
In regard to the ITE revision process, ICTwatch, Satudunia, and Medialink have 
worked with other CSOs like SAFENet and ICJR to establish SIKA (Friends for Fair 
Information and Communication), a coalition of CSOs formed in 2015, which has a 
strong commitment to actively observing the ITE revision process. This commitment 
was illustrated when SIKA gave a report on a list of problems in ITE revision, Catatan 
dan Usulan Masyarakat Sipil atas RUU Perubahan UU ITE, and sent it to DPR after 
the first meeting with MCI and DPR in February 2016 (Eddyono et al., January 2016). 
One further question to point out, the discourse of ITE revision struggle needs to be 
shifted from the discourse of online defamation matters into a more comprehensive 
matters of Internet governance such as the protection of personal data privacy and the 
policy of internet content blocking which are considered as inappropriate content. 
Challenges and limitations of a revised ITE and ICT environment 
Although emerging discourse on the digital economy in Indonesia has taken place, 
challenges surrounding the ICT environment, such as infrastructure and access 
development, and media and Internet literacy, still remain and need to be unravelled. 
CSOs have provided essential contributions to the ICT policy development process, 
for example in the ITE revision process. However, the outcome of the process often 
does not fulfil the interests of public, and is driven by the dominant political and 
economic interests. The case study of the ITE revision process in this thesis has 
illustrated that the contestations of interests among CSOs, big business, and the 
government were highly influenced by the actors’ resources - their degree of access to 
information, power and dominant position within the debates - and by the structure of 
policy-making process.  
The long process of reaching a decision to revise the ITE, from 2009 to 2015, showed 
that the process was actually a struggle between the state and society. The revised ITE, 
was being discussed in formal meetings with DPR, MCI, and some CSOs in a 
relatively short time of 3 months, from February to April 2016. Including CSOs only 
in the first meeting to discuss ITE revision drafts was an example of the existing rigid 
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principles applied by the government. It seems that the government was still unwilling 
to have direct internal CSO engagement in the policy-making process. Therefore, 
CSOs depend on political party members in DPR to support what they have fought for 
in the ITE revision process. Eventually the ITE revision draft was legalised in DPR in 
October 2016 and enacted a month later.  
The ITE revision covered some points which focus on preventing a multiple 
interpretation of “distributing, transmitting and accessing electronic information that 
contains defamation” in Article 27 by adding an explanation of what is meant by that 
expression, and making amendments to penalty and case status in an Article 27 
infringement. The 6-year penalty was shortened to 4 years and a ‘delik umum’ (general 
offense) case status was changed to a ‘delik aduan’ (a report should be made by a 
victim) status. In practice, this changing status means that power has been shifted away 
from the ability to place someone directly in jail due to a law’s violation (Ministry of 
Communication and Information, 2016). This decision induced some robust reactions 
from CSOs. Mainly they were disappointed that the critical points in the ITE were not 
changed according to their CSO’s aims. In particular, Article 27 on defamation, which 
restrained public rights to express opinions and critique the government was not 
deleted (Johnson, 2016). 
It was a perceptive critic from ICJR and LBH who also claimed that the process of ITE 
revision was highly influenced by the government’s interests. One such interest was 
considered to be the government’s unwillingness to allow people to criticise the 
government. The right to express opinions was restricted by Article 27 of the ITE 
remained in place although its penalty was reduced (ICJR, 2016b).  
Similarly, Satudunia also described the ITE revision process as a secretive process 
where there were not any avenues for CSOs to be involved in and contribute to the 
process. Although CSOs were included in the early meeting with the MCI and the 
DPR, their lack of involvement in the rest of the process lessened their input. The early 
meeting was the one and only chance for CSOs to sit together to discuss the ITE 
revision. Nevertheless, Satudunia and other CSOs like ICJR, ELSAM, LBH Pers, and 
SIKA, formulated a report on a list of problems in the ITE revision, Catatan dan 
Usulan Masyarakat Sipil atas RUU Perubahan UU ITE, and sent it to the DPR after 
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the first meeting with the MCI and the DPR in February 2016 (Eddyono et al., January 
2016). 
Furthermore, one activist from SAFENet also evaluated that ITE revision was only 
superficial, and did not touch the central question of constraints on the rights to express 
opinions (Lubis, 2016). He also added that the Internet, as a democratic space, has 
shifted to a contested space due to more control by the government in the struggle over 
the ITE revision process. The view of the Internet as a democratic space seemed to 
fade away as the space became less autonomous due to government regulations and 
domination by big mass media corporations, or centralised by a single business interest 
with help from the government. A further confusing aspect of the ITE revision is a 
new subject introduced within the law, in an Article on “the right to be forgotten” 
principle, which appears to be in need of a more complex explanation.  
It is unfortunate that the whole process of ITE revision was less integrated with the 
spirit of public participation and democracy and that this process has ended in the 
period of President Jokowi’s administration, which had guaranteed after election a 
period of the democratic values of openness, accountability and public participation.  
The usefulness of Giddens’ framework to understand the mechanism of functioning 
actors and structures, and in understanding the interplay between the government, big 
business and CSOs within the ITE development process, together with the insights 
explained above, lies in the concept of duality of structure. The concept explains how 
social practices at micro-level can and do, affect macro-level structures. While 
structures such as the ICT policy facilitate, and prescribe Indonesians’ use of the 
internet from day-to-day, what Indonesians do on and with the internet, in other words 
their media and social practices, feed back into the structures. It is where what some 
might deem deviant social practices take place and also the result of what is shaped by 
their social practices and their repercussions. The point is, the structure though formed 
remains malleable.  
Meanwhile, Giddens’ approach limits discussions of the use of power in social 
interaction, which is I think a critical point in the Indonesian context when discussing 
interactions and relationships between actors and structures in policy development 
process. As Giddens says: 
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[a]ll social interaction involves the use of power, as a necessary 
implication of the logical connection between human action and 
transformative capacity. The stocks of knowledge drawn upon by actors in 
the production and reproduction of interaction are at the same time the 
source of accounts they may supply for the purposes, reasons and motives 
of their action.  
As the result of this thesis, a possible future research direction on the influence of 
power and Giddens’ duality of structure in policy development process might be 
applied in other similar types of analysis.
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Appendix 1 Information Sheet  
INFORMATION SHEET 
Study Title:  
Civic Engagement and the Role of Internet in Indonesian Society 
Invitation 
We would like you to take part in a research study. Before you decide you need to 
understand why the research is being done and what it would involve for you. Please 
take time to read this information carefully. Please ask if there is anything that is not 
clear or if you would like more information. Take time to decide whether or not you 
wish to take part.  
Purpose of Study 
The study is designed to investigate the impact of civil society and public participation 
on the development of Internet Communication Policy in Indonesia. This research will 
examine the history of Information and Communication Policy in Indonesia, explore 
how information about ICT policy has been disseminated to the public, investigate 
online and offline community contributions to the legislative process around ICT 
policy and examine the impact of these contributions in the context of 
Telecommunication Law in Indonesia.  
Participants Selection 
You are being invited to take part in this research because your experience as a 
government official and a community participant can contribute much to our 
understanding and knowledge of telecommunication and ICT laws and practises.  
Do I have to take part? 
It is entirely optional and deciding not to participate or to withdraw from the study at 
any time will not affect any benefits in any way. You do not have to give a reason.  
What will happen if I agree to take part? 
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If you are happy to participate in the research, we will ask you to read this information 
sheet and sign the consent form. We will make arrangements for you to meet to do the 
interviews. It might be possible that the interviews may be done more than one time 
and followed electronically in written documents such as emails and electronic 
questionnaires.  
What are the possible benefits, disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
Your participation will help us find out more about the online and offline public 
participation in telecommunication policy development in Indonesia. There is a risk 
that you may share some personal or confidential information by chance, or that you 
may feel uncomfortable talking about some of the topics. However, we do not wish 
for this to happen: You do not have to answer any question or take part in the 
interviews if you feel the questions are too personal or if talking about them makes 
you uncomfortable. 
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
All information you provide to us will be kept confidential. Data from interviews will 
be confirmed to you before it is published. Only researcher and her supervisor have 
access to the data. All data collection, storage and processing will comply with the 
principles of the Data Protection Act under Curtin University Policy.  
What will happen to the results of the study? 
All information provided by you will be stored on a computer with analysis of the 
information obtained undertaken by the researcher at Curtin University. The results 
from this analysis will be available in one or more of the following sources: scientific 
papers in peer reviewed academic journals; presentations at international and regional 
conferences; local seminars.  
Who has reviewed the study to ensure it is correctly conducted? 
Research Ethics Committee at Curtin University has reviewed this study. Research 
projects are not undertaken unless Ethics Clearance has been granted. If you wish to 
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find more about Research Ethics Committee, please contact School of Media Culture 
and Creative Arts, Curtin University. 
The visual materials or photographs taken during this research will be used only for 
additional documents and for illustration in conference presentations. No other use will 
be made of them without your written permission. 
Thank you for your participation and cooperation.  
 
Deviani Setyorini           
deviani.setyorini@student.curtin.edu.au                 
School of Media Culture and Creative Arts Curtin University    
   
 
Associate Professor Michele Willson     Dr Susan Leong 
Head of Department of Internet Studies Curtin University  Supervisor 
m.willson@exchange.curtin.edu.au     susan.leong@curtin.edu.au  
Building 208 level 3 R.311 B      Building 208 level3R.311 D 
+ 61 08 92663594      
 
Human Research Ethics Committee (Secretary)  
Office of Research and Development  
Curtin University of Technology, GPO Box U1987, Perth WA 6845 
Phone: 9266 2784 or hrec@curtin.edu.au    
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Appendix 2 Consent Form 
 
CONSENT FORM 
Title of Project  : Civic Engagement and The Role of Internet in Indonesian Society 
Name of Researcher : Deviani Setyorini 
Contact Address : Jl Cempaka No 49 Cilegon 42418 Banten Indonesia 
Telephone number  : +62 81310917097 
Email    : deviani.setyorini@student.curtin.edu.au / ordinarydevi@gmail.com  
 
Please Initial Box 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information 
sheet for the above study. I have had the time and 
opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and 
have had these answered satisfactorily.   
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am 
free to withdraw at any time without giving any reason.  
 
 
3. I agree to the interview being audio recorded. 
 
4. Having been assured of anonymity, I consent to the 
collected data being used for analysis, presentation and 
publication. 
 
5. I agree that the researcher may contact me.  
 
 
6. I agree to take part in the above study. 
 
Name of Participant :     Name of Researcher : 
Date    :     Date    : 
Signature  :    Signature   : 
Contact Address/Tel.no/email: 
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Appendix 3 Interview Guide  
 
INTERVIEW GUIDE 
Name of Interviewer : Deviani Setyorini 
Name of Interviewee : GDB  
Position  : Head of public relations and information of the Ministry of 
  Communication and Information  
 
List of items List of questions 
The history of Information and 
Communication Technology 
Policy in Indonesia 
1. What Telecommunication Law has 
been implemented in Indonesia since 
1994? 
2. Were there any changes in the Law 
after Reformasi? 
3. Are there any specific regulations or 
law to address ICT? If any, what law 
and since when? 
4. Is ICT regulated with mass media law, 
such as the Law of Press and Law of 
Broadcasting? 
5. How did the Law no 11/2008 form? 
What parties were involved? 
6. How about the Law no 14/2008? 
7. Are there any major issues related to 
the Law no 11 and Law no 14/2008? 
8. Is there any specific policy, 
regulations and law about the 
Internet? If any, please explain. 
9. Are there any revisions made for the 
Law no 11 and Law no 14/2008? 
10. What is the progress of Bill of 
Convergence and Telematics since it 
was introduced in 2010? 
11. Is the Telecommunication Law no 
36/1999 being revised? 
 
How information about the ICT 
policy has been provided to the 
public 
 
1. How does the government 
disseminate any information about 
ICT policy and regulations? Is it 
available through the website of 
Ministry of Communication and 
Information? 
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2. Does the government provide the 
information about ICT policy in 
mainstream media such as newspaper 
and television? 
3. Is there any written document about 
ICT policy that can be accessed by 
people? If any, what kind of 
documents and where to get these 
documents? 
4. Is all information about ICT policy 
accessible for public in general or 
only for specific information? 
5. Who are involved in the discussions 
of ICT policy? 
6. Can common people involve or give 
any suggestions in the discussions? 
 
Strategic ICT Plan of Ministry of 
Communication and Information 
2010-2020 
1. What national plan does the 
government have towards ICT 
development? 
2. What important or major aspects to be 
considered the most in the plan? 
3. Does the government publish the 
information about the national ICT 
plan in mass media? Are there any 
promotional media or advertisements? 
4. Who are involved in the process of 
making the national ICT plan? Is it 
only between the government and the 
Ministry of Communication and 
Information?  
5. Is the national ICT plan open for 
public’s feedback? 
6. What is the progress of the plan so 
far? 
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Name of Interviewer : Deviani Setyorini 
Name of Interviewee  : FC 
Position   : Division Manager of Knowledge Management Satudunia 
foundation  
 
List of items List of questions 
Community activities to 
campaign ICT policy 
1. What activities does your organization 
concern of? 
2. Have your campaigns and advocacy 
done regularly? 
3. Do you supply the information about 
your activities online? 
4. Is your website accessible for any 
people? 
5. Is the information about the activities 
available on the web? 
6. Who can be involved in your activities? 
What are the requirements? 
7. Does your organization hold the 
activities only in certain places? 
8. What are the benefits of joining the 
activities? 
9. How do you get the funding for your 
activities? 
10. Who are the key persons in your 
organization? Do they have any 
influence in the government? 
 
Involvement or contributions 
made to the legislative process 
1. Do you involve in every discussion with 
the government about the ICT policy? 
2. What roles do you play in the 
discussions? 
3. Do you provide any information 
regarding the process and the progress 
of the ICT policy on your website? 
4. To what extent is your contribution 
before, during and after the discussions? 
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Appendix 4 Interview Transcript 
 
INTERVIEW 1 
 
DS  : Sorry, one moment please, I'm going to record this so I don't miss any 
important information. But in the past 3 years I see that there have been several 
newsletters. There are several topics according to my personal observations. 3 years is 
not a short amount of time, provided that you focus, if there is a point you want reach, 
perhaps derived from an earlier vision. So I see that these activities are connected, and 
also with the newsletter, hey. I didn't know where the newsletter was distributed, at 
least the documentation about what is done there and it's something that must be 
continually improved. In my opinion, because the name implies advocacy or a 
campaign, I can see it already exists, but when we want to talk about data, the 
documentation - evaluations and record trails - is not necessarily there. This 
documentation could be included with the archival data and in the future could be 
useful as the main data. Nothing more than just for the project if you want it to 
continue. So I can see that Medialink has a role there. 
AF  : So Medialink really from the outset (2010) looked at various issues. I was at 
ESAI before, [working on issues of] freedom of the press and freedom of information. 
Since 2006, 2007, we have been actively focusing on Act No. 14. When I was no 
longer in ESAI, with a couple of colleagues I started to develop activities that focused 
on information, shifting from the media to the person or the information. How did 
people or society from various sectors exploit or benefit from the information they 
needed and which was circulating at the time. From these issues it came down to 2 
areas of focus. Until 2013 at least. So an interval of 3 years, hey. In 2014, next week, 
we'll try planning like we did in 2013.  
The primary focus is on assisting the community, especially marginal groups, to be 
capable of benefiting from or using information. 
DS  : What do you mean by marginal groups, could you give me an example? 
AF  : Yes. For example, the victims of the Lapindo mudslide in Porong. Since its 
founding Medialink has collaborated with existing Lapindo mudslide victims 
Command Posts and various communities of victims. 2 existing communities are still 
being assisted. The first is a group of women called Jimpitan Sehat in the village of 
Besuk Timur in East Java. Now they've all moved. Now we're in the process of 
consolidating the posts that have moved because they've been split into 2 locations. 
That's what we're assisting with at the moment. Whether we have donations or not, we 
will continue to assist them. Actually the TIFA foundation has supported them through 
Tantri's programs since Medialink was founded. 
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The second group is a study group called 'Arrohmah'. Interestingly, this group was not 
actually initiated by Medialink. It was initiated by the community itself and the 
Lapindo victims who were first affected by the mudslide. The first group, Jimpitan 
Sehat, is located outside the Lapindo dike. The study group, the women, including 
victims of the Lapindo mudslide, are based at the Bakrie dike who haven't been 
resettled yet. 
They were self-initiated then formed an alliance with the Lapindo mudslide victim 
Command Post and now we support them within the framework of information 
utilisation. 
DS  : What is their focus? What exactly is the study group? Do they provide 
education to the community? 
AF  : No, they established the group to establish social security for the disaster 
victims Command Post. We are assisting from the perspective of information access 
and utilisation. With that, they can establish social security including things they can 
claim from the government.  
Now the issue is health insurance. They were removed from the new 'Jaminan 
Keshatan National' (National Health Insurance) scheme database. Because the 
administration was experiencing difficulties, they were spilt all over the place. Their 
new location has not been recorded but their previous location was deleted. So that's 
one example of this project. 
Next, the second focus is advocacy. We are involved in advocacy policy where we see 
we can influence the public's access to information. Medialink has been involved in 
various policies, for example the legislation on the Digital Broadcasting Act.  
DS  : This is new legislation, hey? 
AF  : Yes, then we'll focus on the revised Telecommunications Act. In fact, we 
would also like to bring back the Media Convergence Act. 
DS  : Sorry to interrupt, but does the Digital Broadcasting Act have anything to do 
with the digital television application? 
AF  : Yes, we can discuss that debate later. Then we supported the Convergence 
Act and we have participated from the beginning in setting policy on the protection of 
personal data. The privacy act in Indonesia is called ‘Perlindungan Data Pribadi’ 
(Personal Data Protection). Data protection had been more on the European agenda 
whereas America has something more like a privacy act. So Kominfo (Ministry of 
Communication and Information) together with the UNPAD think tank is setting the 
policy on personal data protection. We are also involved.  
DS  : So is the plan for the Convergence Act to merge with the revised 
Telecommunications Act? Because if you think about it, since the Electronic 
Information and Electronic Transactions Act was implemented, there has been a lot of 
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polemic and the usual stuff from the government, as usual Kominfo (The Ministry of 
Communications and Information) wasn't interested and this is still going on hehehe. 
AF  : Absolutely. The Convergence Act was scrapped by the government because 
it was trivial because various units within Kominfo would be lost or would merge into 
one. In particular, the sections in charge of broadcasting and telecommunications were 
combined into one, what's their acronym again? Anyway it's different now. The PPI 
dan SDPPI (The Directorate General of Postal and Information Services and The 
Directorate General of Resources, Postal Services and Information). I don't know what 
the acronym is, resources and broadcasting providers or what, anyway the main thing 
is that it's about broadcasting infrastructure providers. So broadcasting and 
telecommunications have merged.  
Whereas from a practical business sense, the media in Indonesia in both 
telecommunications and broadcasting has merged, and has already converged based 
on business. The world of broadcasting is also a telecommunications-based industry, 
and also online media which has a business model based on selling data. Data 
providers and Internet service providers. And telecommunications is the same. 
Several telecommunications companies also have online television. So from a practical 
point of view, it's already happened. But since this will be associated with the existence 
of several units within Kominfo and the Broadcasting Commission merger with BRTI 
(Telecommunications Regulatory Board of Indonesia), so there will be a great deal of 
friction in the business sector. They are more comfortable with the status quo, they 
have already made large profits from these incompatible regulations. For example 
there are no regulations on how mobile television is managed. Because from the point 
of view of content, mobile television must be regulated by the Broadcasting Act, but 
the Broadcasting Act does not recognise the term 'mobile television'. In fact, even 
digital television is not covered by the Act.   
DS  : So the Telecommunications Act was actually originally initiated because of 
business as well. Because on one hand we're talking about infrastructural issues and 
the government feels there is no issue with content in the telecommunications industry, 
and that content should be regulated through specific legislation. And as a result, the 
Broadcasting Act and the Electronic Information and Electronic Transactions Act 
appeared. 
AF  : Actually not really. 
DS  : I mean put it this way, it's maybe more usual for the government to make an 
amendment to an article on broadcasting or content, rather than creating new 
legislation which overlaps with the current Telecommunications Act. 
AF  : Because according to the government's framework in the 
Telecommunications Act, radio frequencies are treated differently to broadcasting. In 
telecommunications, frequencies are considered to be property rights which can be 
bought and sold by administrators. For example the case of the AXIS and XL merger. 
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It's only viewed from the perspective of industry monopoly and competition. But 
nobody considered the frequencies which were used by one group of companies. 
Unlike broadcasting, frequencies by rights belong to the public and should be fully 
utilised for the benefit of the public. So when frequencies are leased, the licenses are 
periodically up for review. So when the Indosiar and SCTV merger happened, there 
was uproar, and Kominfo was also in uproar. There are 2 different paradigms within 
Kominfo. So there are 2 different paradigms, and 2 different issues. Frequency 
management is regulated by the Telecommunications Act. So from a legal perspective, 
there is a legal loophole in the SCTV and Indosiar merger. Because the understanding 
of what 'frequency' means within telecommunications is like that. 
So when we hear 'convergence', it is actually about setting these 2 paradigms. There is 
an opportunity for the frequency paradigm to become public property, and this cannot 
be taken lightly. The government is more comfortable with revising the 
Telecommunications Act. It has 160 articles. So if we can't have the convergence 
[legislation], that's because it's already part of the telecommunications [legislation]. 
But we will still be seeking a public ownership of frequencies, managed by the state 
rather than business interests.  
DS  : I'm actually interested in the first focus. There is a kind of community 
empowerment. Like a recognition of the need for information. And more focused on 
marginal groups. Are Medialink's own activities still focused in East Java or are there 
activities in other areas directed towards marginal groups? 
AF  : Our base is expanding in some areas in accordance with their basic needs, 
health. At this time we are shaping information for communities who are able to 
participate based on information from the health sector, in particular the 
implementation of National Health Insurance (NHI). We are focusing on the 
information rather than the medium. Why? Because we don't care about which medium 
is used. For example, by mastering ICT skills. Every kind of medium possible should 
be used. With that choice, we are leaving the community free to chose the medium 
they are most comfortable using.  
You could say that Medialink is not asking the community to use a specific medium, 
but to make use of the mediums there are. Medialink is more focused on how the 
quality of information access suits their needs. For example, in community groups in 
3 regions: Kebumen, Lumajang and Porong. In fact, to participate in the NHI scheme 
is free as contributions are paid by the state.  
DS  : So the NHI card is free? 
AF  : At the moment, all citizens must register for NHI. There are 2 categories, paid 
and free. Those in the paid category must pay the fees, and in the free category the fees 
are paid by the state. Those thought to be poor or marginalised must verify any data 
obtained from information from any source.  
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We are able to manage information, reproduce information, distribute information and 
produce information to be released by using the mass media and the Internet. Then we 
can co-produce. So their information can be adopted by the relevant government 
agencies. So access to information is developing as a catalyst for marginal groups 
when they obtain information with the ability to educate to their group or other groups.  
We are inviting them become aware of the importance of information, the sensitivity 
of information. Until now they have considered information to be something common,  
something just for chatting about, something factual. But information is important you 
know, we are educating them about ways to locate information from the government, 
the mass media and other sources. After you have located the information, what can 
you do with it? We are educating them about disseminating information via their 
internal distribution networks. After locating the information and knowing what their 
needs are, how can they benefit from the existing information to resolve any issues? 
By using information like this, they can even produce information as a way to open 
discourse, to question the government, to vote, they can make use of the mass media. 
This is Taba who's just arrived. This is Devi. 
DS  : Hi, please feel free to join us, just go ahead. 
Sorry, to interrupt, in terms of comparative discourse, it seems to me to be a bit 
pessimistic and cynical when there are individuals who are good but do not have a 
position equal to the government. When they become part of the system, they can't 
fight the system. 
AF  : That's true, and part of the culture, it's clientelism. That's why we are focusing 
on the capacity for equity in the community. Courage isn't just 1 or 2 people, for 
example an informal leader. To be equal is the first prerequisite. The challenges exist 
on multiple levels. 
First of all, a sustainable community. We create a forum or a social medium in a 
community that makes them come together first. Secondly, there is the capacity for 
equity. Even so, we're not able to ensure that the capacity of all community members 
is equal or equivalent. 
And that is what distinguishes us from the dominant discourse based on information 
access. In Western Europe it depends on the individual, in China it has a communal 
basis. In Indonesia the communal originally very much depended on the informal 
leader. One factor that makes a community unsustainable is its dependence on an 
informal leader. Maybe Taba can explain about the events in Porong.  
Then the second challenge is about the level of ability to make use of the media, media 
networks, and the mass media. That's where public relations companies or the 
government fail. 
The third challenge is how they are able to press their demands for their version of 
information to the government, the co-production. We start from the bottom up, which 
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is the easiest way to reach people. From the village, to the health centre or to the sub-
district, then to the Department of Health. 
The fourth challenge, the most difficult, which represents Medialink's aspirations, is 
how they can be connected to each other to develop joint activities. There are some 
communities that are connected to each other. Our  vision is to encompass all of this. 
This is really difficult and long-term and requires awareness from their part, 
internalised within themselves and their communities.  
DS  : If I put myself in their position, to think or realise that every day we need 
information and that information is important, it's not easy. 
AF  : That's why we created the social mediums in these community, there are 
routine meetings which we are forced to hold in which they have to come and talk. 
There is a medium of reciprocal learning with those we assist.  
DS : In the community, are these routine dialogues of a voluntary nature, supported 
by Medialink,  or is it the role of the community to invite local government institutions 
such as neighbourhood and residents associations? 
AF  : At first, this group was formed voluntarily. To enable us to bond we started 
with processing their needs. Medialink did not educate or come to bring a specific 
program but to offer solutions by finding out the information needs of the community. 
What are your problems, and the NHI issue emerged. 
So, some [communities] were in normal regions, where the geographical boundaries 
still existed, where the village government is still there, and the local government 
institutions are involved. In fact, they are forced to demand the village authorities to 
adopt the products that they produce. But we are training them in negotiation skills. 
DS  : Is it happening and has it been successful? 
AF  : In Kebumen there has been lots of success. 
DS  : That's good, it means that all Medialink does is not in vain. 
AF  : Exactly, but the challenge in Kebumen is on 2 levels. In a normal society, the 
challenge is the sustainability of the community.  
DS  : Because they're getting more and more clever? 
AF  : Because they don't need us any more. If it's over, then that's it. 
Taba  : Actually, it's not that they're too clever, but in those communities we always 
believe that there are people who are smart, and those who are not so smart. If the 
movement doesn't begin with levelling capacity beforehand, usually the more capable 
will improve, but the less able will be reluctant to get involved. So we balance or 
equalise capacity first with targeted interventions at local government agencies.  
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DS  : So if you like, we can't just hope that in one group all participants will be at 
the same or similar level. The fact is, it has been and will always be that way. What 
can be done about their sense of belonging? 
AF & : We start with their common needs. 
Taba  
 
AF  : We were successful in Kebumen district where there were several individuals 
who could negotiate with the village authorities and even up to the Department of 
Health. Our task is to help close the gap between the community and these individuals. 
Taba  : Because if it has been experienced elsewhere, it is very likely to happen. For 
example, a participant in Porong was able to speak at the level of the House of 
Representatives in Jakarta. Now the question is how to manage the continuity of the 
process at the community level. On one hand we are considered successful when these 
participants are able to intervene in government policy, but what if the participants 
then move or change their position? Being a government spokesperson means they are 
no longer a spokesperson for the community. 
We can't forbid them to become parliamentary candidates, for example.  
AF  : For example, one of the facilitators that we assisted in Kebumen became a 
guest speaker for the programs disseminated by the Health Department on the NHI 
issue. It completely reversed their position. What we observed in that group was the 
shift in position of the participants. The problem is the gap. In a normal group like that, 
that is the challenge. They're not facing any problems of natural disasters. 
But in the Porong group who were dealing with a natural disaster, the community 
congress was solid precisely because they were facing the problem together. But there 
were still many problems when they had to produce information for the public, the 
media and the government. So it was this vision that we wanted to achieve,  in relation 
to these challenges. So Medialink's strategy leans more towards capacity building 
rather than the technology or the medium. How to build the capacity of the community 
to utilise information. 
DS  : Because the idea is more about community power than individual power. The 
principle itself is empowerment. 
AF  : Yes, but you must also consider that there have been many movements for 
ICT utilisation for communities in Indonesia. For example, Budiman Sudjatmiko's 
'Desa Membangun' (Village Development) movement. You must research that. 
Because that is one way in which ICT must benefit the welfare of the whole 
community. We also have partners in Yogyakarta, Tantri's program, called Infest, 
which is developing information channels for migrant workers so that migrant workers 
are educated about taking advantage of the medium, in information channels. 
Tantri : So it's more about developing this community of migrant workers so that they 
can take advantage of information channels.  
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DS  : Because in the past, advanced technology did not yet exist in Indonesia, so 
we thought the solution was to purchase and implement these technologies in everyday 
life. For example, before there were smartphones, Internet connections were slow, and 
the signals or networks weren't good. But when this technology arrived, we didn't have 
sufficient expertise to use it. 
I read a book about the digital divide a few days ago. Actually, the divide is not only 
about whether or not we have the devices or the infrastructure, but also about the skills 
divide and the cultural divide. 
AF  : Yes that is one of our discoveries. The digital divide exists but also the 
infrastructure is there, but not necessarily utilised. Tantri and I and a few colleagues 
from other NGOs are monitoring the Open Government Partnership (OGP) which was 
initiated by UKP4, in a presidential work group. The open data policy. UKP4 is like a 
delivery unit in the UK. 
We have a pilot project in Indragiri Hulu, Ambon and Central Kalimantan (districts, 
cities and provinces). They are initiating programs with an ICT basis. Like open data, 
open budget, open school. One of the programs is to display the data management of 
BOS (School Operational Assistance) funds on their school website. But the problem 
in Ambon is that Internet access is not that great and the local community are not 
accustomed to accessing information through the Internet. So the only people who 
have access are people from Jakarta and London. How can we make it normal for them 
to access information via the Internet? This is what has become the focus of our 
activities and it's a little different from other movements. Because in the context of an 
information society the technology determinant is strongest, but we are more interested 
in the social influence of technology.  
DS  : This is concerned with cultural aspects. 
AF  : The central point in this debate is a web-based community, which we have 
not yet adopted as it may not be about the technology required by the community, but 
the community's capacity to use information. Any medium will be easily exploited if 
the capacity is there. So we are in close synergy with information capacity. First of all, 
information capacity will increase, and secondly, we are helping to translate technical 
information from the government to communities using language that is easily 
understood. The medium can be anything. What is lacking in Indonesia is this, how to 
utilise the medium of technology or ICT for the public.  
Because for those that already make use of ICT in Indonesian society, they prefer to 
use ICT technology for private benefits rather than public benefits. For example, data 
from the Ministry of Tourism and Creative Economy shows that e-commerce in 
Indonesia hasn't really developed, because we prefer to utilise social media for private 
interests. Facebook is narcissistic, Twitter is also the same. It's for chatting socially not 
for selling or participating in the economy. Economic interests aren't being pushed. It's 
not for the sake of political participation, and there is no economic participation.  
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In practice it's there, but it's still a small proportion. Now there are companies moving 
in that direction, for example PT Djarum bought blibli.com to promote their products. 
Because the Internet has penetrated only 40% of the Indonesian population, the use 
that I would like to see, as a decision-making tool by individuals on a personal level, 
is being achieved using existing mediums rather than new media. People in Porong 
have facebook but only use it only for meeting new people and chatting, not to discuss 
problems in their lives. As Castell said, how can a networked society be built just with 
ICT, because there are still many issues such as access and capacity. 
DS  : They think they have new technology but do not think about how to use it 
optimally.  
AF  : That's why we focus on the issue of capacity. We're shaping the community. 
We are injecting their capacity to produce and reproduce information. Capacity in co-
production with information from government agencies. And capacity connects 
communities, from the highest level to those who are struggling. That is what we have 
facilitated, we have assisted to build the inter-group medium, but it's not being utilised.  
DS  : Maybe it's for the long term. After facilitation and initiation, continuity of 
community programs must be the next step.  
AF  : The government should be doing 2 types of equalisation, first equity in 
infrastructural capacity, and second, equity in information access capacity. In fact the 
government could if they wanted to, with the use of the Universal Service Obligation 
Fund (USO) for MPLIK (Sub-district Mobile Internet Service Providers) activities. 
DS   : If I'm not mistaken, the government is not contributing to supporting 
infrastructure, and is focused more towards private industry because the private 
sector's business interests are in infrastructure. The funds that the USO originally came 
from were private, in this case from  PT TELKOM and INDOSAT, and were for their 
obligations in implement the activities of the USO. It said in the news that their 
contract will end in 2015, is that what will happen? I am pessimistic that the 
government will take over the role in the USO obligations.  
AF  : The government has already earned a great deal of profit from 
telecommunications businesses by selling frequencies and data usage in Indonesia. 
PLIK and MPLIK are also not working, as they are project-based.  
DS  : I've also been researching government programs and Kominfo: PLIK MPLIK 
by involving students. We want to know what the Kominfo initiative is in this program 
but it turns out there are a lot of big question marks. When we obtained a lot of data 
about areas in Banten, it was PLIK and MPLIK who received it. In fact it turns out that 
many of the PLIK and MPLIK projects don't really exist, there is only a banner or sign 
to say PLIK and MPLIK are here. Even one of our interview respondents did not 
understand that this was a continuing program, and could think of it only as a handout 
or a grant. 
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AF  : One of the problems with Kominfo is that they are so focused on 
infrastructure. Kominfo have scrapped programs that build community institutional 
capacity. We are urging them to adopt the model that we are using as a process of 
institutional capacity building. Within Kominfo there are several directorates. For this 
issue we are working in partnership with the Director General of Public Information 
and Communications, Freddy Tulung. His response has been good. But getting it into 
policy, that is still a difficult challenge.  
DS  : And from the community, has the response been completely positive, have 
they helped? 
AF  : Yes, especially in Porong, in the region where there was the disaster, because 
it suited their needs. But in normal regions, we are still a little hesitant. We had an 
assumption that marginal groups would be easier than normal groups because of their 
needs, they know the benefits and the benefits are tangible. Our assumption was right 
hey Taba, that information groups would be more sustainable in marginal groups than 
in normal groups? 
Taba  : Thus far our hypotheses has been right. 
DS  : But the hypothesis still needs to be proven.  
AF  : To know the benefits of information, consider for example that information 
is like the oxygen we need to breath, so we will always need information. 
DS  : Maybe they still don't think that way, it hasn't captured their imagination. 
AF  : Or as Tantri would say, their 'code'. 
Taba  : We believe that if society is not yet capable, it's because the community has 
a different radar. 
Tantri : Society has a different code in understanding technology and progress. So it's 
not a question of which society is more advanced and which ones aren't.  
Taba  : The mistake is to think that those who don't understand ICT are pro-progress. 
AF  : That is why we always focus on the benefit of information and not on the 
medium. Because when we're communicating we are educating about how to take 
advantage of the medium. 
Taba  : In the communities that we assist, they have differing patterns of information 
dissemination.  
AF  : We have ended our project in Wonosobo.  
Taba  : In Lumajang, they prefer to use forums and notice boards. The newsletters 
are still in circulation but there is a low level of readership. When they have a gathering 
they can chat and tell stories together, you know? Reading is a personal practice, you 
know?  
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DS  : Like in Semarang, in front of the Suara Merdeka newspaper offices there is a 
copy of the newspaper mounted inside a glass board so that people gather to read and 
discuss the news with each other. 
Taba  : Yes, exactly. People who gather then talk about what's happening, there's a 
discussion. 
DS  : I've been very lucky to get so much information. According to my schedule 
I'll be conducting fieldwork in March. 
Tantri : The issue of connection is very important, I really think it's influential. So 
true. Like in Japan where Internet penetration is 4 x higher than in Indonesia. It will 
greatly affect our daily activities. 
Taba  : But what about in Sabah and Serawak in Malaysia, is there fast connection 
there as well? 
DS  : The question of connection is a technical problem which I believe we will 
overcome in Indonesia although I don't know when. But the problems of skills and the 
cultural divide is more important in my opinion. Likewise with infrastructure, it's a 
technical problem which we overcame, we are now in-tune with the latest technology. 
We can already make use of technology and the information it brings with it better. 
AF  : Actually in Indonesia we have the technology, Internet penetration is 40%, 
only nothing has really happened. 
Tantri : According to Nugroho's dissertation, the situation in Indonesia isn't 
complicated, even NGOs in Indonesia in 2009 just relied on email and mailing lists. 
Simple applications that don't need a large Internet connection capacity have already 
produced positive movements for positive change. Whereas now there are more 
complex applications like facebook and Instagram, but the movements for change 
aren't there. 
DS  : Because if you've already moved geographical location as a shortcut, or 
you've moved house to get access to the best information there could possibly be, how 
can the problem of skills and the cultural divide we were talking about earlier, in 
particular where utilising information can't be guaranteed to improve, be overcome?  
Tantri : If we apply this Indonesia we can't overcome the problem if we just think 
about skills and cultural aspects, we should think about all aspects including technical 
and infrastructural aspects. In western countries, where there are cities and the tools 
are already available and the system is made so we can search for information, debate 
is more about the value of the information, if it's true or not, valid or not. Whereas in 
Indonesia, we don't have any of this hehe. The equipment is there but there is no signal, 
the information is there but it's not valued either. 
For instance in London, information is available anywhere, as provided by the 
government. For example, the ticketing system for public transport forces the public 
to make use of information. In parliament, the debate is already on more 'adult' issues. 
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There is even a system to enable members of parliament to meet with their 
constituents. With these methods, through the system, I think it creates a more 
conducive atmosphere. But in Indonesia, if we want to connect it can't be through half-
measures. 
If we look at OGP, their focus is on the medium, because Indonesia is categorised as 
a Third World country, developed countries are categorised as First World countries. 
So developed countries are imposing their programs on the Third World. And Third 
World countries are forced to implement their programs by approaching conditions in 
developed countries. Donor programs from western countries have yet to recognise the 
psychographics of the community, particularly in rural areas. The medium is not 
available, and the programs are even Jakarta based. 
AF  : Because the system in Indonesia is different, the culture is different, like the 
experience in Jakarta International Airport where announcements or information are 
available but the public prefers the information to be read out and announced over the 
PA system. In our society, the habit of searching out information is rare. The culture 
is different from developed countries.  
Taba  : So hearing something is more convincing than reading it. 
AF  : If that's the case, why not move from that point, now what is needed is how 
people can utilise information not how people can utilise the medium. The question of 
what the medium is, that's for society to decide. Nowadays smartphones are ubiquitous 
but what people want to use them for is up to them. I am still comfortable with having 
social gatherings and residents association meetings in my home every Saturday night, 
for example.  
For example, I ran focus discussion groups in Ambon so they could get to know the 
OGP.  The response of one the women's communities there was: Oh, I only just found 
out that the Ambon City Government was so advanced and had website, but don't 
confuse us with access problems, it's enough for us just to use our usual way. I asked, 
what is your usual way? Using a mobile information van. Because they (OGP) will 
have an advanced program in Ambon to build a web-based community at the village 
level. And what's crazier still, is that people in Ambon who can meet face-to-face are 
being told to use the web. 
Tantri : From face-to-face to being told to use that medium? It's forcing them really. 
AF  : Actually if you listened to the input from the focus groups, they wanted to 
increase the number of mobile information vans. How could they decrease the 
number? Secondly, the character of Indonesian society is that people are happier about 
the existence of government publications if they are distributed proactively without 
the community having to ask. If society is told to ask for it, how's that going to work? 
This is related to global ICT policies now like open data, which is interpreted in 
Indonesia as the presence of a website. ICT has not been interpreted as changes to the 
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culture of bureaucracy, proactive disclosure, or opening information channels 
proactively. 
The Keluarga Berencana (Family Planning) program used to be great, information 
came to the village using mobile information vans. In Ambon it is even now still a part 
of the collective consciousness. I remember it from when I was little. There were films 
followed by explanation/clarification.  
So in fact information channels which allow the government to get closer to the 
community do not create gaps, as opposed to a medium which creates a gap in society 
such as the web. 
DS  : Because in time, once the community understands the need for information 
and becomes familiar with new mediums there will no longer be problems, it will be 
easier to adopt and adapt.  
AF  : Yes, because thus far we haven't been accustomed to using information via 
ICT. So far, development has only followed only the interests of the market, it hasn't 
been socially engineered by the government.  
On a global scale, there has been a blossoming in the non-English Internet. The Internet 
is currently mostly US based. In other sectors there has been growth in the Internet in 
accordance with the context in which the Internet is being applied.  
The pitfalls of Internet for Community are still there, but not so for society's capacity 
to write down its experiences on the web. Like the case of migrant workers, their ability 
to write improved rather than the continuity of capacity within the community. The 
hypothesis is that the community will be sustainable if it can produce and reproduce 
information itself. In Porong the strongest thing was the community, not the production 
of information. In Kebumen they are at the information production stage, but the gap 
between individuals is so wide that the community's existence is threatened. That 
participant [we talked about] could go anywhere, but he had left his community 
behind. He travelled around the district to disseminate information about the NHI 
scheme, he became a midwifery advocate too.  
Tantri : When people begin to appreciate the value of information, if they understand 
the problem, then the character for participating in evaluating that information will 
emerge.  
AF  : Yes, that's why we focus on communities. 
DS  : Culturally we are communal. 
AF  : Yes, that's true, so why not exploit what is already good, the communal 
approach. The evaluation will be about whether the community is sustainable or if it 
will disappear. 
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Appendix 5 UU ITE 
 
Electronic Information and Electronic Transactions Act 
 
SECTION VII 
PROHIBITED ACTIONS 
 
Article 27 
 
(1) Intentionally and without the right distributing and/or transmitting and/or 
making Electronic Information and/or Electronic Documents with indecent 
content accessible. 
 
(2) Intentionally and without the right distributing and/or transmitting and/or 
making Electronic Information and/or Electronic Documents with content on 
gambling available. 
 
(3) Intentionally and without the right distributing and/or transmitting and/or 
making offensive and/or defamatory Electronic Information and/or Electronic 
Documents accessible. 
 
(4) Intentionally and without the right distributing and/or transmitting and/or 
making Electronic Information and/or Electronic Documents containing 
extortions or threats accessible. 
 
Article 28 
 
(1) Intentionally and without the right disseminating false and misleading 
information which results in consumer harm during Electronic Transactions. 
 
(2) Intentionally and without the right disseminating information intended to 
incite hatred or hostility towards an individual and/or specific groups of 
people based on their tribal, religious, racial, and intergroup identity. 
 
Article 29 
 
Intentionally and without the right transmitting Electronic Information and/or 
Electronic Documents containing personally addressed threats of violence or 
intimidation.  
 
Article 30 
 
(1) Intentionally and without the right unlawfully accessing Computers and/or 
Electronic Systems that belong to others by any means. 
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(2) Intentionally and without the right unlawfully accessing Computers and/or 
Electronic Systems by any means with the intent to obtain Electronic 
Information and/or Electronic Documents. 
 
(3) Intentionally and without the right unlawfully accessing Computers and/or 
Electronic Systems by any means by breaking through, breaching, bypassing, 
or infiltrating the security system. 
 
Article 31 
 
(1) Intentionally and without the right unlawfully intercepting or tapping 
Electronic Information and/or Electronic Documents from a Computer and/or 
specific Electronic System belonging to another party. 
 
(2) Intentionally and without the right unlawfully intercepting the transmission of 
Electronic Information and/or Electronic Documents not intended for public 
use, from, to, and within a Computer and/or specific Electronic System 
belonging to another party, regardless of whether this causes changes to, 
omissions in, and/or deletion of the Electronic Information and/or Electronic 
Documents being transmitted. 
 
(3) Aside from interception as intended in paragraph (1) and paragraph (2) 
above, interception may be carried out within the framework of law 
enforcement at the request of police, prosecution, and/or other law 
enforcement institutions as defined under the law. 
 
(4) Further provisions regarding the procedures for interception as intended in 
paragraph (3) are regulated in accordance with government regulations. 
 
Article 32 
 
(1) Intentionally and without the right unlawfully altering, adding, removing, 
transmitting, damaging, losing, moving, or hiding Electronic Information 
and/or Electronic Documents belonging another party or the public by any 
means. 
 
(2) Intentionally and without the right unlawfully moving or transferring 
Electronic Information and/or Electronic Documents to an Electronic System 
of an unauthorised person by any means. 
 
(3) The actions referred to in paragraph (1) resulting in confidential Electronic 
Information and/or Electronic Documents becoming publicly accessible and 
threatening the integrity of the data. 
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Article 33 
 
Intentionally and without the right or unlawfully engaging in any kind of activity 
which may result in disruption to Electronic Systems and/or cause Electronic Systems 
to malfunction. 
 
Article 34 
 
(1) Intentionally and without the right or unlawfully producing, selling, trading, 
using, importing, distributing, providing or possessing: 
 
a) Computer hardware or software specifically designed or developed to 
facilitate acts as referred to in Article 27 to Article 33; 
 
b) Computer passwords, access codes or similar that are intended to 
allow access to  Electronic Systems for the purpose of facilitating acts 
as referred to in Articles 27 to 33. 
 
(2) An act as referred to in paragraph (1) is not a criminal offence if its purpose is 
to lawfully conduct research, to test an Electronic System, or to protect the 
Electronic System itself. 
 
Article 35 
 
Intentionally and without the right or unlawfully manipulating, creating, changing, 
deleting or destroying Electronic Information and/or Electronic Documents with the 
intent to create the appearance of authentic data. 
 
 
SECTION XI 
CRIMINAL PROVISIONS 
 
Article 45 
 
(1)  Persons convicted of criminal actions as intended in Article 27 paragraphs 
(1), (2), (3) or (4) shall be imprisoned for a maximum of 6 (six) years and/or 
be fined a maximum of IDR 1,000,000,000 (one billion Indonesian Rupiah). 
 
(2) Persons convicted of criminal actions as intended in Article 28 paragraphs (1) 
or (2) shall be imprisoned for a maximum of 6 (six) years and/or be fined a 
maximum of IDR 1,000,000,000 (one billion Indonesian Rupiah). 
 
(3) Persons convicted of criminal actions as intended in Article 29 shall be 
imprisoned for a maximum of 12 (twelve) years and/or be fined a maximum 
of IDR 2,000,000,000 (two billion Indonesian Rupiah). 
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SECTION XII 
TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS 
 
Article 53 
 
At the time of the enactment of this Act, all Legislation and institutional regulations 
regarding Information Technology that are not contrary to this Act are declared to 
remain valid. 
 
SECTION XIII 
CLOSING PROVISIONS 
 
Article 54 
 
(1) This Act shall take effect on the date of enactment. 
 
(2) Government Regulations shall be stipulated no later than 2 (two) years from 
the date of enactment of this Act.  
 
(3) For the public record, this Act shall be published in the State Gazette of the 
Republic of Indonesia. 
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